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Supervisor:  Thomas M. Hunt 
 
This study investigates the suitability of applying international relations theory, 
specifically international regime theory, to Olympic sport governance. The reliance of the 
Olympic governance system upon its conception of sport as a politically transcendent 
source of moral inspiration and the importance of this ideology to political actors can be 
used to accurately classify it as an international regime or institution. Two outcomes 
derive from this argument. First, the Olympic regime recognizes states as free riders and 
allows them to accrue benefits from association with Olympic sport without bearing any 
of the costs of providing it. This makes the Olympics an especially appealing target for 
state political manipulation. Second, the regime is relatively unable to enforce any of its 
rules for state behavior not because it is weak or lacking in legitimacy, but because its 
ideological principles make enforcement impossible. The arguments advanced in the first 
section of the dissertation are supported by empirical case studies in the second. 
Historical process tracing methods are used to synthesize historical narrative with causal 
analysis. The decision to ban South Africa at the 1968 Summer Olympics, the 1980 U.S.-
led boycott of the Summer Games in Moscow, and the development of the International 
Convention against Doping in Sport are all instances in which the Olympic movement 
and international politics intersected, and thus represent useful illustrations of the 
relationship between the Olympic regime and international politics. 
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 1 
Introduction 
This study is nominally about sport and politics. That a relationship between the 
two exists at all is commonly accepted as true, especially among researchers and authors 
who specialize in this area. This collective acknowledgement is itself quite noteworthy, 
as much past (and some contemporary) scholarship treats the sport-politics connection as 
surprising or counterintuitive; many authors presume readers will be astonished that sport 
and politics do, in fact, “mix”. However, sport’s role in this relationship is too often 
misunderstood (to say nothing of the relationship itself). Sport is consistently and 
mistakenly treated as existing at either one of two philosophical extremes. One 
conception of sport portrays it as inherently “good” but nonetheless corruptible; it can 
only fail to be a positive moral force when we humans fail in one way or another to 
adhere to the unassailable principles of true sport. It is this notion that views any 
connection between sport and politics as unnecessary and probably harmful to sport. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, sport is treated as a value-neutral social practice. This 
perspective views sport as produced by and reflective of its societal context. Sport’s 
goodness is relative to its ability to achieve whatever ends desired of it by society. In this 
sense, sport is a social or political instrument, wielded by various actors at various times 
to achieve goals largely external to sport.1 Depending on one’s perspective, the 
relationship between sport and politics can thus take on very different meanings and can 
be evaluated in very different ways. What these views have in common, however, is their 
                                                 
1 Juxtaposing conceptions of sport in this way is derivative of a larger and significantly more nuanced 
ongoing debate in sport philosophy. A well-articulated middle ground between these two positions, as well 
as accessible summaries of each, can be found in William J. Morgan, “Broad Internalism, Deep 
Conventions, Moral Entrepreneurs, and Sport,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 39, no. 1 (2012): 65-
100. An equally compelling response is Scott Kretchmar, “Pluralistic Internalism,” Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport (2014), doi: 10.1080/00948705.2014.911101. 
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treatment of sport as a fixed concept. Whether inherently good or inherently vacuous, 
sport, in its most elemental state, is unchanging. 
I take a decidedly different approach to conceptualizing sport. Rather than 
lamenting the “intrusion” of politics into sport or expressing superficial astonishment at 
the existence of a connection between these two phenomena, this dissertation advances a 
theory of sport and politics that reassesses sport’s influential, perhaps even causal role in 
shaping political choices and behavior. Sport is both possessive of inherent values and 
contingent upon the context in which it exists. Because sport is not a fixed construct 
(neither empty vessel nor moral beacon), its ability to have an impact on our lives is 
shaped to a significant degree by those who create and, on a larger scale, govern sport. In 
other words, those who exert control over sport—its constitutive and regulative rules, its 
administrative apparatus, the values it explicitly or implicitly symbolizes—are able to 
influence what sport is and what sport will do. 
A trivial example illustrates this point. If, one day, I ask my friend to join me for a 
game of tennis, it is entirely up to us, both individually and collectively, to decide how 
the game will proceed and what meanings or lessons (if any) we draw from it. If we are 
both highly skilled, we might adhere very closely to rules of play set forth by some 
governing body and observe other strict protocols that will guide our conduct and 
behavior. Further, the game might be considered a reliable indicator of which one of us is 
the superior player; if we are not particularly close friends (or if one has recently 
wronged the other in some way), we may even end up being quite competitive with or 
hostile toward one another. However, if we are not that skilled, or simply not feeling that 
spirited, we might create a more relaxed atmosphere for ourselves, in which rule 
adherence is not as important and the outcome not quite so reflective of our relative 
abilities. In both cases, note that both the structure of the match and the meanings drawn 
 3 
from it are left entirely up to the two people responsible for making the match possible in 
the first place. If we consider instead that all the available courts are occupied by a large 
tennis tournament organized by a local sport club (and our only option, if we want to play 
at all, is to enter the tournament), the locus of control shifts. Instead of the players getting 
to decide the rules, the intensity and pace of play, and so forth, these decisions now rest 
with the organizing club. If my friend and I are in a non-competitive mood, we may find 
our participation in the tournament (assuming we are allowed entry) quickly ended. 
Moreover, if the club is part of some larger network of tennis organizations, the level of 
institutional control becomes even greater and more diffuse. The only choice left up to 
the players is simply whether or not to participate. 
What this rudimentary example shows is that when considering what sport is and 
what sport does with regard to politics, governance matters. Again, because sport is not a 
rigid concept, those who exert control over sport (whether individuals or institutions) are 
responsible for determining its outcomes and consequences. I am not suggesting that this 
control is absolute or that sport’s utility is unlimited. As a mode of human performance, 
sport still possesses unique characteristics that distinguish it from other sets of behaviors. 
Rather, my point is that the ability to at least partially define sport’s essence and utility is 
accompanied by a certain level of accountability when it comes to both the positive and 
negative effects of sport upon other areas of life. If the local sport club in the above 
example finds the number of tennis players in its membership dwindling, it may want to 
reconsider the extent to which it emphasizes competitive tennis relative to more 
recreational forms of the sport. By the same token, if another of the club’s sport programs 
fails to achieve some desired external objective (like reducing crime or childhood 
obesity) the club may not be entirely at fault, at least in terms of implementation. That is, 
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it is possible that characteristics intrinsic to sport may have rendered it an ineffective 
device regardless of how well or poorly the program was managed. 
These brief forays into sport philosophy and the relevance of governance to the 
study of organized sport may seem a bit odd or needlessly abstract. But, assuming the 
premises introduced above are true (that sport, while containing unique inherent 
characteristics, is also socially constructed and that, with regard to the latter point, 
governing entities exert a special type of control over sport’s form and purpose), it 
becomes clear that they are essential to this study, as they imply that the relationship 
between sport and politics is symbiotic, not unidirectional. In other words, political 
behavior in relation to sport is not necessarily corruptive, nor does sport exist in political 
contexts as merely an instrument to be manipulated. These cases are certainly true some 
of the time, but to accept them as the only possible manifestations of the sport-politics 
relationship wrongly excludes the array of effects that sport can have on political 
behavior. If, as I have argued, the effects of sport upon other areas of life are largely 
dependent upon the way in which it is governed, then it seems quite reasonable and 
appropriate to concentrate upon sport governance in the study of sport and politics.2 
In making the case for sport governance as the key to studying and understanding 
the relationship between sport and politics, the Olympic movement seems an intuitively 
suitable subject for such investigation. The Olympic games are perhaps the most visibly 
political sport form in the world. Their emphasis on national symbolism and 
representation coupled with the Olympic movement’s quasi-political objectives for sport 
(e.g., the promotion of global peace and respect for cultural differences) contrast starkly 
                                                 
2 Barrie Houlihan makes a similar argument with regard to international sport organizations. However, he 
focuses primarily on the instrumentality of sport vis-à-vis politics and sees the function of sport governance 
as mostly delimiting the scope of sport’s political uses. See Barrie Houlihan, Sport and International 
Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 55-81. 
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with a corresponding fear of and utter disdain for being exploited by states or other 
political actors. Situated at the heart of these diametrically opposed positions is a system 
of governance that can accurately be described as undemocratic, lacking transparency, 
and historically corrupt. It is relatively clear that the Olympics are highly politicized and 
the governing organizations of the Olympic movement are political entities. What 
remains misunderstood are the particular ways in which the nature of Olympic 
governance and Olympic sport enable or encourage certain types of political behavior. 
In this study, I advance a comprehensive argument in support of applying 
international relations theory to the study of Olympic governance. Specifically, I contend 
that both rational choice and constructivist regime theories can, in different ways, account 
for the role of Olympic governance in international politics. In making this argument, my 
primary objective is to show how international relations theory can provide an 
explanatory link between the contradictory logic of Olympism (which sees sport as 
politically useful yet transcendent of politics) and problematic outcomes; namely, the 
consistent politicization of Olympic sport by states and the inability of Olympic 
administrators to govern effectively. 
The remainder of this dissertation is split into two sections. The first focuses on 
theory. In the first chapter I demonstrate the plausibility of explaining the political role of 
Olympic governance in terms of international regime theory. The second chapter contains 
a review of the relevant literature. In the third chapter, I explain the methodology used in 
providing empirical support for my arguments. The second section is devoted to 
empirical case studies which are used to demonstrate regime theory’s utility as an 
explanatory framework, as well as to identify its limits and potential boundary conditions. 
Finally, I offer some concluding remarks on this study’s contribution to future research 
and to the field of sport management more generally. 
 6 
SECTION I: THEORY AND METHODS 
In this section I explore the relevance of international relations theory to Olympic 
governance. Specifically, I advance an argument in support of not only its relevance but 
its accuracy in explaining how the configuration of Olympic governance, combined with 
the normative claims Olympic administrators make about sport, produce specific 
outcomes. In Chapter 1, I characterize Olympic governance as a type of international 
political regime, comprised of loosely associated national and international organizations 
which are collectively responsible for governing Olympic sport. The assumption, 
confirmed by a growing body of research, that international sport is inherently political is 
the fundamental premise on which this argument is constructed. Because the IOC 
strongly asserts its position as the sole authority over Olympic sport, it follows that the 
organization is thus responsible for the political effects achieved by and through sport. By 
describing Olympic governance as an international regime, I attempt to show how the 
inherent characteristics of Olympic governance produce suboptimal outcomes for the 
regime. Additionally, the literature review explains how this conception of Olympic 
governance addresses significant gaps in current knowledge and contributes to a deeper 
understanding thereof. The final chapter in this section reviews the methodology and 
methods used to provide empirical support for the claims made in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 1:  Regime Theory and Olympic Governance 
Because this study attempts to develop a theoretical link between Olympic 
governance and politics, a reasonable first step might be to decide how exactly the 
concept of “politics” should be specified. After all, this term is suggestive of a number of 
different areas on which one might focus: international relations, domestic politics, issues 
of social justice and human rights, or even the internal power dynamics of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC). For many reasons, this study will limit its 
conception of “politics” to international relations. First, the Olympic movement is, by 
design, an international phenomenon. Although its founder Pierre de Coubertin had 
domestic (specifically, French) political interests in mind when he first involved himself 
in amateur sport, the Olympics’ emphasis on national representation and their view of 
sport as a force for peace are indicative of their international disposition. Second, 
scholarship concerning the politics of the Olympic movement focuses (explicitly or 
implicitly) on international relations, particularly on the ways in which nation-states use 
the Olympics for foreign policy purposes. Third (and assuming the first two reasons are 
valid), concepts borrowed from international relations theory can provide at least a 
starting point for explaining the Olympic governance system’s international political 
status and function. That is, if the Olympics are an international political entity and 
“matter” to international relations, the robust theoretical literature in this area ought to be 
able to at least partially account for or explain Olympic governance. 
Just as narrowing the scope of “politics” to the study of international relations is 
necessary to gain conceptual clarity, so too is it important to bring the idea of “Olympic 
governance” into sharper focus in order to conduct a more compelling analysis. In order 
to accomplish this task, two assumptions about the Olympic governance system must be 
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validated: first, that such a system exists and can be empirically identified and second, 
that it can, at least for the purposes of this study, be considered a unitary actor. That is, 
the Olympic governance system, though it is comprised of many different individuals, 
groups, and organizations, can nonetheless be described as a single entity. Clarifying the 
nature and structure of Olympic governance is fundamental to the core argument of this 
study, which relies on these two assumptions in order to characterize Olympic 
governance as an international regime. 
The idea of an “Olympic system” is not new.1 However, it is a concept that is at 
best ambiguous, especially given the diffuse and sometimes clandestine nature of its 
constituent organizations. If the objective here is to establish that a system of governance 
does indeed exist, it is probably best to begin with identifying what is exactly is being 
governed. To this end, two definitions are of note, both contained in the Olympic Charter. 
This document defines “Olympism” as: 
a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of 
body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks 
to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good 
example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical 
principles.2 
It goes on to define the “Olympic Movement” as: 
the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out under the 
supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by 
the values of Olympism. It covers the five continents. It reaches its peak with the 
                                                 
1 Richard Espy, in The Politics of the Olympic Games (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1979), refers repeatedly to an “Olympic system”. A more recent descriptive analysis which uses the term 
prominently is Jean-Loup Chappelet and Brenda Kübler-Mabbott, The International Olympic Committee 
and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport (London: Routledge, 2008). Paavo Seppänen, 
“The Olympics: A Sociological Perspective,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 19, no. 2 
(1984): 113-127, takes the additional step of building an analysis around the notion that the Olympic 
system can be considered a unitary actor. 
2 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter: In Force as From 9 September 2013 (Lausanne: 
International Olympic Committee, 2013): 11. 
<http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf> (accessed July 31, 2014). 
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bringing together of the world’s athletes at the great sports festival, the Olympic 
Games. Its symbol is five interlaced rings.3 
Fundamentally, Olympism is the motivational force which makes possible all things 
Olympic. Indeed, the Olympic Charter from which these definitions are drawn is defined 
in its own pages as “the codification of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism.”4 
Correspondingly, and as evinced by the second definition above, the Olympic Movement 
is simply the totality of observable actions taken by individuals or groups that claim to be 
inspired by Olympism. 
While Olympism is foundational to all other Olympic phenomena, the way in 
which the Olympic movement is defined is much more helpful in the search for a 
practical definition of an Olympic governance system.5 First, the Olympic movement is 
defined as actual behavior, making it a much more suitable target for governance than an 
idea or philosophy. Second, this aggregation of behavior is, by definition, “carried out 
under the supreme authority of the IOC”. What this suggests, then, is that the IOC 
governs the Olympic movement, which can be restated as the IOC governs all actions 
undertaken in the spirit of Olympism. While the IOC claims to govern an entire subset of 
ideologically-motivated behavior, it seems simultaneously impractical (if not impossible) 
that one organization would be able to accomplish this feat. Moreover, it still does not 
provide the necessary detail to demonstrate that a system of governance actually exists. 
The mechanism by which the IOC asserts authority over the Olympic movement 
is a system of official recognition.6 The IOC alone possesses the ability to formally 
acknowledge that organizations, especially international sport federations (IFs) and 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Stylistically, I avoid capitalizing nouns used in conjunction with the term “Olympic” (e.g., “movement”, 
“governance”, “games”), except when these terms are used in this way in a directly cited source. 
6 IOC, Olympic Charter, 18. 
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national Olympic Committees (NOCs), are members of the Olympic movement.7 Such 
recognition does not, however, imply that these organizations are wholly subservient to 
the IOC. In fact, the Olympic Charter explicitly recognizes the importance of national 
and international sport organizations’ independence: 
Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports 
organisations within the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations 
of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, 
determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right 
of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring 
that principles of good governance be applied.8 
What this preservation of sovereignty suggests is that the IOC is not in the business of 
establishing an international sport hierarchy, nor is it entirely responsible for the actions 
of organizations belonging to the Olympic movement. While this helps to delimit the 
scope of the IOC’s authority with regard to other sport organizations, it also raises the 
question of what, exactly, remains to be governed within the Olympic movement. 
To understand the nature of Olympic governance, it is important to understand 
and acknowledge the type of authority the IOC exerts. The organization is not interested 
in creating a vast bureaucracy to govern all aspects of international sport, nor is it 
particularly concerned with (in fact, it is in most cases vehemently opposed to) 
influencing sport at the national level. The IOC, rather, traffics in ideology. This is 
evident in the logic through which it positions itself at the forefront of a philosophical 
movement (i.e., the IOC governs the movement which is in turn a manifestation of the 
philosophy). Though the IOC calls Olympism a “philosophy of life”, this set of principles 
                                                 
7 For a more complete description of these as well as other important organizations in the Olympic 
movement, see the glossary appended to this study. 
8 IOC, Olympic Charter, 11. 
 11 
also forms the basis for a normative conception of sport.9 Essentially, the IOC exerts 
authority over an idea, and its most basic governance function is to determine whether the 
actions and behaviors of Olympic movement members are compliant with the Olympic 
Charter and by extension, with the principles of Olympism. 
As a system of governance, the Olympic system can be described as a coalition of 
relatively autonomous private organizations which agree to comply with the principles of 
Olympism as established by the IOC in exchange for recognition as members of the 
Olympic movement. Fundamentally, each party to this transaction gives and receives 
credibility. The IOC’s claim to be the central governing authority of the abstraction it 
identifies as “Olympism” is supported by the Olympic movement’s membership, who in 
turn, through official IOC recognition, receive the benefits of public association with the 
movement’s noble ideals (to say nothing of the commercial payoffs stemming from these 
values’ marketability). So., while the IOC’s authority over other members of the Olympic 
movement is quite limited, it exists nonetheless. More importantly, the existence of this 
authority supports the notion that a system of Olympic governance and the nature of such 
governance can be clearly identified. 
Having established the existence of an Olympic governance system rooted in the 
concept of Olympism as well as the authority of the IOC to interpret and police behavior 
relative to this concept, the second assumption foundational to this study is that the 
Olympic governance system can be accurately described as a unitary actor. This is not to 
suggest that the Olympic system is a unitary actor in the ontological sense; the analysis 
up to this point very clearly acknowledges that the members of this system maintain a 
good deal of autonomy and that the IOC’s authority over the Olympic movement is 
                                                 
9 This normative view of sport is adduced more fully in the Olympic Charter’s description of the IOC’s 
mission and role which, unsurprisingly, lists the promotion of Olympism as the organization’s fundamental 
task. See Ibid., 16. 
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limited in scope. Rather, the characterization of the Olympic governance system as a 
single entity is driven by theoretical necessity. The primary objective of this study is to 
identify the ways in which international relations theory (specifically, regime theory) can 
account for the role of Olympic sport in international politics. To this end, the 
classification of the Olympic governance system as an international regime inherently 
relies upon the idea that “the regime” can be grammatically referred to in the singular 
form. Doing so is motivated partly by convenience, but is also rooted in the idea that the 
disparate components of the Olympic governance system (or any governance system) 
have enough in common that they can be considered collectively while still maintaining a 
foothold in empirical reality. This aggregative practice is not specific to the field of 
international relations or even to academic scholarship. We typically refer to 
organizations, governments, and other types of groups as singular actors, even while 
recognizing that they are comprised of individuals and subgroups of individuals. Further, 
the interrelation of these components is often highly complex. It is possible to 
acknowledge this complexity while still attributing behavior to the larger, unified 
collective.10 
Although subsuming complex parts under the unitary actor assumption is fairly 
common, it is still important to show that this assumption holds for Olympic governance. 
Obviously, describing the Olympic governance system as a unitary actor means that a 
good deal of nuance and intricacy is assumed away; the complex dynamics of 
interpersonal and interorganizational relationships within the Olympic movement are 
                                                 
10 That the practice of identifying large, complex groups as unitary actors is commonplace does not 
necessarily settle the issue of whether doing so is the best way of conducting an analysis. Such a 
pronouncement is driven partly by epistemological commitments as well as by the nature of the question 
being posed. On these concerns, especially on how different levels of analysis (i.e., different conceptions of 
the same scenario) can produce varying conclusions, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2
nd
 ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). 
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intentionally disregarded. The issue is whether this loss of detail will fundamentally 
undermine the analysis, which in turn suggests that such a determination must be made 
within the context of this particular study. Given that the focus here is on the relationship 
between Olympic sport and international politics, I contend that considering the Olympic 
governance system as a unified entity is appropriate. This is because, as I will more 
specifically demonstrate in subsequent sections, the political relevance of Olympic sport 
is primarily linked to a normative conception of sport derivative of Olympism, which 
sees sport as serving noble, quasi-political purposes, emphasizes the necessity of national 
representation in competition, and rejects any sort of governmental involvement. As the 
preceding discussion has shown, these issues are the IOC’s main concerns and the 
province of its authority. If it can be assumed that the members of the Olympic 
movement cede authority to the IOC in matters involving the nature of Olympic sport 
(i.e., what Olympic sport is or is not, and what Olympic sport should or should not be), 
and that the nature of Olympic sport is what makes it politically attractive to international 
actors, then the IOC can reliably be considered as acting as a representative of the entire 
Olympic movement within the international political arena. Again, this line of reasoning 
should not be construed as a total discounting of the internal workings of Olympic 
governance or an assertion of the IOC’s absolute preeminence in all areas of international 
sport. Rather, it is simply a demonstration of the usefulness and appropriateness of using 
the unitary actor heuristic in analyzing the relationship between Olympic governance and 
international politics. 
Having established the validity of assuming that the Olympic movement can be 
described as a system of governance with the IOC as its central authority and that this 
system can be considered a unitary actor relative to the broader international political 
environment, the task of linking Olympic governance to international relations theory can 
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proceed. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that the Olympic governance system 
can be characterized as an international regime or institution. Based on this 
characterization, I discuss the seemingly perpetual politicization of the Olympics in terms 
of two problematic outcomes: the failure of the IOC to live up to standards of good 
governance, and the ease with which the principles of Olympism are politically 
manipulated, especially by states. In doing so, I attempt to show that the “intrusion of 
politics” into the Olympic sphere is not a special or deviant case, but in fact a predictable 
result, stemming not from political interests or forces being imposed on Olympic sport 
but from the very nature of Olympic governance. 
OLYMPIC GOVERNANCE AS INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
The concept of regimes (sometimes called “institutions”) originated within the 
field of international relations following World War II (most notably in the 1970s and 
1980s) as a way to explain the absence of widespread international conflict, even as a 
perceived decline in American hegemony threatened to destabilize the bipolarity of the 
international system. Regimes are defined as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”11 
What makes regimes interesting as an international political concept is their status as both 
an independent and a dependent variable. That is, researchers examine not only the 
effects of regimes on international relations but also their origins and the factors that lead 
to their creation.12 From the assumptions foundational to the two major paradigms in 
international relations (rational choice and constructivism), several strains of regime 
                                                 
11 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” 
in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
12 Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 4. Young 
makes a distinction between “contractarian” and “constitutive” perspectives with regard to regimes. The 
former is concerned with how and why actors create regimes, while the latter focuses on the effects of 
institutions on actors’ behavior. 
 15 
theory have been derived.13 Especially because this study stakes out a middle ground 
between these two paradigms, it is important to understand the attendant assumptions that 
inform differing perspectives on both how regimes are created and what their functions 
are with regard to international relations. To achieve such understanding, it is probably 
best to start by describing the fundamental tenets of both rational choice and 
constructivist perspectives and then work towards identifying some shared elements. 
Regime Theories 
Using the definition introduced above, it is reasonable to assert that regimes are 
instances of cooperation among states or other international actors. Even if such 
cooperation is merely a shared acknowledgement of basic behavioral standards or 
agreement on rules governing simple processes, it is clear that some amount of 
collaboration takes place. While this point might seem trivial, it is actually quite 
important because of the way cooperation is treated by different international relations 
paradigms. 
Rational Choice 
Neorealism is a systemic view of international relations that is perhaps the most 
pervasive (if not always the most popular or accurate) theoretical perspective in the 
field.14 Neorealist theory emphasizes the primacy of states as units of analysis and state 
behavior as a function of their relative arrangement in an anarchical international system. 
According to more traditional realist theories, states are inherently power-seeking or self-
                                                 
13 Contemporary characterizations of international relations identify realism, liberalism, and constructivism 
as the field’s three major paradigms. However, I prefer to use the rational choice/constructivism distinction 
because it emphasizes the difference between the ways in which actors interact with their environment. 
Rational choice assumes actors that are calculatingly self-interested, while constructivism sees ideas, 
beliefs, and social norms—and the interpretation thereof—as the fundamental drivers of behavior. 
14 The most well-known (and probably most cited) work is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
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serving, and power is the fundamental motivation for political behavior.15 As Hans 
Morgenthau writes “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or 
to demonstrate power.”16 In contrast to this view, neorealism views power-driven 
behavior not as a trait inherent to states but as a rational response to the realities of the 
international environment. With no guarantee of security, states are forced to “self-help”, 
which in turns leads to a system in which stability (and peace) are functions of state 
capabilities.17 In his seminal work, Kenneth Waltz concluded that self-interested states 
would only cooperate so long as doing so served their own immediate interests; 
ultimately, however, these arrangements were transient, as the nature of the international 
system would eventually drive states to choose self-help over cooperation. Others have 
used his assumptions to make stronger claims about the possibility of sustained state 
cooperation.18 Of particular interest is the neoliberal perspective, advanced by Robert 
Keohane and others, which sees regimes, institutions, and other forms of collaborative 
behavior as rational outcomes of self-interested behavior among states.19 Other derivative 
theories, emphasizing to varying degrees the nature of states and the structure of the 
international system, have drawn different conclusions. 
Collectively, these theories are commonly termed “rational choice” theories of 
state behavior, because they assume (along with the idea that states are unitary actors) 
that states behave more or less rationally; they can accurately assess the consequences of 
                                                 
15 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1950), 3-25. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
17 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102-128. This chapter also contains a (the) major restatement of 
balance-of-power theory. 
18 Two perspectives include hegemonic stability theory and neoliberalism (or more specifically, neoliberal 
institutionalism). See, respectively, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981) and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
19 Keohane, After Hegemony, 65-84. 
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a decision and act to further their own interests. The most important implication of this 
assumption is its predictive capability. With the appropriate empirical measures, a given 
state’s preferences can be calculated and its actions forecast with a relatively high degree 
of accuracy. While the importance and influence of specific factors may vary depending 
on the specific theory being used, the idea that states are rational actors remains constant. 
Given the neorealist influence in this school of thought, cooperation among states 
is treated as mostly anomalous.20 Because of the microeconomic underpinnings of 
rational choice theories, both the emergence and political function of regimes are 
explained in terms of market forces and rational self-interest. Hegemonic stability theory 
(of which there are several variants) treats the presence of a hegemon (a single most 
powerful nation) as a necessary or at least optimal condition for the emergence of 
cooperation. Regime creation is a result of mutual, rational self-interest. The hegemon, 
whose status is dependent mostly upon military and economic might (as well as less 
quantifiable factors like prestige), seeks to preserve its position through binding weaker 
states to agreements that reify the hegemon’s global leadership. At the same time, less-
powerful states enter into these agreements out of a sense of self-preservation, calculating 
any challenge to the status quo as too costly.21 
A second rational choice perspective on regimes, neoliberal institutionalism, 
argues that regimes are more aptly characterized as the outcome of bargaining among 
states and that the presence or absence of a hegemon is not a consequential variable.22 
                                                 
20 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 210. 
21 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 144-155. Also see G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic 
Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 
1998/99): 43-78. Although Ikenberry characterizes the creation of many postwar international 
arrangements as at least partially influenced by American hegemony, his explanation of their persistence 
beyond the Cold War and in the face of changing international power relationships strikes a distinct middle 
ground between rational choice and constructivist theories of regimes. 
22 Keohane, After Hegemony, 80-83, 182-216. 
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Essentially, states are capable of recognizing certain instances when cooperation is 
preferable to conflict, and regimes are the result of negotiation among states in an attempt 
to maximize absolute (as opposed to relative) gains.23 In this view, regimes are a solution 
to market failure; they provide a public good to states that would have otherwise been 
underprovided or not produced at all.24 Common to all of these perspectives is the view 
that regimes or institutions serve an instrumental function. A set of actors (usually, but 
not necessarily, states) recognize a specific problem that might best be solved through 
cooperation and create the necessary international apparatus (i.e., “principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area”) to achieve a satisfactory solution. While opinions vary on the ability of 
regimes to survive a change in the utility functions of the principals involved in their 
creation (Ikenberry calls this ability “institutional stickiness”), the notion that institutions 
are agents acting on behalf of their constitutive principals is fundamental to rational 
choice regime theory.25 
Constructivism 
A contrary and perhaps more fundamental view of international relations known 
as social constructivism (or just constructivism) typically grants the assumption of an 
anarchic international environment. However, proponents argue that the nature of this 
environment does not necessarily cause states to be self-helping and mostly unable to 
achieve anything more than fleeting cooperation.26 Constructivists instead claim that the 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 75-77. 
24 Ibid., 85-109. For a more succinct elaboration of this particular argument, see Robert O. Keohane, “The 
Demand for International Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 152-161. 
25 Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” 45-46. 
26 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425. 
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influence of the international order on state behavior is socially constructed; anarchy is 
not, by itself, a predictive condition. Probably unintentionally (and somewhat ironically, 
given this dissertation’s subject matter) invoking focal concepts of regulative and 
constitutive rules also used in sport philosophy, John Ruggie explains the distinction 
between rational choice and constructivism: 
This…permits us to identify an utterly profound gap in neo-utilitarianism: it lacks 
any concept of constitutive rules. Its universe of discourse consists entirely of 
antecedently existing actors and their behavior, and its project is to explain the 
character and efficacy of regulative rules in coordinating them. This gap accounts 
for the fact that, within their theoretical terms, neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism are capable of explaining the origins of virtually nothing that is 
constitutive of the very possibility of international relations: not territorial states, 
not systems of states, not any concrete international order, nor the whole host of 
institutional forms that states use, ranging from the concept of contracts and 
treaties to multilateral organizing principles. All are assumed to exist already or 
are misspecified.27 
What Ruggie is saying is that rational choice theories of state behavior are built on a 
rather fixed view of the international system (and indeed, assume the existence of a 
system in the first place). While the parsimony and clarity achieved by these theories 
allow research to proceed in a very “scientific” manner, constructivists argue that doing 
so assumes away far too much; explanatory or predictive specificity is lost in the pursuit 
of elegance and parsimony. This tension is, in the abstract, a manifestation of the balance 
between the general and specific that can be found in any academic realm. Thus, the 
counterargument against constructivism is that the pursuit of nuance inevitably becomes 
mere description, and the lack of clearly-defined variables and predictable outcomes 
renders constructivist perspectives somewhat non-falsifiable. 
                                                 
27 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 871. The text commonly used in 
sport philosophy is Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, Press, 1978). 
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Constructivist perspectives on regimes, while perhaps less theoretically rigorous, 
nonetheless offer a useful alternative view from which to proceed in assessing the degree 
to which Olympic governance can be accurately characterized as an international 
regime.28 Constructivists explain the emergence and continued presence of international 
regimes and institutions in much the same way that they explain other international 
phenomena; namely, as the product of social interaction and processes of meaning-
making among a set of actors. Diverging from rational choice perspectives, 
constructivism accords regimes a much greater degree of autonomy and influence over 
the behavior of other actors in the international system and, indeed, the system itself.29 
While rational calculation may play a role in their creation, international institutions are 
also the product of how actors engage with and derive meaning from ideas, beliefs, 
norms, values, and other less quantifiable (and much more highly variable) factors. 
Moreover, their legitimacy is not solely based on the ongoing support or endorsement of 
a principal or set of powerful principal actors, but also on their ability to embody or 
symbolize particularly powerful meanings.30 In this sense, while regimes still exist in a 
state-dominated international system, their effects in and on this system are not 
dependent upon, and are at times autonomous from, state interest and action. 
                                                 
28 Two of the most fully-developed theoretical contributions are Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Martha Finnemore, 
National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
29 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 1-33. 
30 Again, Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” 52 
is instructive, although he does not accept outright the constructivist contention that social identity and 
interaction are fundamentally determinant of almost every observable phenomenon in international politics. 
Rather, he advances what he calls “historical institutionalism”, which synthesizes elements of rational 
choice (which he characterizes as overemphasizing agency), constructivism (which overemphasizes 
structure) and history (claiming that institutions are path-dependent and historical antecedents affect future 
behavior). In any case, Ikenberry acknowledges that the ways in which regimes are socially constructed—
the norms and beliefs which legitimize their creation and existence—matter just as much (if not more) than 
the rational purposes they might serve. 
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Regimes are a part of international political life. Whether one sees international 
politics as a state-based microeconomic market or a fluid society of international actors, 
regimes play a role in the functioning of this system. In the next section, I assess the 
utility of describing Olympic governance as a regime, and apply rational choice and 
constructivist ideas to the formation and persistence of the Olympic governance system. 
In doing so, I avoid adopting one paradigmatic lens to the exclusion of others. Rather, I 
attempt to show that, while the plausibility of the accounts offered by differing 
perspectives varies, the regime concept accurately captures the political status of Olympic 
governance regardless of paradigmatic commitments. 
The Olympic Regime 
It seems reasonable, returning to Krasner’s definition of regimes, that Olympic 
governance could be considered a set of “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” The 
organizations comprising the Olympic governance system standardize sporting practices 
around the world in accordance with the principles of Olympism. As noted above, this is 
the fundamental transaction that forms the basis for Olympic governance; sport 
organizations recognize the IOC as the authority in Olympic sport and in return they reap 
the benefits of Olympic affiliation. For instance, IFs must enforce rules prohibiting drug 
use and the overt commercialization of athletes for any of their competitions to be 
considered legitimately “Olympic”. However, calling the Olympic governance system a 
regime simply because it performs the task of clarifying what does or does not qualify as 
Olympic sport is a superficial application of the regime concept. Implied in the definition 
of regimes being used here is that the “issue-area” governed by the regime is of 
consequence to the broader international political environment. In other words, it may be 
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accurate to define Olympic governance as an international regime based solely on its 
essential functions, but if that regime toils largely in isolation, there is little more that 
needs to be said; the regime (and indeed, sport itself) would exist only for its own sake. 
The ways in which Olympic sport has been theoretically and empirically linked to 
politics can be classified into two categories. The first characterizes sport as a political 
“tool” for states, wielded for purposes of diplomacy, prestige, constructing or reifying 
national identity, and asserting sovereignty, among other objectives.31 These descriptions 
of international sport’s political utility seem to align with a distinctly rational choice view 
of regimes. They show how the Olympic regime serves an instrumental purpose, allowing 
principals (i.e., states) to pursue foreign policy objectives through regime agents (i.e., 
national Olympic committees and Olympic athletes), even as realist and neorealist 
theories are criticized for their inability to account for Olympic sport as an international 
political phenomenon.32 While somewhat contradictory, this criticism serves to identify a 
crucial tension in applying the regime concept to Olympic governance: reconciling the 
distinctly apolitical principles of Olympism with the notion that Olympic sport is indeed 
politically relevant. As I argue below, it is possible to resolve this issue using a 
combination of rational choice and constructivist ideas. 
A second perspective on the relationship between Olympic governance and 
international relations assesses sport not as a political tool, but as a political entity in its 
own right. Much of this analysis focuses on the interaction of sport’s espoused values and 
professed moral authority with its distinctly nationalist structure. This category of 
                                                 
31 The most ambitious work is Barrie Houlihan, Sport and International Politics. Many of these links 
between sport and politics are also posited in Victor D. Cha, “A Theory of Sport and Politics,” 
International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 11 (2009): 1581-1610. 
32 Ibid. Both Houlihan’s and Cha’s criticism of realism appears to be a reaction to the emphasis realism 
places upon states as primary actors. Because realism does not accord Olympic governance and other non-
state entities the same status or importance as states and power politics, it is, in these authors’ view, unable 
to adequately capture sport’s political significance. 
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scholarship is mostly critical of Olympic governance, especially the incongruity of its 
liberal rhetoric and much more autocratic organizational configuration.33 Moreover, this 
view of Olympic governance sees its reliance on values and principles as simultaneously 
powerful and disingenuous, or at best misleading.34 Redeker’s particularly excoriating 
view calls sport “political opium, a para-diplomatic theatre where states and their 
international affairs fall victim to the sportive illusion.”35 Regardless of the extent to 
which Olympic organizations live up to their guiding principles, the power of ideas, both 
within Olympic governance and with regard to states, is clear. This institutionalization of 
ideas that subsequently guide behavior fits well with Krasner’s definition of regimes, 
especially when one considers that these “norms” and “principles”—sport as an 
instrument of global peace and sociocultural development, the necessity of political 
neutrality—have remained relatively constant over time, even as “rules” and “decision-
making procedures” have changed.36 For instance, rules about amateurism, the 
participation of women, and even the organizational structure of the IOC have been 
altered, but all of these changes have occurred under the constant umbrella of Olympism. 
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that Olympic governance is a value-driven 
system which is attractive to states as a political tool. While the power of these values 
and ideas is subject to debate, it is clear that Olympic governance can accurately and 
                                                 
33 John Hoberman, “Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism,” Journal of Sport History 22, no. 1 
(1995): 1-37. 
34 See John Hoberman, “The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force,” SAIS Review 31, no. 1 
(2011): 17-29. 
35 Robert Redeker, “Sport as an Opiate of International Relations: The Myth and Illusion of Sport as a Tool 
of Foreign Diplomacy,” Sport in Society 11, no. 4 (2008), 500. 
36 Krasner defines principles as “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude” and norms as “standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”, and sees them as constitutive elements of a given 
regime. In other words, a change in principles or norms would change the regime itself. Relatedly, he 
defines rules as “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action” and decision-making procedures as 
“prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”, and sees these as variable within a 
given regime over time. See Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 2-4. 
 24 
meaningfully be defined using the terminology of international regimes. The 
institutionalization of ideas about what sport is and should be guides the behavior of 
stakeholders and provides a measure of predictability and standardization to Olympic 
sport provision. Moreover, the attention paid to the myriad ways in which sport is 
relevant to international relations serves as a clear indication of its political salience. 
Origins 
Most theoretical perspectives concerning international regimes and institutions 
focus on their creation. This is particularly true for rational choice adherents, but 
constructivists are also interested in the origination of regimes. Because both assume (to 
varying degrees) that states are the primary actors in a fundamentally anarchical 
environment, the creation of regimes is typically described or explained relative to state 
behavior and involves an investigation of the reasons states establish or agree (either 
implicitly or explicitly) to participate in cooperative institutions. Thus, the issue with 
regard to this study becomes one of assessing these perspectives’ applicability to the 
origins of modern Olympic governance. The history of the modern Olympic movement is 
well-documented by sport historians.37 Recounting this narrative is not important here. 
Rather, in this section I attempt to place the historical data within conceptual frameworks 
of international regimes, and in doing so, assess the explanatory merits of the competing 
theoretical perspectives on international regimes and institutions introduced above. Of 
                                                 
37 In addition to Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic 
System, other insightful analyses include Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1992), Robert K. Barney, ed., Rethinking the Olympics: Cultural 
Histories of the Modern Games (Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, 2009) and Barbara J. 
Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006). John J. MacAloon, This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the 
Origins of the Modern Olympic Games (London: Routledge, 2007) assesses the sociological and 
psychological motivations of the Olympics’ founder. 
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primary concern is determining the role of states in the origination and growth of the 
modern international sport governance system. 
Certainly, nationalist considerations informed Olympic founder Baron Pierre de 
Coubertin in his drive to use sport for social reform in France at the end of the nineteenth 
century.38 However, as his focus shifted to internationalism and the development of an 
international sport festival, the balance between politics and sport became more 
precarious. Coubertin saw sport as transcendent of traditional cultural and political 
differences.39 This at least partially explains the reasoning behind the decision to 
constitute the IOC as a distinctly private, nongovernmental organization while at the 
same time allowing athletes to compete as representatives of their native countries. As 
administrators of a distinctly international phenomenon, it was important for IOC 
members to be politically unaffiliated, so that their distinctly political (or more 
generously, humanitarian) goals of fostering peace and cultural understanding could be 
above reproach. Simultaneously, national representation was seen as a crucial element of 
the sport festival, as the symbolism of nations (not simply athletes) gathering to interact 
and compete peacefully was central to the broader objectives of Coubertin and the 
Olympic movement.40 
Setting aside for a moment the use of nationalist symbolism in the Olympics, it is 
clear that, from the outset, the growth of the Olympic movement (as well as the 
proliferation of international sport more generally) occurred outside of state purview. The 
creation of the IOC was a private endeavor; the organization was initiated by aristocrats 
rather than politicians. The same was largely true of international sport federations, 
                                                 
38 MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 43-82. 
39 Ibid., 267. 
40 Keys, Globalizing Sport, 35-39. 
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although their growth was motivated as much by a desire for standardization of sport 
across national cultures as it was a plan to use sport for other political ends.41 This 
suggests that a straightforward application of rational choice regime theory cannot 
adequately explain the roots of Olympic governance, in the sense that the emergence of 
the Olympic system was not the direct result of collaborative state action. While a 
rational choice explanation for the Olympic system’s creation could likely be developed, 
it would need to be constructed around the motives of the Olympic founders, paying 
particular attention to how (or whether) they considered the tension inherent in creating a 
sport festival that was simultaneously international and apolitical. Any such explanation 
would also, simply due to the nature of rational choice theory, be likely to characterize 
states as free riders with regard to the Olympic regime. This is derivative of the explicit 
exclusion of states from Olympic governance and the reality that, if Olympic sport is 
considered a “good”, states are able to access this good (i.e., reap the political benefits of 
Olympic sport, as discussed above) while contributing relatively little to its provision. 
Regardless of whether the Olympic regime can be explained in terms of rational 
choice regime theory, the fundamental contradiction embedded in the very idea of 
Olympic sport (apolitical yet politically useful) poses a distinct challenge to the rational 
choice perspective, precisely because it is so seemingly irrational. That is, the IOC 
presides over a system built on a paradox. This is especially with regard to the role of 
governments.42 Specifically, a major tenet of Olympic governance is the view that 
governmental involvement is detrimental to the ability of Olympic sport to achieve its 
lofty objectives. While the IOC typically urges national governments to support sport 
programming within their respective borders, any political interference in either Olympic 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 40-63. 
42 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, 57-59. 
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governance or Olympic events is prohibited.43 On the surface, and combined with the 
above characterization of states as free riders, this would seem to be a convenient 
alignment of preferences. States, given the opportunity, generally prefer not to contribute 
to the provision of Olympic sport, and Olympic governance is based in large part upon 
the belief that state involvement is, at best, undesirable.44 Although these two positions 
seem compatible, what remains unclear is exactly why states accept a form of sport 
governance that is so strongly opposed to the idea of their involvement. In other words, 
assuming states enjoy taking advantage of the political opportunities afforded by 
Olympic sport while not contributing to its provision (i.e., free riding), it would seem 
more appropriate and perhaps more efficient for them to do so in a system that 
encouraged such behavior, or at least did not treat it as anathema.45 So, while the free 
riding of states and the apolitical preferences of Olympic administrators seem to be 
aligned, the willingness of states to concede the suitability of Olympic governance 
remains a bit puzzling. 
Just as modern Olympic governance seems to be suboptimal from a state 
perspective, a similar claim might be made on behalf of the Olympic leadership. That is, 
the same ideological beliefs which prompted the formation of the IOC and motivate other 
sport organizations to recognize its authority in Olympic sport simultaneously appear to 
discourage more efficient, egalitarian forms of governance. The system has apparently 
                                                 
43 On the former point, Ibid., 20. The latter point is emphasized in several sections of the Charter. 
44 There is a distinction to be made here between types of free riding: a passive form through which states 
accrue benefit simply through the configuration of the governance system, and a more active form in which 
states (with little fear of repercussion) manipulate Olympic sport for political ends. This distinction is 
important and will be more fully explained later in the chapter. 
45 The Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) were one attempt to create such a system. See 
Chris A. Connolly, “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” International 
Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1311-1324. 
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settled on an equilibrium in which free riding by states and any direct state involvement 
are both considered undesirable. 
International Legitimacy and the Role of Sport 
The analysis to this point has considered the suitability of rational choice 
explanations for the emergence and persistence of Olympic governance, and posited that 
regardless of how such an explanation might be constructed, it would likely characterize 
states as free riders relative to the Olympic regime. However, rational choice regime 
theory cannot by itself account for states’ acceptance of the particular manifestation of 
modern Olympic sport governance which exists today, nor the insistence by Olympic 
administrators upon adhering to governing principles which prevent more efficient (and 
perhaps more effective vis-à-vis its humanitarian objectives) Olympic sport. What is 
particularly puzzling is why the system remains remarkably stable, given its inherent 
tensions and the availability of more preferable alternatives. While characterizing states 
as free riders could explain in very basic terms how Olympic governance fits into the 
broader international relations environment, this idea cannot capture, and indeed mostly 
ignores the ways in which sport acts as a mediating variable. 
In many ways, the issue of developing separate explanations for the Olympic 
regime’s form and function mirrors the fundamental shortcomings of rational choice and 
constructivist regime theories more generally. While rational choice theory captures the 
basic structure of Olympic governance, it cannot adequately account for the role of 
beliefs about sport, especially the ways in which both Olympic administrators and states 
attach normative meaning to international sport. This is where constructivist perspectives 
can be of service, especially from a state perspective. As Alexander Wendt argues, 
Westphalian sovereignty (the defining characteristic of what he calls a “Lockean 
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culture”) has been the dominant international cultural principle for much of modern 
history.46 This is a culture in which much significance is attached to the idea of state 
sovereignty. Recognition within the culture is dependent upon acknowledging others’ 
right to self-governance and territorial boundaries. Because of this norm, state behavior 
and interaction is characterized not by an anarchical, self-fulfilling Hobbesian motivation 
to vanquish others in order to survive, but a somewhat more civil (perhaps one might 
even call it “sporting”) structure based on respectful rivalry.47 As Barbara Keys notes, it 
was within this culture that international sport first emerged and, following World War I, 
flourished. That Olympic governance (as well as other forms of international sport) 
proliferated is not entirely surprising, as the heavy emphasis international sport 
organizations placed upon national representation in friendly competition accurately 
mirrored the deeper structure of the international political landscape during this period. 
Many states recognized the opportunities this afforded them and, while not engaging 
directly with sport governance, nonetheless saw it as a natural and desirable 
development.48 Moreover, based on Wendt’s constructivist explanation of the 
international system as a set of social actors who respond to ideas and internalize norms, 
it seems reasonable to think that the rhetoric espoused by the Olympic governance system 
claiming sport’s status as a moral good would serve to maintain Olympic sport’s appeal 
to states over time.49 
                                                 
46 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 279-297. 
47 Ibid., 279-283. 
48 Keys, Globalizing Sport. Also see Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games, 3-20. Mark 
Dyreson, Making the American Team: Sport, Culture, and the Olympic Experience (Urbana, IL: University 
of Illinois Press, 1998) provides a comprehensive account of the United States’ use of sport for nationalistic 
purposes both foreign and domestic during the early years of the Olympic movement. 
49 On the internalization of values by international actors, see Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics, 312.  
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If states are essentially free riders when it comes to the provision of Olympic 
sport (reaping the benefits while not directly contributing or participating in its 
governance), it would seem somewhat contradictory for them to accept a governance 
system which decries and actively seeks to prevent their involvement. This is not because 
they necessarily want to take an active role in Olympic governance, but rather because 
the guiding principles of Olympism suggest that any link between states and sport 
(typically framed as “politicizing” the Olympics) is somehow socially or even morally 
undesirable. Thus, it would seem that states, given the opportunity, would prefer a form 
of Olympic governance which would allow them to free ride but that would not so 
heavily emphasize the necessity of apolitical sport. Moreover, states ostensibly have the 
wherewithal to initiate such a change, yet no move to alter Olympic governance seems to 
be forthcoming. In applying basic tenets of constructivist theory to this apparent 
contradiction, there is a strong possibility that over time, states have internalized Olympic 
values to the point that Olympic sport not only mirrors the fundamental political culture 
of our age but seems to be a part of the international system’s broader liberal progression 
during the twentieth century. The claimed meritocratic nature of Olympic sport (for 
instance, the idea of the “level playing field” so heavily emphasized as essential to elite 
sport, particularly in reference to anti-doping policy development) reinforces the notion 
that open competition is desirable and rewards the most deserving actors.50 More 
disturbingly, it justifies existing systemic disparities as natural outcomes.51 The financial 
success enjoyed by the IOC and the Olympic movement as a corporate entity, especially 
                                                 
50 This parallel between Olympic values and the tenets of liberal politics is addressed in David L. Andrews 
and Michael L. Silk, eds., Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, Consumption, and Culture (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2012). 
51 Bruce Kidd, “Inequality in Sport, the Corporation, and the State: An Agenda for Social Scientists,” 
Journal of Sport and Social Issues 19, no. 3 (1995): 232-248. Although couched in a domestic sport context 
and targeted at researchers, Kidd’s arguments about institutionalized inequality in modern society and its 
relationship to sport continue to be highly relevant. 
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over the past three decades, serves in a similar way to confirm the capability and 
appropriateness of its governance structure. Combined with the benefits of free riding, the 
apparent compatibility of Olympic sport with ideas shared by the developed world about 
what the international system is and should be works to solidify Olympic governance as 
an appropriate and acceptable sport form in the eyes of states. 
Having established an explanation using constructivist theory for state acceptance 
of Olympic governance, the issue can now be addressed from the perspective of the 
Olympic regime itself. It is clear that Olympic governance is motivated by, among other 
things, beliefs about the positive utility of its particular conception of international sport. 
As an extension of this idea, one might reasonably expect the regime to work towards 
broader participation from relevant stakeholders; essentially, to address the free riding 
issue and elicit contributions toward the provision of Olympic sport (or, conversely, to 
exclude non-contributors from accessing the good). However, the regime not only avoids 
this approach, it insists that doing so is fundamentally opposed to its conception of 
Olympic sport. Solving the free rider problem by requiring state involvement in Olympic 
governance would constitute a fundamental transformation of Olympic sport into 
something else entirely. Whether this is a reasonable expectation is debatable, but of 
more immediate interest is the underlying assertion about the nature of sport. The belief 
in the political sanctity of Olympic sport is not surprising. However, this belief is 
arguably an obstacle preventing the Olympic governance system from more effectively 
governing the Olympic movement. The centrality of these beliefs about sport to Olympic 
policymaking might be considered an indication of fundamentally irrational governance, 
unless the particular values embodied in and propagated through Olympic sport serve 
some other instrumental purpose. 
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Establishing the purposiveness of using Olympic values as a veil of legitimation 
for Olympic governance is a complex matter to say the least. It is relatively clear that 
they possess some utility for Olympic administrators, but to what degree this utility is 
intentionally pursued (as opposed to simply incidental to normal organizational behavior) 
is difficult to say with any degree of certainty. With regard to intentionality, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that the Olympic movement’s leadership is acutely aware of 
the ways in which rhetoric can be used to simultaneously maintain the role of apparent 
global humanitarian authorities while abstaining from any meaningful action.52 At the 
same time, the firmness with which particular beliefs about Olympic sport are held can be 
plausibly attributed to normal organizational inertia.53 Especially because Olympic 
sport’s effectiveness as a political tool was tied from the outset to its political neutrality 
(and because this view of sport possesses a certain ideological appeal), any impetus to 
alter this belief may not have been easily generated from within the Olympic governance 
apparatus. Regardless of the extent to which the persistence of normative beliefs about 
sport is intentional or incidental, the view of apolitical sport as a sufficient condition for 
achieving its stated humanitarian objectives serves to stymie institutional change within 
the Olympic regime. 
In this section I have argued that the governance of Olympic sport can be defined 
in regime theoretical terms. Through a consideration of rational choice and constructivist 
perspectives, I have shown how Olympic governance is situated relative to states within 
the international political system as well as how ideas about sport serve to reify the 
legitimacy of the IOC and by extension, the Olympic movement. Additionally, I have 
                                                 
52 Again, Hoberman, “The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting Political Force” and Redeker, “Sport as an 
Opiate of International Relations” are two of the most insightful recent works addressing this point. Also 
see Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
53 See, for example, Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, “Structural Inertia and Organizational 
Change,” American Sociological Review 49, no. 2 (1984): 149-164. 
 33 
argued that beliefs about sport’s nature and political utility work to prevent a 
(theoretically) more efficient form of Olympic governance. In the final section, I explore 
the implications of this tension for both states and Olympic governance. 
CHALLENGES FOR REGIME GOVERNANCE 
Classifying Olympic governance as an international regime suggests that it 
provides predictability and standardization in an issue area of relevance to international 
politics. Further, this means that particular characteristics of the regime can be linked to 
predictable outcomes. Because this dissertation is focused upon explaining how the 
nature of Olympic governance is linked to the quality of that governance, as well as how 
it is linked to international relations in a more general sense, this section will focus on 
two specific types of outcomes. The first might be characterized as internal to the 
Olympic movement and is concerned with the impact of structure and ideology on the 
ability of the IOC to provide good governance. The second concentrates on the link 
between Olympic governance and international politics, logically extending the notion of 
the “Olympic regime” to assess the ability to govern sport not in the sense of 
organizational management, but in the sense of exerting control over sport as a politically 
meaningful international phenomenon. For both, the emphasis is on showing how the 
interplay between the structure of the Olympic governance system and the essence of 
Olympic sport produces the outcomes in question. 
The IOC and Good Governance 
Few (if any) serious contemporary Olympic researchers associate the IOC with 
good governance. This criticism stems from an organizational structure lacking in 
democratic mechanisms and general oversight, as well as a fallacious ideological 
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commitment to sport as a sufficient condition for achieving humanitarian objectives.54 
Recent empirical observations have confirmed the idea that Olympic governance is 
somehow deficient. While the Salt Lake City bid scandal in 1998 was probably the most 
notable in terms of its voracity, other issues both sport-related (such as judging 
controversies in figure skating at both the 2002 and 2010 Winter Olympics as well as the 
short-lived 2013 decision to remove wrestling from the Summer Olympic program) and 
political (including human rights controversies surrounding the 2008 Summer Olympics 
in Beijing and 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi) have called into question the IOC’s 
ability to adequately fulfill its leadership and management duties.55 
What is good governance? As with any normative standard, a single definition is 
elusive. Typically, the term “governance” is used in reference to shared decision-making 
processes.56 By extension, then, “good” governance is the development of these processes 
in a way that appeals to generally accepted ethical principles which emphasize, among 
other things, transparency and fairness. While the term originated in the international aid 
community as a way to judge post-Cold War progress in the developing world, it can 
simultaneously be used to evaluate compliance with the expectations and rules of 
international institutions, as well as the institutions themselves.57 
                                                 
54 On the formation and effectiveness of the IOC’s Ethics Commission, see John J. MacAloon, “Scandal 
and Governance: Inside and Outside the IOC 2000 Commission,” Sport in Society 14, no. 3 (2011): 292-
308. A more theoretical take is Daniel S. Mason, Lucie Thibault, and Laura Misener, “An Agency Theory 
Perspective on Corruption in Sport: The Case of the International Olympic Committee,” Journal of Sport 
Management 20, no. 1 (2006): 52-73. The latter point is what John Hoberman refers to as “amoral 
universalism”. See The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide 
D. Caratzas, 1986) for the most developed explanation of this idea. 
55 On the Salt Lake City scandal, see Stephen R. Wenn and Scott G. Martyn, “‘Tough Love’: Richard 
Pound, David D’Alessandro, and the Salt Lake City Olympics Bid Scandal,” Sport in History 26, no. 1 
(2006): 64-90. 
56 Daniel C. Esty, “Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,” Yale 
Law Journal 115, no. 7 (2006): 1497. 
57 Martin R. Doornbos, “‘Good Governance’: The Pliability of a Policy Concept,” TRAMES 8, no. 4 
(2004): 372-387. 
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In assessing whether or to what extent the IOC provides good governance to 
Olympic sport, my intention is not to argue that one of the conditions posited above is 
more causally linked to (a lack of) good governance than the other. Rather, I simply 
extend the Olympic regime’s inherent logic to show that, together, structure and ideology 
comprise a self-confirming feedback system which perpetuates what many have deemed 
to be a suboptimal status quo. In other words, these two causes are not independently 
contributing to the same outcome but are instead interactive. The combination of an 
ideologically motivated regime and powerful but mostly indifferent free riders serves to 
reinforce rather than challenge the pathologies of Olympic governance. 
The Olympic regime’s reasoning at the core of this problem can be summarized in 
the following statements: 
1. Apolitical sport is a sufficient condition for achieving the Olympic 
movement’s objectives. As discussed in the preceding section, this was at 
the heart of the motivation driving the formation of the Olympic 
movement. The (mostly genuine) belief that sport which was 
simultaneously nationalistic and divorced from international politics could 
be a powerful force for global peace is the Olympic movement’s raison 
d’être. 
If this statement is taken as true and immutable, two implications derive: 
2. Pluralistic governance of Olympic sport is unnecessary. Because there is a 
belief in the direct causal link between the provision of Olympic sport and 
the Olympic movement’s desired outcomes, governance becomes a 
question of simply ensuring that events like the Olympic games occur; 
other principles of good governance are rendered less important or 
irrelevant. The underlying assumption here is that as Olympic governance 
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becomes more expansive (in terms of bureaucratic structure or democratic 
inclusion) it becomes less effective. 
3. Pluralistic governance of Olympic sport is antithetical to Olympic values. 
An extension of the previous statement, this assumption is directly linked 
to the necessity of sport remaining apolitical. The supporting logic is 
simple but compelling: as more actors and interests become involved in 
controlling the Olympic movement, the likelihood that “politics” 
(understood generally as the competition among diverse interests) will 
become more prevalent in Olympic governance increases. 
The final link which closes the logic loop is implied by the preceding two statements: 
4. Deviations from the current governance system are a threat to Olympic 
sport. While progressive attempts to democratize Olympic governance or 
institute more rigorous oversight might be deemed as moves toward a 
fuller realization of good governance, the Olympic movement’s 
constitutive beliefs about sport imply the opposite and serve to undermine 
this sort of behavior. Further, the lack of democratic structures makes even 
initiating such a move very difficult. With opposition to the status quo 
effectively mitigated (and given the economic success of the Olympics), it 
thus appears self-evident that the current system is the most appropriate 
and effective for governing Olympic sport. 
In this outline of the reasoning supporting the IOC’s resistance to change and rejection of 
what it views as political intrusion, it is easy to see how structure and ideology 
complement one another. While it may seem as though causation flows in only one 
direction (i.e., beliefs about what Olympic sport is and should be lend support to a 
private, somewhat autocratic system of governance, or more generally, ideology justifies 
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structure), it was this very governance structure which created and reified the ideology at 
the founding of the Olympic movement. Although ideas about Olympic sport are 
powerful, they originate in the minds, words, and actions of individuals and the 
organizations they comprise. 
Again, the point here is not to locate the shortcomings of Olympic governance in 
either organizational structures or values, but to show how these two phenomena work in 
tandem to provide a suboptimal outcome. Indeed, their mutual reinforcement thwarts 
efforts to initiate meaningful change. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the notion 
that even when change occurs, ostensibly progressive initiatives which might be 
considered steps toward good governance are nothing more than superficial moves to 
placate the harshest critics of Olympic governance.58 In this view, both structure and 
ideology are subverted as means toward commercial or political ends.59 While this is a 
significant and somewhat alarming possibility, making this assumption changes the 
fundamental problem. Any assessment of whether or to what extent the IOC provides 
good governance is based on the premise that doing so falls within the scope of the 
organization’s objectives. If the Olympic governance system is (or has become) little 
more than a façade to mask the pursuit of other interests, the issue of good governance is 
beside the point. 
In sketching the logic underlying the relationship between the structure and 
ideological principles of Olympic governance, I have attempted to show how the 
                                                 
58 On this question, a recent collection of academic perspectives is Bruce Kidd and Heather Dichter, eds., 
Olympic Reform Ten Years Later (London: Routledge, 2012). 
59 The situation in which so-called humanitarian organizations are used for less noble purposes is not new 
and certainly not unique to sport. See, for example, Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, 
Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989) or 
more recently, Thomas W. Dichter, Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third 
World Has Failed (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). Also see Michael N. Barnett 
and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” 
International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699-732. 
 38 
interaction between the two contributes to the failures of governance which have been 
well-documented both recently and throughout Olympic history. Unfortunately, while 
regime theory can be useful in identifying obstacles to good governance and explaining 
why and how they work, it is not possessed of the predictive power to offer further 
insight. From a rational choice standpoint, the system has reached an equilibrium in 
which the incentives for the majority of actors (especially the most powerful) are 
weighted toward maintaining the status quo. In a constructivist sense, too, the power of 
Olympic ideology makes change seem almost antithetical to the values which lend the 
Olympic movement its legitimacy. While there remains much work to be done in this 
area, doing so requires a shift in focus and theoretical commitment (perhaps in the 
direction of critical theory) that moves beyond the scope of this study. The final section 
in this chapter will deal more explicitly with the Olympic regime structure’s implications 
for the relationship between governance and international relations. 
Regime Enforcement and Political Exploitation 
The brief discussion of rational choice theory above suggests that states (and other 
non-participating actors) are strongly incentivized to free ride on the provision of 
Olympic governance. Generally, free riding in this context can be understood as the 
accrual of benefit from the existence of Olympic sport without contributing to its 
production. In the specific case of states, this benefit is often political in nature.60 Taken 
as a starting point, the idea that states free ride on the Olympic regime requires further 
elaboration, especially given the pervasive belief within the Olympic movement that 
Olympic sport is able to promote global peace and intercultural respect as well as the 
popular belief that hosting Olympic events can be beneficial to a city, region, or country. 
                                                 
60 See note 31. 
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To once again reiterate a crucial point, there is an inherent contradiction between the 
conception of Olympic sport as politically useful and the rejection of all political 
influence. This apparent contradiction can be reconciled, however, by distinguishing 
among types of free riding. 
One type of state free riding can be characterized as passive. Indeed, the idea that 
states might realize political benefit through their association with the Olympics is an 
extension of Olympism’s basic logic.61 Moreover, the IOC has in recent years partnered 
with intergovernmental organizations in sport development efforts which extend beyond 
the sphere of elite competition.62 It seems reasonable to assume, then, that the assertion of 
strictly apolitical sport’s importance to the success of the Olympic movement is a 
qualified (rather than absolute) statement. In other words, there exists a set of appropriate 
political behaviors in which states can engage with the Olympic movement’s tacit 
blessing. These include many of the “benefits” or “uses” of sport typically associated 
with Olympic participation: the demonstration of membership in the international 
community and national vitality, the development of national sport programs and 
governance systems, as well as the oft-cited (though highly dubious) ability to use sport 
competition as a sort of proxy for settling international political conflict. Additionally, 
states that host Olympic competitions are usually assumed to accrue political and 
economic gains through the construction of physical and technological infrastructure, 
tourist spending, and in a more general sense, the ability to leverage the event’s visibility 
                                                 
61 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, 11. The Fundamental Principles of Olympism 
(specifically the second and fourth) emphasize the ability of sport to promote peace and human rights, two 
ostensibly political objectives which are also of consequence to a broader array of international actors. 
62 See, for example, Bruce Kidd, “A New Social Movement: Sport for Development and Peace,” Sport in 
Society 11, no. 4 (2008): 370-380 and Ingrid Beutler, “Sport Serving Development and Peace: Achieving 
the Goals of the United Nations through Sport,” Sport in Society 11, no. 4 (2008): 359-369. 
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to promote themselves to global audiences, political or otherwise.63 Despite their 
apparent political nature, these sorts of behaviors are tolerated (and at times even 
encouraged) by the Olympic regime. 
States can also be more aggressive in their manipulation of sport for political 
ends. Most often this occurs when domestic or foreign conflicts are publicly linked to 
Olympic participation. Typically, the linkage is made by a state or other international 
actor (such as an interest group or NGO) and calls into question the compatibility of a 
particular state’s policies with the values of the Olympic movement. This claim is 
followed by a response which denounces the initial charge as equally un-Olympic on the 
grounds that it wrongly “politicizes” the event. However, aggressive free riding by states 
can also occur outside the context of a specific event, such as when national governments 
exert undue influence over the administration of their national Olympic committees. In 
these cases as well as myriad others, states can penetrate the Olympic governance process 
and pursue political objectives relatively assured that they will not face any 
consequences. 
Because of this inescapable reality, borne out through the nature of regime 
dynamics, it seems reasonable to examine how the Olympic regime might better enforce 
its own rules. After all, this is a primary task for any institution. If the regime exists to 
provide order in a particular issue area, and this order is achieved through normative 
pressures and more explicit behavioral guidelines, it follows that the regime should be 
prepared to assess what sorts of actions constitute violations of these rules and be able to 
take the steps necessary to achieve modification of that behavior (or, if modification is 
                                                 
63 There is a growing consensus among both scholars and policymakers that these are essentially 
convenient assumptions that lack any strong empirical support. See Jonathan Barclay, “Predicting the Costs 
and Benefits of Mega-Sporting Events: Misjudgment of Olympic Proportions?” Economic Affairs 29, no. 2 
(2009): 62-66 as well as Douglas Booth, “Olympic City Bidding: An Exegesis of Power,” International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport 46, no. 4 (2011): 367-386. 
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not possible, to deny the violating party access to the privileges obtained through regime 
membership).64 However, by claiming sport is and should be apolitical, even as certain 
uses of sport by states are deemed acceptable, the Olympic regime undermines its own 
enforcement capabilities. This occurs in three ways. First, the Olympic regime mistakenly 
views its ideological principles as sufficiently self-enforcing. Second, the ideologically-
driven decision to prohibit state involvement renders enforcement by exclusion very 
difficult, if not impossible. Because states are not technically members of the regime, 
they cannot be sanctioned or expelled. Third, any response to alleged politicization is 
itself political, making any attempt at maintaining sport’s neutrality a political act; 
enforcement becomes a violation of the very rules being enforced. 
As noted in the section on good governance above, the Olympic regime’s 
persistent assertion of sport’s political transcendence bespeaks a belief that this ideology 
is sufficiently powerful to be self-enforcing. Sport, in the abstract, is not a priori 
apolitical. It is not difficult to imagine (and indeed, there are several historical examples 
of) overtly political sport.65 By casting sport as apolitical, the Olympic regime makes 
participation contingent upon recognizing, at least tacitly, the validity of this 
characterization. Thus, the reasoning goes, any state represented in Olympic sport must at 
least tacitly agree that sport is and should be politically neutral. By extension, this logic 
assumes that if states endorse the apolitical characterization of sport (and the attendant 
belief that it is a necessary condition for the Olympic regime to achieve its humanitarian 
objectives), they would not have any reason to violate this principle. Obviously, this is an 
                                                 
64 This is a somewhat murky area for regime theorists, as some regimes’ requirements for membership 
significantly reduce the need for enforcement while other regimes have a high tolerance for rule violation. 
See Young, Governance in World Affairs, 79-107. 
65 See John M. Hoberman, Sport and Political Ideology. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984, as 
well as Jim Riordan and Arnd Krüger, The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Routledge, 1999). 
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invalid conclusion because it ignores the possibility that states would want to be involved 
in Olympic sport for reasons beyond those suggested by Olympic values, and perhaps 
more fundamentally, confuses a normative belief that state interests and regime principles 
should be totally aligned with a reality in which they are often divergent. 
The same apolitical ideology that provides the motivation for Olympic 
governance effectively excludes states from the administration of the Olympic regime. 
While this presumably preserves the autonomy of the IOC and NOCs, when states 
inevitably politicize sport, these organizations are left with very few methods of recourse. 
Certainly, Olympic organizations cannot sanction state governments; they are not regime 
members and the regime thus lacks the authority to punish their rule violations. The 
Olympic regime may localize the problem, identifying any “intrusion of politics” as a 
rogue incident involving only a small number of organizations or individuals. While this 
serves to minimize the issue, it does little to punish transgressors or deter future deviant 
behavior. The regime might decide to sanction or ban a state’s national sport apparatus 
(i.e., its national Olympic committee and national sport federations), or revoke hosting 
rights for an international event, but these actions present further problems which will be 
discussed below. The lack of viable options for addressing violations of sport’s political 
neutrality is directly tied to the ideological underpinnings of this rule. 
Fundamentally, what undermines the ability of the Olympic regime to enforce its 
policy of political isolation is the fact that any response to a rule violation is itself 
political. Despite every effort to act in the furtherance of apolitical sport, any attempt to 
punish what I have called aggressive free riding can be subverted by claiming that the 
enforcement response is politically motivated. This effectively ties the hands of the 
Olympic regime. Because any attempt at enforcement can be considered a violation of the 
rule being enforced, the IOC is unwilling to take any meaningful action in this area. Even 
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if the regime can successfully expel a member on these grounds, exclusion is not a very 
palatable recourse, as it contradicts the regime’s efforts to be wholly inclusive. Again, the 
fear is that making any sort of judgment about which states’ sport organizations should or 
should not be allowed to participate in international sport directly contravenes the notion 
that sport is an apolitical, cosmopolitan sanctuary where all are welcome. 
The Olympic regime’s ideological edifice is a duality of sorts. While it is 
immensely helpful in legitimizing Olympic governance in the eyes of states, it also 
attracts unwanted politicization and ultimately sabotages the ability of the regime to 
protect this fundamental principle. Because states are essentially free riders with regard to 
the Olympic regime, they will continue to passively reap the benefits of international 
sport as well as use sport for (in the IOC’s view) undesirable political purposes until they 
are forced to either bear the costs of supplying it or are denied access to it entirely. This 
places the regime in a difficult position, as these options suggest either a fundamental 
reconsideration of states’ role in Olympic sport, significantly expanded efforts to protect 
sport from political intrusion, or a shift in the basic principles which sustain Olympic 
governance. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter conceptualizes the Olympic governance system as an international 
regime. Doing so addresses a number of gaps in current knowledge about the relationship 
between the Olympics and international relations. Characterizing Olympic governance as 
an international institution simultaneously acknowledges sport’s political significance 
and identifies it as part of a class of recognizable international phenomena. By extension, 
this enables the opportunity for more dispassionate and objective analysis of the Olympic 
regime’s ideological power; in other words, creating a space for examining questions of 
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“how” and “why” without necessarily grappling with normative questions of “whether” 
or “ought”. Additionally, bridging the divide between studies of Olympic sport and 
international relations provides the foundation for generating testable questions which 
can subsequently be empirically investigated. As I will show in the following chapter, 
such questions and systematic investigation have been largely absent from the field of 
Olympic studies. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
This review of the literature relevant to this study is divided into four sections. 
Because of the central role ideas and meaning making play in the theoretical discussion in 
Chapter 1, the first section examines constructivist theory and its application to empirical 
cases within the international relations canon. The second section assesses the relative 
merits of various attempts to theorize the relationship between sport and politics. In the 
third section, literature pertaining to the politics of the Olympic movement is reviewed. 
The final section analyzes empirical studies of international sport and international 
politics. 
CONSTRUCTIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In Chapter 1, I introduced some of the most fundamental constructivist 
international relations literature.1 Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics 
continues to serve as the major theoretical formulation of constructivism.2 The 
constructivist perspective’s major contribution to international relations is its challenge to 
rational choice as a foundational assumption for studying international politics; in many 
ways, constructivism exists at a more abstract level than rational choice theories. While 
rational choice research assumes many characteristics of the international system are 
fixed, “constructivists cannot take identities and interests for granted, and understanding 
the processes by which they originate and change has been a big part of the constructivist 
                                                 
1 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang 
Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52, no. 
4 (1998): 855-885; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699-732. 
2 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
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research program.”3 Although now somewhat dated, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink’s review of constructivist empirical literature identifies the effect of global norms 
in local contexts, the relationship between ideas and power, the influence of identity on 
state action, and the ways in which social construction occurs as major problems 
addressed by the constructivist research agenda.4 These authors also survey the empirical 
areas which have received attention from constructivists, particularly international 
organizations, international law, epistemic communities, the particular effects of 
structural configuration, and the role of persuasive language.5 
More recent empirical work relevant to this study has challenged the idea that 
humanitarian international organizations challenge ethical norms and are progressing or 
evolving toward a higher moral order.6 Michael Barnett argues that, rather than being 
guided solely by their founding principles, humanitarian organizations are affected by the 
same sorts of political and bureaucratic forces as other organizations. Over time, these 
organizations end up reinforcing the status quo rather than challenging it; indeed, what it 
even means to be a humanitarian organization is subject to constant redefinition. 
Barnett’s findings suggest that principled organizations (like those of the Olympic 
regime) struggle to maintain true to their espoused principles when faced with 
environmental and organizational pressures acting at cross purposes. 
In a similar vein, Ted Hopf’s study of hegemony challenges the notion that 
ideology, as a causal variable, is a product solely of the ruling elite.7 Hopf contends that 
                                                 
3 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001), 394. 
4 Ibid., 396-400. 
5 Ibid., 401-403. 
6 Michael Barnett, “Evolution without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt,” International 
Organization 63, no. 4 (2009): 621-663. 
7 Ted Hopf, “Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” International 
Organization 67, no. 2 (2013): 317-354. 
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studies of hegemony have treated ideas as imposed by the hegemon. Specifically, he 
argues for a more accurate application of Gramscian theory and the concept of common 
sense to the study of hegemony and ideology. Essentially, Hopf shows that ideology is 
not simply imposed, but negotiated. His argument provides for a more instrumental role 
of “the masses” in the way hegemony functions internationally. In a roundabout way, this 
reasoning is applicable to the study of international sport organizations. The theory 
advanced in this study argues that the ideological conception of sport held by the 
Olympic regime is inherently unenforceable, especially with regard to states. Hopf’s 
argument supports this theory, as it takes into account not only the creator and promoter 
of the ideology (in this study, the IOC), but also the targets of that ideology (states) and 
how their interpretation and reaction to this ideology influences the hegemonic status of 
the Olympic regime. 
While international relations scholars have not paid much attention to sport as a 
phenomenon with much relevance to international politics, this attitude is beginning to 
shift.8 The recent acknowledgement of sport’s importance is particularly true with regard 
to its relationship to diplomacy; scholars in this area of study have begun to explore the 
limits of sport’s use as a diplomatic implement as well as to identify best practices.9 This 
brief review has shown how ideas borrowed from constructivist perspectives can inform 
                                                 
8 Aaron Beacom, “Sport in International Relations: A Case for Cross-Disciplinary Investigation,” The 
Sports Historian 20, no. 2 (2000): 1-23; Jonathan Grix, “Sport Politics and the Olympics,” Political Studies 
Review 11, no. 1 (2013): 15-25; and Simon C. Darnell and David R. Black, “Mainstreaming Sport into 
International Development Studies,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2011): 367-378. Indeed, the case for 
a stronger relationship between sport and international relations was being made as early as the mid-1980s; 
see Trevor Taylor, “Sport and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect,” in The Politics of Sport, 
ed. Lincoln Allison (Wolfeboro, NH: Manchester University Press, 1986), 27-48. 
9 Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Mapping the Relationship between International Sport and 
Diplomacy,” Sport in Society 17, no. 9 (2014): 1098-1118, as well as Stuart Murray, “The Two Halves of 
Sports-Diplomacy,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 23, no. 3 (2012): 576-592. 
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studies of international sport, including this one. The following sections examine the 
ways in which sport scholars have linked sport to international politics. 
THEORIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SPORT AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
Foundational Issues 
At the heart of the scholarly study of sport and politics is the persistent question 
of whether the two are, in fact, relevant to one another. Likely a reaction to the endemic 
normative assertion that sport and politics should not mix, much of the literature in this 
area exhibits at least a subtle contrarian response to this belief by suggesting (or 
exclaiming) that sport and politics are not so separate after all. This tends to confound the 
advancement of scholarship. Characterizing the belief in sport’s political transcendence 
as widely held (even if only to demonstrate its inaccuracy) propagates a false 
equivalency; repeatedly constructing straw men just to knock them over incorrectly 
legitimizes the possibility that they may be made of more than straw. By extension, the 
ability to hinge a study’s novelty on the refutation of this belief prevents researchers from 
achieving anything that might be considered scientific progress, instead trapping them in 
a cycle of continuous justification for sport and politics receiving scholarly attention in 
the first place. Despite a growing body of scholarship that demonstrates the link between 
sport and politics, it is still often considered necessary to acknowledge that discussing the 
two in the same breath could be surprising. 
An equally confounding issue in the field is definitional ambiguity. While “sport” 
and “politics” are useful parameters for identifying an area of scholarship in general, 
most studies do not differentiate between various types of sport or politics. With regard to 
sport, one might reasonably distinguish among sport forms (baseball, football, hockey, 
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etc.), levels of sport (amateur, professional), purposes for sport (commercial, 
development), and contexts (national, international). With regard to politics, the primary 
point of distinction is between domestic and international, although comparative politics 
(the study of similarities and differences across domestic polities) as well as the 
interaction between the domestic and international spheres are also relevant areas for 
sport research. Regardless of how or to what extent the scope of “sport” or “politics” is 
defined, because it has been sufficient to use these terms without further specification, 
many arguments and findings are easily undermined or contradicted. This, in turn, 
frustrates efforts to develop testable theories of “sport and politics” and the field struggles 
to progress beyond its treatment of the relationship as merely novel or anomalous. 
These issues are obviously not applicable to the entire body of literature which 
examines sport and politics, and I certainly do not wish to suggest that work which 
employs this device is somehow deficient or wrongheaded. In describing these problems, 
I simply wish to point out some fundamental challenges that have not been adequately 
resolved by those who work in this field, challenges I have attempted to overcome or at 
least more fully address in this study. 
The Applicability of International Relations Theory to International Sport 
Although published nearly twenty years ago, Barrie Houlihan’s Sport and 
International Politics remains the most comprehensive attempt to connect sport and 
international relations theory within an explanatory framework.10 While Houlihan does 
not advance a theory per se, several of his arguments are relevant to this study and will be 
addressed below. First, however, I wish to focus on Houlihan’s assessment of 
international relations theory and its applicability to international sport.11 Houlihan 
                                                 
10 Barrie Houlihan, Sport and International Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994). 
11 Ibid., 29-54. 
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identifies realism, pluralism, and globalism as the three main schools of international 
relations theory. His descriptions of pluralism and globalism track closely with what 
many scholars might identify as “liberalism” and “Marxism”, respectively. Houlihan does 
not include constructivism in his review, though to be fair, this work was published just 
as constructivism was gaining a foothold as a legitimate paradigmatic commitment within 
international relations, and Houlihan does argue for the inclusion of constructivist 
principles in international relations theorizing, particularly with regard to pluralism and 
globalism.12 Essentially, Houlihan argues that realist theory cannot account for 
international sport because of the primacy it grants to states and material determinants of 
power.13 He instead argues that pluralism (with its emphasis on non-state actors) and 
globalism (with its emphasis on economic power relations) are better suited for studying 
international sport.14 While the general point is valid, the notion that realism cannot 
explain international sport simply because it does not accord sport much importance or 
significance begs the question. 
The claim of sport’s uniqueness is stated even more strongly by Cha, who writes 
that “International relations scholarship…leaves us with no clear answers about the link 
between sport and international relations.”15 Unfortunately, Cha offers only anecdotal 
examples in support of his “theory of sport and politics”, which might more accurately be 
described as a typology of sport’s political functions. A more recent collection of essays 
takes up the thread of Houlihan’s earlier work, locating sport within a neoliberal political 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 53-54. 
13 Ibid., 40, 52-53. 
14 Ibid. Houlihan does hedge a bit on this issue, citing early rational choice work on regimes as evidence 
that realists have attempted to incorporate explanations of international cooperation and the role of 
institutions into their frameworks. 
15 Victor D. Cha, “A Theory of Sport and Politics,” International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 11 
(2009), 1584. 
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and cultural context.16 In particular, the introductory essay argues that modern sport (the 
book deals with sport at all levels, not exclusively international) is a product and creator 
of a neoliberal political culture which subverts the state and elevates (or perhaps 
glorifies) the market.17 While the essays in this collection take on a wide range of topics, 
the common theme is that sport’s political value is based almost entirely on its ability to 
reflect what the editors see as a dominant and globally pervasive neoliberal ideology. 
This is at once innovative and repetitive; sport is still being used for political ends, only 
corporations, international institutions, and interest groups have replaced states as the 
ones pulling the strings. 
A more radical, atheoretical conception of sport sees it not as instrumental (i.e., 
being manipulated by an actor or set of actors in the furtherance of some agenda), but an 
ideological institution unto itself.18 Redeker argues that, rather than states using sport as a 
diplomatic tool, sport—as a symbol, an idea, or what Redeker calls “an ensemble of 
exigencies”—determines the legitimate and the appropriate in terms of political 
behavior.19 In calling sport both an “anthropo-factory” and “spiritual power”, Redeker 
writes: 
“Sport is something entirely different than a tool or means that wouldn’t alter 
whoever used it; it is a total system, a planetary machine that profoundly 
transforms men and women as well as their relation to the world (for example, we 
can no longer pass by snow covered hills without imagining ski trails etc.). 
Therefore, it’s illusory to believe, naively, that the relation between sports and 
humans is purely an external one, and that it is possible to utilize it in all 
innocence and impunity – while, really, sport has markedly transformed the 
                                                 
16 David L. Andrews and Michael L. Silk, eds., Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, Consumption, and 
Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012). 
17 Michael L. Silk and David L. Andrews, “Sport and the Neoliberal Conjuncture: Complicating the 
Consensus,” in Ibid., 9. 
18 Robert Redeker, “Sport as an Opiate of International Relations: The Myth and Illusion of Sport as a Tool 
of Foreign Diplomacy,” Sport in Society 11, no. 4 (2008): 494-500. 
19 Ibid., 495. 
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human being, inducing anthropological changes, if not mutations. It’s just as 
much of an illusion to think of sports as controllable, because in this case one 
simply forgets the essence of sport, which is both the manufacture of humans and 
spiritual authority. Sport is nothing other than a devouring monster-machine, 
become autonomous in relation to individuals and states, swallowing up 
everything in its way.”20 
In this view, sport has been elevated to the status of religion; it is irrevocably woven into 
the fabric of social life to the point of near-infallibility. In Redeker’s view, it is not 
accurate to assess which international relations theory best explains sport, because the 
ideological foundations of international sport essentially comprise a theory of 
international relations. While this perspective is not fully developed in Redeker’s brief 
essay, it emphasizes the prominence of ideas and international sport’s reliance upon them 
for legitimacy and political power.21 
Sport Governance: Utility vs. Autonomy 
One issue that is derivative of the struggle to place international sport within 
theories of international relations is the question of whether to characterize “sport” as 
political tool or political actor. Sport is often seen as a facilitator of diplomacy, a medium 
for asserting or reflecting ideology, a useful tool in “nation-building”, an access point 
(particularly for smaller states) to the broader international political system, and a 
burgeoning global industry.22 In any case, with the exception of sport’s growing 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 499. 
21 John M. Hoberman, Sport and Political Ideology (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984) is 
almost certainly a forerunner to Redeker’s position. While Hoberman’s focus is primarily on state use of 
sport for domestic purposes, the particular qualities of sport that allow it to be used for political purposes 
(or more abstractly, to appear to be used politically while in fact transcending politics) are discussed. A 
more succinct argument can be found in John M. Hoberman, “The Myth of Sport as a Peace-Promoting 
Political Force,” SAIS Review 31, no. 1 (2011): 17-29. 
22 Houlihan, Sport and International Politics, 8-25. The utility of sport in nation building might reasonably 
be classified as more relevant to sport and domestic politics, although Houlihan rightly points out the use of 
sport by imperialist nations during colonization. On this point, a thorough and illuminative study of 
American sport is Gerald R. Gems, The Athletic Crusade: Sport and American Cultural Imperialism 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2012). Cha, Theory of Sport and Politics, echoes Houlihan’s 
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relevance to the global economy, all of these descriptions of sport identify it as a tool for 
state use. Sport’s relevance to international relations is primarily rooted in the ability of 
states to freely incorporate sport into their foreign policymaking. 
At the same time, sport is often described as a relatively autonomous political 
entity. Houlihan has difficulty reconciling these two views. After listing the ways in 
which sport serves state interests, he stresses the importance of international sport 
organizations as key political actors and their ability to influence state behavior.23 In 
attempting to combine these two views, his argument appears to be that while sport 
serves an instrumental purpose for states, international sport organizations dictate the 
scope of sport’s allowable uses. This still leaves the question, however, of why states 
would acknowledge the authority of international sport organizations and, more 
importantly, whether the international sport governance system is capable of policing 
what it deems to be unacceptable behaviors. 
Keys’ study of the development of international sport governance during the 
interwar years suggests the apparent autonomy of international sport was a function of 
isolationist foreign policies by many states following World War I as well as the 
cosmopolitan rhetoric espoused by sport leaders.24 Essentially, war-weary states were not 
interested in participating in the development of international sport, but did not see the 
Olympic movement and its adherents as politically threatening given their staunch belief 
in sport’s political neutrality and espousal of utopian values. Other scholars have focused 
on sport’s political relevance through the lens of political economy, defining its 
                                                                                                                                                 
“themes for discussion” with his typology which classifies sport as a tool for constructing and broadcasting 
national identity, for fostering diplomacy, and for instigating domestic political and social change. 
23 Houlihan, Sport and International Politics, 55-81. 
24 Barbara J. Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 40-63. 
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importance in terms of its revenue potential and economic impact.25 Collectively, these 
views emphasize sport’s importance in international affairs, but lack a deeper exploration 
of this relationship. 
POLITICS IN AND OF THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 
While the preceding literature focused on international sport, the works in this 
section deal specifically with the Olympic movement. These are highly relevant given 
this study’s scope. One of the earliest works aimed at analyzing the politics of the 
Olympics succinctly describes them as a reflection of the tension between an increasingly 
international and transnational world still clinging to nationalist sentiments.26 John 
Hoberman, focusing on Olympic ideology, has been highly critical of the IOC, arguing 
that its ideological façade masks more sinister motives.27 Peacock has adopted ideas 
about the socially-constructed nature of reality and meaning to demonstrate how the 
Olympic movement adapts to and takes advantage of changing international conditions.28 
Others have taken a more subtle, empirically-oriented approach in drawing attention to 
the various moments in Olympic history when sport and politics intersected.29 Although 
not strictly academic, the investigative journalism of Andrew Jennings and (to a lesser 
degree) Dave Zirin has provided powerful insight into the depth and breadth of Olympic 
                                                 
25 John Forster and Nigel K.Ll. Pope, The Political Economy of Global Sporting Organisations (New 
York: Routledge, 2004). 
26 Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979). 
27 John M. Hoberman, “Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism,” Journal of Sport History 22, no. 1 
(1995): 1-37. The “moral bankruptcy” of the Olympics is also explored in John Hoberman, The Olympic 
Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986). 
28 Byron Peacock, “‘A Secret Instinct of Social Preservation’: Legitimacy and the Dynamic Reconstitution 
of Olympic Conceptions of the ‘Good’,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2011): 477-502. 
29 Two comprehensive though now out-of-date studies are Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the 
Modern Games, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1992); and Christopher R. Hill, Olympic Politics 
(New York: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
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politics and international sport governance.30 Unburdened by the strictures typically 
associated with academic writing, these authors have directly challenged the corrupt, 
immoral practices of these organizations and, perhaps more importantly, the effects of 
such poor governance for those inside and outside the sphere of elite international sport. 
Although they are historical studies, Nicholas Evan Sarantakes’ Dropping the 
Torch and Thomas M. Hunt’s Drug Games both explore the more general ways in which 
the Cold War made the connection between sport and politics more explicit.31 
Sarantakes’ study of the 1980 U.S.-led Olympic boycott, an exemplar in historical data 
collection, focuses primarily on the individual failings of President Jimmy Carter and his 
administration’s misunderstanding of Olympic governance. Hunt deals more explicitly 
with the international sport governance apparatus, showing how, especially during the 
1970s and 1980s, the power and prestige of the IOC had not exploded to the level at 
which it exists today. This fractured, often contentious governance system was unable to 
efficiently or effectively deal with the growing drug use problem in international sport; it 
took nearly four decades from the anti-doping movement’s “focusing event”—a death 
attributed to drug use at the Olympics in 1960—for comprehensive anti-doping policy 
and enforcement to take effect. 
These studies as well as others comprising the abundance of Olympic literature 
confirm several basic assumptions of this study. Namely, that the Olympics have been 
                                                 
30 Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996) and Foul! The Secret 
World of FIFA: Bribes, Vote Rigging, and Ticket Scandals (London: Harpersport, 2006). Zirin is prolific in 
the area of sport and politics, though his most recent work, Brazil’s Dance with the Devil: The World Cup, 
the Olympics, and the Fight for Democracy (Chicago: Haymarket, 2014) deals most explicitly with the 
Olympic movement. 
31 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Thomas M. Hunt, Drug Games: The International 
Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping, 1960-2008 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011). 
Drug Games builds on the arguments first developed in Thomas M. Hunt, “Sport, Drugs, and the Cold 
War: The Conundrum of Olympic Doping Policy: 1970-1979,” Olympika: The International Journal of 
Olympic Studies 16 (2007): 19-42. 
 56 
politicized throughout history and continue to have political appeal, and that sport 
governance itself is not immune to the forces of organizational politics and bureaucracy. 
However, while the importance of demonstrating that the Olympics are a political 
phenomenon cannot be overstated, there is less engagement in this literature, in general, 
with the questions of why and how this process occurs. This is a problem or gap 
addressed by this study, which advances a theoretical framework that can account for the 
empirical consensus of the relationship between international sport and international 
politics. 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
As discussed above, it is somewhat difficult to organize empirical studies of 
“sport and politics” into more discrete categories. Most studies take a phenomenon- or 
case-based approach to studying this relationship (e.g., Olympic boycotts, the 2008 
Beijing Olympics, sport for development policy) and do not delineate between specific 
types of sport or politics, although the Olympics are the overwhelmingly favored 
laboratory of choice for scholarship in this area. This section examines this literature, 
assessing its conclusions and how it informs or contradicts the arguments advanced in 
this study. 
Sport and the Cold War 
The bipolar international system during the Cold War offers scholars an 
accessible opportunity to study the ways in which states used sport to further their foreign 
policies (particularly the demonstration of political ideology) as well as the efficacy of 
international sport governance in developing and managing its relationship with the 
broader political environment. Curiously, many of the empirical examinations of sport 
during the Cold War focus on its effects in domestic political contexts. Chalip, in 
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formulating a heuristic method of performing sport policy analysis, shows how Cold War 
concerns undermined the development of a more robust amateur sport policy in the 
United States.32 Koller elaborates on these preliminary findings, demonstrating how 
America’s desire to use sport to symbolize the superiority of Western ideology 
effectively strips its athletes of many constitutional rights and protections.33 Essentially, 
these studies suggest that in an effort to manipulate sport into a useful foreign policy tool, 
the United States has adopted sub-optimal sport policies which harm both individual 
athletes and the general development of sport within its borders. 
One of the preeminent sport and Cold War scholars, Thomas M. Hunt—in 
addition to his work in anti-doping—has explored the connection between sport and 
politics both in the United States and within the Soviet bloc.34 While Hunt confirms the 
notion that U.S. domestic sport policy is primarily influenced by a desire to be distinctive 
from Soviet (i.e., state-controlled) sport policy, his study of national sport policy in the 
German Democratic Republic shows that sport was used to assert national identity within 
the Soviet bloc; East Germany was competing with the U.S.S.R. for national autonomy 
just as much as it was competing with the United States. This finding not only confirms 
the belief of sport’s utility in nation-building, but also undermines the American belief 
                                                 
32 Laurence Chalip, “Policy Analysis in Sport Management,” Journal of Sport Management 9, no. 1 
(1995): 1-13. 
33 Dionne L. Koller, “How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in the 
Pursuit of National Prestige,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2008, no. 5 (2008): 1465-1544. 
Koller actually concentrates more on the effects of U.S. compliance with WADA’s policies, but situates 
this analysis within the milieu of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. 
34 Thomas M. Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic Medals Race,” International Journal of 
the History of Sport 24, no. 6 (2007): 796-818; “American Sport Policy and the Cultural Cold War: The 
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Years,” Journal of Sport History 33, no. 3 (2006): 273-297. The Soviet 
study is Thomas M. Hunt, Paul Dimeo, Matthew T. Bowers, and Scott R. Jedlicka, “The Diplomatic 
Context of Doping in the Former German Democratic Republic: A Revisionist Examination,” International 
Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 18 (2012): 2486-2499. 
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that, in international sport, the U.S. faced a united Soviet front in international sport 
during the Cold War. 
While studies of sport during the Cold War offer an excellent set of circumstances 
under which to study sport and politics, the major criticism of this work is that, given the 
end of the Cold War over two decades ago, its conclusions are only specific to that 
particular international environment. The end of bipolarity as well as the spread of 
Western capitalism and popular culture suggests that the relevance of sport to the 
projection of political ideology is waning. This is a legitimate criticism. However, as 
these scholars have shown, although the Cold War may be over, the policies developed 
during this period have had and continue to have far-reaching effects on sport policies 
around the world. 
The Olympics as a Site of Protest 
One of the most visible links between sport and politics is the Olympic boycott. 
The boycott which has received the vast majority of scholarly attention (likely due to the 
involvement of the United States) is that of the 1980 Summer Olympic games in 
Moscow.35 The scholarly consensus with regard to this event highlights the United 
States’ fundamental ignorance of international sport governance as well as the impotence 
of the IOC to influence the United States’ or the U.S.S.R.’s foreign policy. More 
comprehensive examinations of protest activity in international sport question the 
efficacy of Olympic boycotts in general, while others emphasize the utility of the 
Olympic games as a mechanism for enhancing the visibility of political issues.36 While 
                                                 
35 Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch. See also Derick L. Hulme, Jr., The Political Olympics: Moscow, 
Afghanistan, and the 1980 U.S. Boycott (New York: Praeger, 1990). 
36 Scott Rosner and Deborah Low, “The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on Effectuating 
International Political and Economic Change,” Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law 11, no. 1 
(2009): 27-79; M. Patrick Cottrell and Travis Nelson, “Not Just the Games? Power, Protest and Politics at 
the Olympics,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 4 (2010): 729-753. 
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Rosner and Low suggest that, in terms of influencing broad political change, Olympic 
boycotts have historically failed to accomplish their objects, Cottrell and Nelson show 
that protest activity has shifted from being state-driven to being initiated primarily by 
interest groups and other non-state actors. Moreover, this protest activity has increased 
over time. A synthesis of these two studies’ findings seems to indicate that while protests 
which utilize sport are not effective in terms of achieving measurable change, they can be 
highly effective in elevating the awareness and significant of particular issues to a 
broader audience. Berg, Kessler, and Hunt have more recently attempted to reassess 
state-driven boycotts in terms of realist international relations theory, although their 
findings seem to be targeted at assessing the utility of the realist paradigm rather than the 
effectiveness of boycotts.37 
Sport and Diplomacy 
There is a wealth of literature examining how sport has factored into diplomatic 
relations for many different states and in many different settings. One of the most 
comprehensive attempts at empirically studying the use of sport as a tool of foreign 
diplomacy is Heere, et al.’s study of relations between South Korea and Japan 
surrounding the 2002 World Cup.38 Utilizing a mixture of methods and drawing on a 
wealth of primary and secondary data, this study assesses the impact of the World Cup on 
instigating or sustaining the changing nature of both diplomatic and cultural relations 
between the two nations. The key finding was that (perhaps unfortunately) the 
administration of the event had less to do with affecting change than the performance of 
                                                 
37 Brennan K. Berg, Seth A. Kessler, and Thomas M. Hunt, “A Realist Perspective of Governmental 
Perceptions of Olympic Boycott Movements, 1936-2008,” International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics 4, no. 3 (2012): 307-320. 
38 Bob Heere, et al., “The Impact of World Cup 2002 on the Bilateral Relationship between South Korea 
and Japan,” Journal of Sport Management 26, no. 2 (2012): 127-142. 
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the national teams, particularly for South Koreans. In a similar vein, Stevenson and Alaug 
studied the role of football during Yemeni unification.39 However, these authors found 
that the particular construction of the national football team had a positive impact on the 
ability of Yemen’s government to promote an image of a unified state. 
Other studies, in the spirit of Houlihan’s notion of sport providing states “access” 
to the international system, have examined how states have used international sporting 
events to develop a greater international diplomatic presence. Two recent important 
studies include Ndlovu’s assessment of South Africa’s incorporation of the 2010 World 
Cup into its foreign policy and Grix and Lee’s more comprehensive analysis of event 
hosting as a projection of soft power.40 Both of these studies suggest that nations bid for 
and host large sporting events not so much as a demonstration of ideology as a sign of 
commitment to international norms, development, and socioeconomic progress. 
Summary of Empirical Literature 
Two major themes emerge from the empirical literature on sport and international 
politics. First, the purposes for which states incorporate sport into their foreign policy 
agendas have changed over time. Whereas the Cold War political environment 
encouraged states to use sport’s international visibility as a method for asserting the 
superiority of ideological claims, the post-Cold War world is one in which sport provides 
a venue for demonstrating conformity to global norms. Given the increase in prevalence 
and importance of non-state actors on the international stage, the use of sport to address 
political issues is not the sole province of states, either. 
                                                 
39 Thomas B. Stevenson and Abdul Karim Alaug, “Sports Diplomacy and Emergent Nationalism Football 
Links between the Two Yemens, 1970–1990,” Anthropology of the Middle East 3, no. 2 (2008): 1-19. 
40 Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, “Sports as Cultural Diplomacy: The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa's 
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More fundamentally, however, much of the empirical work in sport and 
international politics is based upon the assumption that sport is a political tool. When 
states or other actors wish to use sport, they do so relatively freely, with little threat of 
punishment or serious backlash. Again, this underscores the fundamental question 
addressed in this study. International sport possesses a complex and highly political 
governance structure, and is decidedly relevant to international politics. Further, 
international sport draws much of its legitimacy from its ideological underpinnings, 
particularly (though not exclusively) to its claim as a cosmopolitan movement where all 
states are welcome regardless of political stripe. If this is the case, why do non-sport 
actors appear to use sport for political purposes, ostensibly violating a fundamental 
legitimizing tenet of international sport governance, with relative impunity? The extant 
theoretical and empirical literature has not, to date, examined this question with any vigor 
or specificity. 
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Chapter 3:  Methods 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this study is to elaborate a parsimonious theoretical framework 
that can offer a deeper and more useful explanation of the relationship between Olympic 
governance and international politics. In Chapter 1, I argued that the Olympic governance 
system can accurately be described as an international regime. Further, I explained how 
the meanings and values with which the regime imbues sport in order to legitimize the 
regime’s authority, when interpreted by free riding states in the broader international 
political arena, can be used to undermine the regime’s ability to enforce its rules and 
protect its guiding principles. The key component of the reasoning supporting this theory 
is the fundamental contradiction between asserting sport’s apolitical status and believing 
it can serve political purposes. While this logic is compelling, the utility of a theory is 
measured not only by its underlying logic but its applicability to empirical observation. 
This study will provide empirical support for the proposed theory through a qualitative 
case study research design. A qualitative approach is most appropriate here, as it allows 
for the type of detailed exploration of causation not found in most quantitative or 
experimental methodologies. This is especially relevant because the proposed theory 
specifies causal mechanisms—the structure of the Olympic governance system and its 
rigid beliefs about sport—linking characteristics of the Olympic regime to problematic 
outcomes. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Case study methodology has been identified as a valuable approach in theory 
building and will be used in this study.1 Specifically, data gathered from historical case 
studies will be analyzed using process tracing methods to assess the plausibility of the 
theoretical propositions and arguments articulated in the first chapter of this dissertation. 
A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”2 Further, “the case study inquiry copes 
with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with 
data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from 
the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”3 
While this definition deals with case studies in a very general sense, it illuminates two 
important points. First, case studies can better account for particular contextual effects 
than more generalized, large-n studies; by extension, using multiple case studies can 
better control for context as an intervening variable and thereby identify consistencies in 
observations across varying sets of circumstances. Second, because of their emphasis on 
contextual detail, case studies have the ability to provide the richness and depth necessary 
to better support causal claims. This makes the methodology more useful for tasks such 
as theory development than strictly experimental designs. 
                                                 
1 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Melissa E. Graebner, “Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and 
Challenges,” Academy of Management Journal 50, no. 1 (2007): 25-32. In the field of political science, 
case studies are suggested to be particularly useful in building theories involving “macropolitical 
phenomena” (like the theory advanced in this study). See Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in 
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 ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 18. 
3 Ibid. 
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Before delving into the specific methods and procedures used in this study, it 
would be inappropriate to forgo a discussion, however brief, of the epistemological 
underpinnings of the selected methodology. Case study methodology has been criticized 
for, among other things, a potential lack of rigor and generalizability.4 This criticism is 
particularly relevant for the purposes of this dissertation, as the same debate over the 
specific versus the general (the relative merits of induction and deduction) is also found 
in the fields of history and political science.5 Because this study thoroughly engages ideas 
from political science (specifically international relations) and because I utilize 
traditionally historical modes of research (particularly documentary analysis and the use 
of narrative), it is pertinent to address these criticisms. 
At the core of critiques leveled against small-n research methodologies, whether 
they be case studies, historical narratives, hermeneutics, or other similar approaches, is an 
epistemological belief that narrow, highly specific analyses are inherently unable to 
contribute to a broader corpus of knowledge about a given subject. This is, of course, 
indicative of a deeper logical positivist or post-positivist belief that the most important 
types of knowledge are obtained through the natural scientific model of deduction and the 
testing of hypotheses.6 By rejecting the a priori existence of theories or laws and 
counting as important (or at least relevant) the contextual details that make a given case 
or set of cases unique or unlikely to be replicated, these strategies seem to readily admit 
that generalization beyond narrowly-defined contexts is an innately fruitless endeavor. 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 14-16. 
5 Jack S. Levy, “Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis 
of International Relations,” in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of 
International Relations, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2001), 39-84. Many of the contributions in this volume are thematically similar to Levy’s. 
6 A standard text which offers an accessible explanation of scientific philosophy as well as a rejection of 
the central tenets of logical positivism is Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2
nd
 ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). 
 65 
The emphasis on induction and the reluctance to accept the existence of an objectively-
defined “truth” to be proved or disproved tends to group small-n research strategies into 
either the social constructionist or postmodernist epistemological camps. These basic 
philosophical differences are not easily resolved if indeed they can be resolved at all. 
This irreconcilability suggests that further expounding on the merits of the particular 
assumptions and logics informing these positions would be largely unnecessary for the 
purposes of this dissertation. It would instead be more productive to assess whether the 
particular methodology in question is being appropriately used in this study to 
accomplish the task of theory building. 
The use of a methodology strongly linked to epistemologies which reject ideas 
like the objectively neutral researcher and the existence of truth independent of human 
experience to construct and provide support for a theory may seem contradictory. In other 
words, a methodology that elevates the importance of the specific and questions the 
validity of generalization would seem ill-suited for use in developing generalized 
statements about the relationship among phenomena. However, this wrongly assumes an 
incompatibility between small-n research and a positivist or post-positivist epistemology. 
As E.H. Carr wrote, “The historian is not really interested in the unique, but in what is 
general in the unique.”7 If this is true, and the study of “the unique” can be used to say 
something general about observed phenomena, what advantages can this sort of strategy 
provide in the pursuit of theory construction? Because the theory proposed in this study 
advances a causal relationship, a more specific form of this question might be, “What 
advantages can a small-n study provide in an investigation of causation that large-n 
studies cannot?” 
                                                 
7 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York: Random House, 1961), 80. 
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A concise and useful response to this question lies in one of Andrew Bennett’s 
and Alexander L. George’s many explications of process tracing as a useful method for 
political scientists (i.e., proponents of “the general”) and historians (i.e., proponents of 
“the unique”) alike. In advocating for this common ground, they assert: 
The epistemological middle ground consists of the assertion that causal 
mechanisms and causal effects are both essential to causal explanation. The 
methodological middle ground is the use of process tracing to identify and test 
hypothesized causal mechanisms in historical cases. The theoretical middle 
ground centers on typological theories. These theories allow for equifinality, path 
dependency, interaction effects, and nonlinear relations. They also sacrifice a 
substantial degree of parsimony to achieve greater explanatory richness.8 
In essence, Bennett and George admit that historical or case study research will never 
generate parsimonious theories or achieve broad generalizability in the same way or to 
the same extent as large-n studies. However, what these studies lack in elegance they 
make up for with explanatory power. While analyzing large amounts of data can uncover 
strong correlative relationships, a greater attention to detail can explore causation with a 
much higher level of precision. Moreover, the explanatory power gained through small-n 
research need not be isolated to a single case or narrative. Given a posited causal 
relationship or causal mechanism, a case study methodology offers a highly useful way of 
investigating these claims and deriving general conclusions. 
These points are certainly not original. The preceding discussion is therefore not 
particularly enlightening, but it serves to emphasize that the selected methodology is 
                                                 
8 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political 
Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci,” in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, 
and the Study of International Relations, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2001), 165. Bennett and George define a typological theory as one that “identifies 
generalized pathways, whether the path in question has occurred only once, a thousand times, or is merely 
hypothesized as a potential path that has not yet occurred at all” (p. 157). The point here is that typological 
theory offers a way to situate otherwise atheoretical historical scholarship within a generalizable theoretical 
framework without committing to the precise specification of variables and relationships required by, say, 
mathematical modeling. 
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appropriate for the task of theory construction undertaken in this study. As Bennett and 
George argue, process tracing methods link case study methodology to the construction 
of sound theoretical frameworks. In the following sections, this method and its 
application in this particular study will be described in greater detail. 
METHODS 
Process tracing methods are applied in this study to three historical cases 
involving the Olympic regime. This research strategy is designed to test the central theory 
of sport and state behavior advanced in this dissertation; specifically, the causal link 
between the Olympic movement’s governance structure and ideological principles, and 
the concomitant struggle to enforce those principles, as well as the ability of states to 
manipulate Olympic sport when they feel it politically advantageous to do so. Process 
tracing is “the attempt to trace empirically the temporal and possibly causal sequences of 
events within a case that intervene between independent variables and observed 
outcomes.”9 When used for theory testing and development, process tracing involves 
comparing the historical data or narrative to predictions derived from the theory. 
Typically, this calls for the selection of cases that are both “most likely” and “least 
likely”; that is, cases which represent relatively “easy” and “difficult” tests of the theory 
under investigation.10 
Case Selection 
Given the relative simplicity of the theoretical framework under investigation, 
cases were selected primarily for the explicitness of the relationship between Olympic 
sport and international politics evinced within them. Only the postwar era was considered 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 144. 
10 Ibid., 150-151. 
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for potential cases, as both the international sport system and the international political 
system were markedly different than either before World War I or during the interwar 
era. Because some variation on the dependent variable is necessary in a research design 
such as this, and in line with the guidelines suggested by Bennett and George, three cases 
with differing outcomes were selected.11 The first case, concerning the boycott of the 
1980 Moscow Olympics, represents a failure of the IOC to prevent politics from 
intruding into sport. The second, concerning the issue of South African participation in 
international sport, demonstrates mixed results for the regime. The third, concerning the 
involvement of intergovernmental bodies in the development of the World Anti-Doping 
Agency, suggests positive results for Olympic governance, as it was able to assert its 
authority over international sport issues and control the extent to which sport and politics 
mixed; this represents a “hard” case for the theory. 
As I will address in more detail in the section on variable designation, it may 
seem as though there is a bit of selection bias evident here. All of the cases involve an 
instance of the Olympic regime asserting the political neutrality of sport, which would 
seem to exclude all other cases in which the independent variable took on a different 
value. This seeming bias is not due to intentional selection of theory-confirming cases, 
but rather the construction of the theory itself, as well as the essential nature of the 
Olympic regime. I have argued that the causal phenomenon which works to undermine 
the regime’s ability to enforce its own rules is a feature of the regime itself, and that this 
feature has remained constant over its lifetime. In other words, there are no cases 
involving a typologically different Olympic governance system, one that acknowledges 
sport’s political significance. Nonetheless, I have attempted to select cases in which 
                                                 
11 Ibid. Also see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 129-137. 
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relatively small but significant differences in the independent variable can be ascertained 
and analyzed. The following sections briefly describe these cases and the data used in 
constructing and probing the processes linking the different theoretical components under 
investigation. 
“The South African Problem” at the 1968 Summer Olympics 
Synopsis 
The question of how to reconcile South African domestic policies of apartheid 
with the Olympic movement’s values and desire to remain apart from political issues was 
debated within the larger context of a global shunning of South Africa initiated by the 
United Nations in 1962. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1761 denounced apartheid, 
and called upon U.N. member nations to break diplomatic ties and sever economic 
relations with South Africa. The IOC had to balance, on one hand, the appropriateness of 
becoming embroiled in what it saw as an issue of South African domestic policy and, on 
the other, the growing consensus among many states that South African participation in 
international sport was inexcusable. After banning the South Africa National Olympic 
Committee (SANOC) in 1964 after it refused to denounce national apartheid, the IOC 
again took up the issue of South African participation prior to the 1968 Games. Despite a 
commitment from SANOC to send a mixed-race team to the Olympics and the IOC’s 
strong desire to not exclude any nation for political reasons, international pressure and the 
fear of widespread protests or boycotts ultimately influenced the IOC to rescind South 
Africa’s invitation. A few years later, South Africa was officially expelled from the 
Olympic movement; it would eventually rejoin in 1992 following the repeal of apartheid. 
Data Sources 
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Two books are of great importance in constructing and analyzing this case. The 
first, Kevin Witherspoon’s Before the Eyes of the World provides the only serious 
recounting of the Mexican perspective on the Games as well as the myriad controversies 
that plagued these Olympics.12 The Mexican government was vocal in both its desire to 
host a successful event as well as its opposition to South African participation (which, 
admittedly, may have been a function of international pressure). The Race Game, 
Douglas Booth’s treatise on South African sport during apartheid, will complement data 
gleaned from official IOC documents which evince the progression of the debate over 
South Africa.13 
The U.S.-Led Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics 
Synopsis 
This case represents a “most likely” case for the theory advanced in this study. 
The U.S.-led movement to not participate in Moscow as a response to the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan was overtly political. Despite the IOC’s use of ideas about 
sport’s political neutrality to undermine the boycott, the U.S. and sixty-four other nations 
abstained from Olympic competition in 1980. Most of these nations argued that their 
actions were, rather than condemnable, justified in terms of Olympic values; the 
ideological platform of the Games was incompatible with the military occupation of a 
neighboring country by the Olympic host. In the end, the IOC adopted a strategy of stern 
rhetoric coupled with inaction, ultimately allowing all sides to claim success in the name 
of sport. The boycott was carried out, the Games were held, and the Soviets remained in 
Afghanistan for most of the decade. 
                                                 
12 Kevin B. Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games (DeKalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2008). 
13 Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998). 
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Data Sources 
Nicholas Sarantakes’ Dropping the Torch is the authoritative study of the 1980 
boycott.14 This book contains a list of sources that might reasonably be described as 
comprehensive with regard to this subject and which will be indispensable as a guide to 
supplemental research.15 Primary source material is utilized as well, including the IOC 
meeting minutes from the period as well as the public papers of U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter, who was largely responsible for the origination of the boycott idea.16 Relevant 
volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1977-1980 series 
(particularly Volume VI, which contains material related to the Soviet Union) are also 
used as primary source data.17 
UNESCO, the IOC, and the International Convention against Doping in Sport 
Synopsis 
One of the major policy issues for the Olympic regime throughout much of its 
existence has been policing drug use in sport. While performance enhancement through 
the use of chemical substances is evident as far back as the early twentieth century, 
addressing “doping” did not become a significant agenda item for international sport 
organizations until the 1960s. For the next few decades, the IOC struggled to gain control 
of what it perceived as a rapidly growing and increasingly complex problem, from 
defining “doping” to developing accurate testing protocols to determining appropriate 
                                                 
14 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
15 Ibid., 321-331. 
16 The Carter public papers are available through the American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/> 
17 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2013). 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/carter> (accessed June 18, 2014). 
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sanctions for rule violations. Despite a contentious history with the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the IOC, beginning in the 
late 1980s, worked with UNESCO, an intergovernmental organization, to develop an 
international legal instrument that reified the commitment of member states to combating 
illicit drug use in sport. 
This case represents a “least likely” scenario and a difficult test for the theory 
under investigation. Unlike the other two cases, the IOC initiated and encouraged the 
involvement of a (rather reluctant) governmental entity. Moreover, the legal instrument 
eventually passed by UNESCO—the International Convention against Doping in Sport—
acknowledges the authority of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as the leader of 
the global anti-doping effort. This runs somewhat counter, at least superficially, to the 
predictions and assumptions of the theory, which suggest that the IOC would avoid 
governmental involvement in sport policymaking. 
Data Sources 
This chapter is a revised version of my article concerning this case in The 
International Journal of the History of Sport.18 The primary source material used in that 
article, the UNESCO archive, will be drawn on as necessary to provide supplemental 
data.19 Additionally, Thomas M. Hunt’s Drug Games is the leading study of anti-doping 
policy in international sport and can provide additional context for the particular details 
of this case.20 
                                                 
18 Scott R. Jedlicka and Thomas M. Hunt, “The International Anti-Doping Movement and UNESCO: A 
Historical Case Study,” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 13 (2013), 1523-1535. 
19 The online UNESCO archive, UNESDOC, is accessible at http://unesco.org/ulis. 
20 Thomas M. Hunt, Drug Games: The International Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping, 1960-
2008 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011). 
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Designation of Variables 
Independent Variable 
The causal variables in this study are the Olympic regime’s structure and its 
commitment to apolitical sport as a necessary and sufficient condition for achieving the 
Olympic movement’s objectives. Quantifying different values for these variables is 
admittedly difficult. Indeed, with regard to regime structure, there is very little 
measurable variance, especially in the relatively short time frames of the cases under 
investigation. The same is true for the regime’s conception of sport. The lack of variance 
here can largely be attributed to the fact that the Olympic regime is stubbornly committed 
to this belief. However, it is theoretically conceivable that an organization like the IOC 
might choose to relax its allegiance to this particular tenet (or modify the tenet itself), 
which may in turn affect the ability to enforce regime rules. So, while wide ranges of 
values on this variable are not empirically evident, smaller changes on the Olympic 
regime’s implementation of this particular policy can still be ferreted out from the 
historical data. 
What might different values for this variable look like? In the extreme, 
unwavering assertions of sport’s apolitical status will be evident. Incremental changes 
toward the other end of the spectrum might include a normative restatement (i.e., sport 
should aspire to neutrality, even if reality makes this unattainable), conditional 
rationalization (i.e., particular, perhaps unlikely circumstances in a given situation trump 
the importance of this policy), or, more radically, a softening of the position in general 
(i.e., sport and politics do mix on a regular basis). The theory suggests that as values 
move toward the middle of the spectrum, the Olympic regime will be more likely to 
enforce its rules and achieve its objectives. 
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Causal Mechanism 
The causal mechanism linking the independent variable to the dependent variable 
is how states interpret both their status as free riders and the values foundational to the 
Olympic regime. The theory predicts that, as the regime redoubles its commitment to 
apolitical sport, states will be more able to pursue political objectives through sport. This 
is because 1) states recognize that they are free riding, making Olympic sport a low-cost 
political tool and 2) the regime’s staunch devotion to a particular conception of sport 
undermines its ability to enforce the rules stemming from it. Obviously, this 
oversimplifies the complexities and diversities of state interests and behavior. It also does 
not account for the possibility that states will at times be persuaded by this rhetoric and 
that regime enforcement will function normally. However, it is not the purpose of this 
study to investigate how the independent variable affects state behavior, but rather how it 
affects the ability of the Olympic regime to govern effectively. Thus, state response to the 
regime is simply the mechanism through which these two variables are linked; it is the 
process of state involvement in and reaction to the policies of Olympic organizations that 
ultimately affects the governance of international sport. 
Dependent Variable 
The outcome variable in this study is the relative effectiveness of the Olympic 
regime to enforce its rules and achieve its objectives. For each case, this will necessitate a 
clear description of the regime’s interests, intentions, and preferred outcomes. The actual 
“value” of the dependent variable will thus manifest as an assessment of the difference 
between stated objectives and actual events. As with the independent variable, 
quantification is elusive. However, in general, the expectation is that greater flexibility in 
the Olympic regime’s stance toward sport and politics in a given case, the more likely it 
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is that the regime will be able to achieve a greater percentage of its stated (or, if not 
stated, inferred) objectives or goals. 
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SECTION II: CASE STUDIES 
The cases presented in this section are all relatively well-known instances in 
which the Olympic regime had to grapple with international political concerns. As noted 
in Chapter 3, my primary concern in presenting and analyzing these cases is not to 
completely reconstruct or significantly contribute to existing historical narratives, but to 
use these accounts to assess the validity of the theory advanced in this study. The cases, 
therefore, are not presented as strict chronologies. Rather, they focus on important 
decision points and include considerations of the choices faced by individuals and 
organizations. This allows for a deeper and broader exploration of the key actors and 
sequences of events in each case, as well as a more specific investigation of the 
relationship between the Olympic regime and political behavior. 
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Chapter 4:  “The South African Problem” at the 1968 Summer 
Olympics 
The 1968 Olympic games in Mexico City are considered by many historians to be 
a watershed moment in Olympic history. From the uncertainty surrounding new sporting 
technologies and methods (most notably the ability to control for the effects of altitude 
training and performance enhancing drugs), to the disturbing Tlatelolco massacre ten 
days before the opening ceremonies (in which over 1,300 Mexican protesters were 
arrested and death toll estimates rose into the hundreds), to the very visible symbolic 
protest of sprinters John Carlos and Tommie Smith of the United States and Peter 
Norman of Australia during the medal ceremony for the men’s 200 meter event, the 
Mexico City Olympics were a crucible of social and political unrest magnified by the lens 
of international sport. However, perhaps the most significant political issue in terms of its 
breadth and depth faced by the Olympic regime in the months preceding the 1968 games 
was the policy of South African apartheid and its relationship to Olympic sport. 
Although the language of cultural harmony and inclusiveness that buttresses the 
Olympic ideological edifice would seem to be very much aligned with an opposition to 
apartheid, the matter, at least for the IOC, was not so straightforward. The IOC’s 
president, Avery Brundage, adhered closely to the belief that political concerns of any 
kind had no place in sport, and this included racial politics.1 This was particularly 
problematic in the case of South Africa. Segregation was not just a cultural practice but a 
legal institution, which meant that taking a moral stand on racial discrimination in South 
Africa would constitute interference with the country’s domestic policies, something 
which was beyond the scope of the IOC’s authority. This case presents an interesting test 
                                                 
1 Richard E. Lapchick, “South Africa: Sport and Apartheid Politics,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 445, no. 1 (1979): 156. Also see Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: 
Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
 78 
for the Olympic regime theory because it deals explicitly with the relative ability of 
Olympic governance to foist its interpretations of its rules and principles upon other 
actors. Though the IOC isolated the issue of South African participation in Mexico City 
strictly to the practices of its national Olympic committee, external pressures ultimately 
forced the IOC to not only withdraw South Africa’s invitation but to ultimately expel it 
from the Olympic movement in 1970. 
BRINGING SOUTH AFRICA BACK IN: 1965-1967 
At the seventeenth session of its General Assembly in 1962, the United Nations 
(UN) issued Resolution 1761. This statement, in no uncertain terms, condemned 
apartheid in South Africa. Further, identifying this policy of racial segregation as a global 
security risk, the UN called on its member states to break off any existing diplomatic ties 
with and impose trade embargoes upon South Africa, as well as close their borders to all 
South African government officials.2 Though apartheid was instituted in 1948, this 
resolution marked the beginning of UN engagement with the problem and signaled the 
start of a subtle coalescence of international attitudes in opposition to it. International 
sport was no exception.3 Prior to the 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo, the IOC imposed 
a deadline of December 31, 1963 for the South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC) to publicly commit to ending segregationist practices in South African sport. 
Since the early 1950s, the racial separation of sport in South Africa had been reinforced 
by both cultural tradition and legislative decree.4 Though SANOC complied with the 
                                                 
2 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1761, “The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa,” November 6, 1962. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/17/ares17.htm>. 
3 Douglas Booth, “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 38, no. 3 (2003): 479-480. Booth notes that the growing inclusion of Eastern bloc 
and African nations in international sport governance worked to challenge prevailing Eurocentric attitudes 
about sport’s political utility. 
4 Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998), 57. 
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IOC’s mandate, nominating seven black athletes to its Olympic team, the South African 
government denounced the move and asserted its authority in determining how South 
Africa would be represented in international competition.5 When SANOC refused to 
publicly defy its national government, the IOC withdrew its invitation to the Tokyo 
games.6 The IOC’s decision was not surprising given its disdain for governmental 
interference in Olympic governance, especially when it so visibly undermined assertions 
of national Olympic committee autonomy. 
This skirmish set the stage for the question of South African participation at the 
1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City. On October 5, 1965, Brundage raised the issue 
to the IOC’s Executive Committee, expressing hope that progress could be made toward 
ending racial discrimination in South African Olympic sport.7 The following day, 
however, tensions flared at the General Session meeting. Earlier that year, Italian Giulio 
Onesti had organized a meeting of the national Olympic committees in Rome, designed 
to allow the NOCs to express their views and concerns to the IOC so that their needs 
might better be addressed within the Olympic movement. Though he received an 
invitation to and attended this meeting, the South African delegate Reginald Honey was 
asked by Onesti to leave after several African NOCs protested his presence. From 
Honey’s perspective, the ordeal was offensive and placed him in an awkward position. 
Onesti responded that he was bound to act in the interests of all NOCs, and South 
Africa’s racial policies clearly placed SANOC in violation of the Olympic Charter.8 After 
a brief debate, the Committee, while recognizing that Honey was not necessarily at fault 
(being as he was an IOC representative to South Africa and not necessarily representative 
                                                 
5 Booth, The Race Game, 87. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Minutes of the IOC Executive Committee, October 5, 1965, Madrid, p. 1. 
8 Minutes of the 63
rd
 Meeting of the IOC, October 6-9, 1965, Madrid, pp. 1-3. 
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of the South African government), decided to unconditionally suspend SANOC from the 
next IOC meeting in 1966.9 The fact that South Africa had recently expanded its 
segregation of sport to spectators, requiring black sport fans to obtain permits to attend 
white events (and vice versa), may have contributed to the IOC’s decision to extend the 
position it had taken with regard to the Tokyo Olympics and keep SANOC at arm’s 
length.10 
Though officially suspended, a South African delegation did appear in Rome six 
months later to again plead its case to the IOC Executive Board, asserting its commitment 
to creating an NOC with equal racial representation and giving every assurance that it had 
government approval to pursue this initiative.11 While the Executive Board was 
enthusiastic about this development, the General Session was more skeptical, deferring 
until the IOC’s 1967 meeting to take any formal action regarding South Africa’s status.12 
In introducing discussion on the topic, Brundage noted that expulsion of SANOC, should 
the IOC decide to take such action, would likely be permanent. The South African 
delegation was composed of Frank Braun, Rudolf Opperman, and Denis McIldowie.13 
Braun and Opperman, who would both serve as SANOC presidents, had previously and 
publicly avowed their support for apartheid and segregated sport.14 Nevertheless, in their 
presentation to the General Session, these men reiterated their earlier claims made to the 
Executive Board and also pledged to institute unbiased, meritocratic selection procedures 
for SANOC’s Olympic teams.15 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Booth, The Race Game, 92. 
11 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, April 21-23, 1966, Rome, p. 2. 
12 Minutes of the 64
th
 Meeting of the IOC, April 24-30, 1966, Rome, pp. 14-15. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Booth, The Race Game, 59. 
15 Minutes of the 64
th
 Meeting of the IOC, pp. 14-15. 
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The IOC, while withholding judgment for another year, did take steps to ensure 
that the South African committee was at least making an effort to live up to its promises. 
It decided that prior to the official invitations being extended for the 1968 Olympics a 
delegation comprised of the IOC president (or a proxy) along with two African IOC 
members would visit South Africa to assess what progress had been made in bringing 
SANOC’s operations into compliance with Olympic principles.16 While the IOC was 
understandably suspicious, the cautious approach it took regarding South Africa seems a 
bit odd. Given the IOC’s (and especially Brundage’s) total contempt for political 
interference in sport and its corresponding urge to be as unequivocally inclusive as 
possible, the promises of Olympians—even those who, like the South African contingent, 
had tended toward government interference in the past—would seem to be sufficient. 
Indeed, as the 1968 games approached, the tenor of the discussion surrounding South 
Africa changed, appealing less to compliance with Olympic principles and exhibiting a 
stronger advocacy for apolitical sport. At the Executive Board’s second meeting in 1966, 
Brundage was clear in his position that “Apartheid is a political affair and has nothing to 
do with sport as such.”17 He also somewhat condescendingly cautioned: 
African Olympic Committees in new African countries do not understand that one 
cannot use sports as a stick for achieving political objectives. Whatever we are 
going to decide we have to be very careful as there is a danger with new 
countries, which may not understand our position.18 
Also at this meeting, Reginald Alexander of Kenya, Sir Ade Ademola of Nigeria, and 
Lord Killanin of Ireland were appointed to the investigative committee that would travel 
to South Africa.19 
                                                 
16 Ibid., Annex No. 5. 
17 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, October 22, 1966, Mexico City, pp. 4-5. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. The committee would keep all of its findings secret and report directly to Brundage. 
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Brundage summarized the core issue facing the IOC early in 1967, shortly before 
the committee was to leave on its fact-finding mission. Rather than stake out a clear 
position on apartheid, he chose to portray the situation as a delicate balance between, on 
one hand, a wish for full, nondiscriminatory participation at the games and, on the other, 
the fact that apartheid was a governmental policy and thus beyond the IOC’s purview.20 
Brundage, in addition to reiterating his concern that some (African) NOCs would not 
understand the IOC’s preference for inaction on this issue, also laid out a tentative set of 
evaluative benchmarks for SANOC. These were essentially the same claims made by the 
South African delegation in 1966; namely, that there would be unbiased selection 
procedures and that the government had committed to supporting SANOC’s compliance 
with Olympic rules. If the South African committee could demonstrate that these steps 
were being taken, its path back to the Olympic movement seemed clear.21 
With the IOC’s visit looming, South African Prime Minister John Vorster 
announced new state policy in April regarding the country’s representation in 
international sport events, including the Olympics. The policy, which allowed for the 
inclusion of black athletes on national teams, was specifically designed to comply with 
the IOC’s rules prohibiting discrimination.22 This preceded a very eventful May meeting 
of the IOC. SANOC submitted an extensively-argued brief demonstrating its desire to 
rejoin the IOC and to comply with its rules. The report, prepared by Frank Braun, also 
exhibited a deep understanding of Brundage’s views on the matter. In appealing to the 
IOC president’s belief in the power of sport, Braun asked rhetorically, “Mr. President, 
what will engender greater goodwill, respect, and understanding among the different 
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races of South Africa than to share in one another’s achievements at the Olympic Games 
and for a non-white to become a national sports hero?” More powerfully, though, Braun 
tapped into Brundage’s growing exasperation with what he increasingly viewed as an 
intractable domestic political issue in which the IOC had no business being involved: 
…Mr. President, time and again new issues are being raised after previous ones 
had been met. The question we have to answer for ourselves is whether we shall 
ever again be welcome in the Olympic Games. By the look of things this time will 
not arrive until a complete political reorientation has come about in South Africa, 
in other words, only when South Africa fully complies with the political destiny 
that the world desires of it, something which is clearly beyond the realm of 
sport.23 
This slippery slope argument reinforced what some members of the IOC feared most. By 
condemning an Olympic organization for complying with the policies of its government 
(regardless of whether doing so conflicted with Olympic guidelines), the IOC was 
committing itself to a policy of establishing guilt by association. Banning the South 
African NOC for its conformity with certain aspects of the apartheid regime would set a 
precedent with which the IOC was extremely uncomfortable and which it was not 
prepared to sustain. 
The General Session also received a resolution adopted by the Supreme Council 
for Sport in Africa (a regional sport governing body responsible mostly for organizing 
continental sport events in Africa) calling for South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympic 
movement, charging that the reforms claimed by SANOC were superficial and that the 
sport situation in South Africa was “totally opposed to Olympic morality and 
principles.”24 The most important statement in the resolution, however, was the final 
clause, which called on the organization’s members (essentially, African NOCs) to 
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boycott the 1968 Olympics should South Africa fail to send a fully integrated team.25 The 
IOC, for its part, was mostly unprepared to act on these strong statements, as its fact-
finding committee had not yet completed its trip. 
More than a year before the 1968 games, it was becoming clear that the 
malleability of Olympic principles allowed them to be used in support of a variety of 
positions regarding South African participation. Taken as strict moral prescriptions, the 
sport situation in South Africa clearly violated the Olympic rules prohibiting racial 
discrimination in sport. However, a more rigid interpretation of these regulations (one 
favored by Brundage as well as SANOC) suggested that their applicability was limited to 
Olympic sport alone.26 Regardless, the fact that the Olympics’ governing principles were 
being used to defend both sides of the same debate should have signaled to Olympic 
administrators that attempting to stake out a middle ground could be a precarious and 
perhaps impossible feat. Nevertheless, this strategy—that South Africa could achieve 
compliance with Olympic rules, even as a growing opposition suggested that South 
Africa’s commitment to apartheid categorically contradicted these ideals—was the one to 
which the IOC had devoted itself. 
A DECISION AND A REVERSAL: 1968 
Meeting in February 1968 prior to the Winter Olympics in Grenoble, France, the 
General Session was once again considering the South African issue, now with increased 
urgency given the short amount of time before the Summer Olympics. First, the Session 
was presented with the results of the fact-finding committee’s September trip to South 
Africa, which indicated that while SANOC was more or less complying with the letter of 
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Olympic law, the organization was still very much missing the mark in terms of its spirit. 
However, on the instructions of Brundage, the committee focused its conclusions on the 
former point, suggesting that SANOC had done enough to make sending a multiracial 
team to Mexico City a feasible task.27 
The meeting attendees then listened to another lengthy statement from SANOC 
President Frank Braun. Braun once again employed Olympic rhetoric to his advantage, 
asserting that Coubertin himself would have desired South African inclusion in the 
Olympic movement and pointedly questioning whether the IOC wanted to be responsible 
for “dashing the hopes” of black South African athletes. In making the second point, he 
also suggested that banning SANOC could prompt some sort of (perhaps violent) protest 
action against the South African government, something for which the IOC would be 
directly responsible.28 More importantly, Braun knew that with time growing short, 
SANOC had leverage. He appealed to the bureaucrats on the Committee, saying that 
South Africa had fully complied with the requests made of it at the 1967 meeting in 
Tehran, and emphasized that “further demands on South Africa will result in a complete 
break in its relationship with the IOC.”29 While threatening such a move was clearly a 
gamble, Braun likely knew that Brundage could not abide the idea that the IOC would be 
responsible for driving nations away from the Olympic movement. If the decision came 
down to a potential public backlash against South African attendance in Mexico City and 
the country’s certain (and perhaps permanent) absence from the Olympic family, it 
seemed likely that the IOC would opt for inclusivity. 
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The IOC was satisfied that SANOC had lived up to the requests made of it in 
Tehran, which were to achieve multiracial representation among both athletes and 
administrators, to integrate housing and travel accommodations for the team, and to 
compete as a single team under the South African flag.30 Some members, however, 
continued to voice concerns that the integration of the South African Olympic team had 
had virtually no impact upon the ongoing segregation of sport in South Africa, and that in 
this sense, SANOC was not living up to the spirit of the Olympic ideal. Here again, the 
IOC found itself mired in the drudgery and uncertainty of interpreting its organizational 
purpose. How extensively should Olympic rules be applied? Did the IOC have a 
responsibility to govern a state’s entire sport infrastructure, or simply its Olympic arm? 
Would a decision to ban South Africa in 1968 set a precedent the organization could not 
live up to? The IOC had been grappling with these questions for almost five years with 
no clear resolution or statement of policy. Some members saw SANOC’s achievement of 
the standards set for it at the Tehran meeting as sufficient for inclusion in 1968, while 
others favored returning to the original requests made in 1963, asking for a public 
declaration of SANOC’s opposition to segregated sport. Though the IOC was not 
prepared to issue a formal organizational statement on South Africa’s status within the 
Olympic movement in general, a decision for Mexico City needed to be made. Putting the 
matter to a vote, the IOC, by absolute majority, supported South African inclusion at the 
1968 Summer Olympics.31 
Though the possibility of a negative response (particularly a boycott) was known 
to the IOC and discussed prior to opting for South African participation, it does not 
appear that the organization lent much credence to the threat itself or its potential scope. 
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This was a miscalculation. The IOC expected that many African nations would oppose 
the decision and quickly commit to a boycott, something that occurred almost 
immediately following the decision. Unexpected, however, was the rapid growth in 
global support for these moves. With public opposition to South Africa’s inclusion 
stretching into the Soviet Union and Scandinavia, the IOC grew worried that it had 
unwittingly and irreparably ruined the 1968 games.32 As it became clear during the spring 
that a concerted boycott effort reaching far beyond the African continent was in the 
offing, Brundage dug in. Using rhetoric both he and the IOC would employ in coming 
years to deal with a variety of so-called political intrusions, Brundage pledged that “the 
Mexico Games will go on,” and expressed his displeasure that boycotting nations would 
use the Olympics for political purposes.33 Though some nations supported these views 
and promised to attend the games in Mexico City, Brundage eventually acquiesced to the 
growing calls from within the Olympic movement to reopen the issue.34 
At the urging of Mexican General and IOC Vice President Jose de J. Clark, 
Brundage convened an emergency meeting of the IOC’s executive board in April.35 
Tensions were high. Calling attention to a letter circulated by Brundage in the wake of 
the Grenoble decision defending the IOC’s stance, Soviet IOC member Constantin 
Andrianov accused Brundage of essentially taking a cheap shot at the Soviet Union. In 
the letter, Brundage compared the implications of the South Africa vote to the decision to 
admit the USSR to the IOC in 1952, and to continue to include it even after Soviet 
attempts to quell the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.36 Though perhaps petty, this 
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squabble carried symbolic weight, as the USSR had been a supporter of the African 
NOCs and its own threats to boycott were considered very credible.37 Following this 
exchange, the Board members confirmed their procedural limitations with regard to 
revisiting the South Africa decision, noting that the Board could not enact policy, only 
make recommendations to the General Session.38 Further, Brundage noted that the 
General Session, which would not meet again until immediately before the games in 
Mexico City, could not call an emergency meeting without twenty-four formal requests 
for such, a number that had not yet been reached.39 Confident in its understanding that it 
could take no immediate action, the board adjourned for the day. 
On Sunday, April 21, Brundage and the Executive Board finally began to assess 
policy options. The Board identified two choices available to it; essentially, to uphold or 
reverse the decision made in Grenoble to accept a South African team’s participation in 
Mexico City. A third option, in which SANOC would be asked to voluntarily withdraw 
from the games, was also considered.40 If the IOC persisted in its position that SANOC, 
having satisfactorily complied with Olympic rules, should be allowed to attend the 
games, the Executive board projected that the result would be nothing short of chaos. The 
Mexico City Organizing Committee, under domestic pressure to bar South Africa from 
the Olympics, might refuse to extend an invitation to SANOC. More seriously, the 
Mexican government might withhold visas for the South African team. In either case, the 
IOC would be forced to withdraw and ultimately cancel the games.41 Additionally, the 
threat of a mass boycott was accompanied by a concern that IFs might also revoke their 
                                                 
37 Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World, 66. 
38 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, April 20-21, 1968, p. 2-3. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p. 5. 
41 Ibid. 
 89 
support, choosing instead to stage a separate multi-sport event independently of the 
IOC.42 Finally, there existed real trepidation that SANOC’s presence in Mexico City 
could prompt an act (or acts) of violence.43 
At the same time, the view that admitting South Africa was the right choice 
endured. Brundage, again invoking the 1952 decision to admit the USSR to the Olympic 
movement, suggested that immediate reactions should not deter the IOC from making the 
right long-term decision, which was (in this case and most cases) to be as inclusive as 
possible. He also raised the concern first mentioned by SANOC President Frank Braun 
several months prior that South African exclusion might ultimately become a permanent 
reality.44 Rather astutely, Brundage pointed out that within South Africa, nothing had 
changed since the Grenoble decision. A reversal now would be tantamount to allowing 
politics to govern Olympic sport; the time for a substantive decision on the matter had 
come and gone. The debate to that point had thus revealed the impossible position in 
which the Executive Board found itself. It was responsible for maintaining solidarity 
within the Olympic movement and preserving the integrity of the Mexico City games, 
objectives which would be rendered very difficult if not impossible to achieve if South 
Africa was allowed to compete. At the same time, it strongly objected to the appearance 
of submitting to external political forces or excluding any nation from the games, which 
would be the case if the Grenoble decision was reversed.45 
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Up to that point, the only concrete proposal on the table was one submitted by 
General Clark, which relied upon a fuzzy legal interpretation of IOC procedure to 
disqualify the Grenoble decision and uphold the organization’s original 1963 decision to 
bar South Africa from the games.46 This was summarily dismissed by Brundage as 
unbecoming of the Olympic movement; such a grave decision could not be resolved on 
technicalities alone.47 It had become clear during the course of the meeting that, in the 
interests of safety as well as the preservation of the Olympic movement, the consensus 
favored withdrawing South Africa’s invitation to Mexico City. With the games only six 
months away, it was also clear that bringing the issue to the General Session in 
accordance with IOC rules (or relatedly, asking SANOC to voluntarily withdraw) was 
infeasible. The Board, forced to choose between two undesirable options, sent a telegram 
to all IOC members urging them to support a proposal to revoke South Africa’s invitation 
to the 1968 Olympics, a proposal that was ultimately approved.48 
The backlash from SANOC and the South African government was predictably 
vitriolic.49 In addressing the decision at the General Session’s meeting in Mexico City 
before the Olympics began, the IOC clarified that SANOC had never been suspended 
from the IOC, only refused invitation to specific Olympic events.50 The IOC appears to 
be engaging in a bit of revisionist history on this point. The documentary record and the 
tenor of South Africa’s appeals leading up to the 1968 games suggest that the question of 
SANOC’s status ran much deeper than its participation in Mexico City. Nevertheless, the 
IOC committed itself to reaching a more permanent decision in the near future.51 True to 
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its word, the IOC voted in favor of South African expulsion from the IOC in 1970.52 This 
decision corresponded to a broader worldwide sporting boycott of South Africa which 
was gaining momentum around the same time.53 Upon the commencement of the 
negotiations to end apartheid in 1990, South Africa was readmitted to the Olympic 
movement, participating in the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona after a thirty-two year 
absence. 
IOC STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF POLITICS 
The IOC’s reversal of its decision to reinstate South Africa in 1968 presents an 
interesting theoretical test of the Olympic regime, primarily because the “intrusion of 
politics” so feared and loathed by Olympic administrators emanated not from states but 
from within the Olympic movement. The idea that governments can free ride on the 
efforts of the Olympic regime is an important component of the theory advanced in this 
study, but equally important are the ways in which the regime’s reliance on vaguely-
defined principles as governing mechanisms puts the IOC in situations where its 
decisions are easily influenced and manipulated by other actors. The IOC’s inability to 
enforce its decision to reinstate South Africa was driven primarily by its insistence upon 
linking the decision to and justifying it in terms of Olympic ideology. 
Fundamentally, the doctrine of apolitical sport so closely subscribed to and 
emphasized by the IOC leadership in this case is, as the theory suggests, a concept open 
to interpretation. By extension, it lends itself to myriad contradictions based on how it is 
applied in different settings. As the IOC worked to bring South Africa back into the 
Olympic movement following its absence from the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, the 
organization struggled mightily to interpret and apply this doctrine. The first issue 
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confronted by the IOC was establishing the bounds of its authority, especially when faced 
with governmental interference in or influence over an NOC. On one hand, NOCs are 
supposed to maintain their autonomy and work to prevent political interference in their 
operations. By extension, they as well as the IOC do not involve themselves in matters of 
domestic or international politics. On the other hand, domestic political power dynamics 
usually give governments the upper hand, meaning political interference in Olympic 
matters is often beyond NOCs’ control. In the South Africa case, the IOC seemed to more 
closely adhere to the first position in 1964, refusing to invite South Africa after its 
Olympic committee failed to publicly endorse the IOC’s position regarding 
discrimination in sport. However, between 1965 and 1968, this position evolved, driven 
primarily by an interpretation of the nature of Olympic sport as more fundamental and 
thus more important than any specific Olympic rule. That is, the appearance of political 
autonomy trumps the application of any single Olympic rule, as it is this autonomy which 
legitimizes the rule in the first place. It was thus more important to isolate South African 
Olympic sport as a separate sphere of governance, wholly distinct from yet continuing to 
exist within the context of apartheid politics, and limited to the selection and participation 
of athletes for Olympic events. The IOC was obliged to ensure rule application within 
this sphere alone. 
While the logical steps taken to arrive at such a conclusion are seemingly valid, 
the entirety of the reasoning process is undermined by the fact that it relies upon 
individual and contextualized interpretation of abstract beliefs, not absolute truths. A 
different IOC, comprised of different members and existing in a different time and 
political context, might very well have interpreted the fundamental tenets of the Olympic 
movement as clearly in support of expelling South Africa at the very beginning of 
apartheid’s institution in the country, not reluctantly twenty years later. However, the 
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pliability of Olympism is not limited to thought experiments. The global negative 
reaction to the Grenoble decision indicates the fragility of the IOC’s reliance on its 
principles to guide its actions and the weakness of Olympic governance to make effective 
policy decisions. 
Armed with the belief that it had settled its jurisdictional problem surrounding the 
issue of South Africa’s participation, the IOC seemed confident that it had decided 
correctly to reinstate SANOC early in 1968. Indeed, the reforms enacted in South Africa 
to achieve compliance with Olympic rules were championed by the IOC as evidence of 
the organization’s effectiveness and the power of sport to promote cultural harmony. 
Though it anticipated some backlash, this was mostly dismissed as the ignorance of new, 
mostly African NOCs that had not yet come to terms with the Olympic movement’s high-
minded ideals. However, the rapidity of the boycott movement’s growth was only slightly 
less shocking to the IOC than the reasons used to support it. Beginning from the same 
principles the IOC used to justify its decision, the boycott movement was based upon the 
idea that Olympic principles dictated that the IOC should not endorse or at least passively 
appear to support racist domestic policies. For an organization whose very existence and 
legitimacy relies upon the symbolism inherent in international sport, the IOC severely 
misjudged the emblematic significance of its decision to permit South Africa to attend the 
1968 Olympics, as well as the ability of other actors to draw different conclusions about 
the IOC’s obligations as an international humanitarian organization. 
While the accessibility of Olympic principles to justify the entire spectrum of 
opinions regarding South Africa’s participation in 1968 is interesting, what is more 
important from a theoretical perspective is the IOC’s corresponding inability to assert 
itself as the authority in this area. Ostensibly, as the unquestioned leader of the Olympic 
movement, the organization should have the final word when it comes to interpreting 
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Olympic doctrine. However, instead of making such an assertion, the IOC was forced to 
accede to international political opinion and reverse its decision. In this instance, the 
IOC’s dogmatic adherence to the idea of apolitical sport prevented it from taking a 
stronger stand in defense of its position. As Brundage noted at the emergency Executive 
Board meeting in April 1968, conditions in South Africa had not changed; the same set of 
circumstances and assurances which the IOC had deemed acceptable in February 
remained in place. However, each of the two options available to the IOC at that point—
confirm or reverse the Grenoble decision--had been linked publicly to political concerns, 
rendering both unpalatable. If the IOC reiterated its support of SANOC’s participation, it 
would appear (to its mind, unfairly) to endorse South African apartheid. If it reversed its 
decision, it would acknowledge, however fleetingly, the political nature of sport and 
perhaps more significantly, its inability to transcend political problems. With an 
opportunity to assert itself as the true authority in Olympic sport and defend its 
interpretation of Olympic rules, the IOC rather meekly (but defensibly) appealed to the 
safety of athletes and spectators as the reason for its ultimate reversal on the South 
African issue. 
While the case of South African participation at the 1968 Olympic games does 
not include an explicit instance of state intervention in Olympic governance, it does 
demonstrate quite clearly the inherent contradictions that undermine the effectiveness of 
Olympic governance. First, the IOC fundamentally misjudged that its interpretation of 
Olympic principles might be questioned or challenged. Second, the ease with which 
opponents of the Grenoble decision used Olympic principles to justify a boycott and 
create divisiveness within the Olympic movement took the IOC by surprise. Finally, the 
IOC’s commitment to maintaining its apolitical status prevented it from formulating a 
stronger response to the global backlash following the reinstatement of South Africa. 
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Though Brundage would have preferred to stand his ground and allow the South Africans 
to participate, both the symbolic and tangible outcomes of doing so would have created 
substantial and perhaps insurmountable challenges for the Olympic movement. IOC 
administrators feared that yielding to public pressure in 1968 would doom it to a future of 
continuous intervention in the domestic affairs of state sport, if indeed such a highly 
politicized Olympic movement could exist at all. Somewhat ironically, what would have 
amounted to the IOC’s political endorsement of South African apartheid by allowing the 
South African team to participate in Mexico City likely would have done far greater 
damage to the movement than the perceived politicization caused by the boycott threat or 
the IOC’s ultimate concession to political pressure. 
The primary source of legitimacy for Olympic governance is its declaration of 
transcendent political status. Its commitment to a noble ideology, one that sees sport as a 
useful and sufficient tool for achieving humanitarian objectives, makes its claims to be a 
self-described peace movement appealing and often unquestioned. However, as the 
circumstances surrounding the attempt to reinstate South Africa to the Olympic 
movement in the years leading up to the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City demonstrate, it is 
an ideology that is ill-suited to support good governance. 
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Chapter 5:  The U.S.-Led Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics 
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 is generally 
credited as the impetus for what eventually became a widespread boycott of the 1980 
Summer Olympics. The military intervention was considered by USSR officials to be a 
relatively minor response to growing political instability within Afghanistan.1 
Nevertheless, U.S. president Jimmy Carter and others in his administration perceived the 
Soviets’ move as an overt act of aggression, especially surprising and upsetting after ten 
years of détente.2 The decision to boycott was thus very much a function of Cold War 
politics; this point has been explored at length by scholars.3 Indeed, one of the important 
and oft-examined issues surrounding the study of the boycott is the extent to which it 
helped the U.S. to achieve its political objectives vis-à-vis the initial Afghanistan 
occupation. However, for the purposes of this study, the key questions asked of this case 
are somewhat different. 
The decision by the Carter administration to even attempt a government-led 
boycott of the Olympics represents the aggressive type of free riding introduced in 
Chapter 1, in which states attempt to use the Olympic platform for (in the eyes of 
Olympic governing bodies) inappropriate political purposes. The test of the theory with 
regard to state action, then, is not whether such action is successful or effective in 
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political terms, but simply whether the state engaging in such behavior recognizes and 
acts successfully on the opportunity to free ride. The corresponding test, regarding 
Olympic governance, concerns the ability of the Olympic regime to deter, punish, or in 
some other way remedy the effects of this behavior. Because of the particular theorized 
dynamics of the regime, it will be unable to enact effective enforcement measures, 
stymied mostly by its own guiding principles and the interpretation thereof. These two 
tests can be placed in the context of the events surrounding the Moscow games. First, did 
the U.S. government recognize not only the opportunity to co-opt the Olympics for 
political purposes, but that it could do so with relative impunity? Second, given the U.S. 
decision to attempt a boycott, how did the IOC formulate its agenda in managing the 
situation, and was it able to achieve any of its objectives with regard to preventing or 
minimizing the impact of the boycott? The U.S.-led boycott in 1980 presents an 
ostensibly “easy” test of the theory. However, the details of the case (while mostly 
supportive of this study’s theoretical arguments) are not by any means straightforward in 
terms of establishing direct causality. What follows is an exploration of the above 
questions and an analysis of the degree to which the Olympic regime theory can account 
for both U.S. and IOC behavior in the months leading up to the 1980 Summer Olympics. 
U.S. POLICY FORMULATION: JANUARY 1980 
The Carter administration was cognizant, even well before the Afghanistan 
invasion, of the potential for political turmoil at the Moscow Olympics, as well as the 
ways the Games might be leveraged to exert pressure on the Soviet government to pursue 
reforms.4 When news of the invasion reached Washington, initial intelligence reports 
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suggested that while a boycott of the Olympics would not hurt the USSR economically 
(an approach the administration preferred), it would be symbolically powerful.5 Though a 
boycott would have “almost no effect” on the state’s pocketbook, a successful boycott 
was described as a potential “political setback”, something that would “humiliate the 
leadership” and “deprive the USSR of the prestige and propaganda opportunities it 
clearly hopes to extract from a well run, noncontroversial Olympics.”6 While the 
opportunity to embarrass the Soviets was appealing, the immediate counsel in the wake 
of the invasion was to proceed with caution in pursuing an Olympic boycott, assessing 
what other Western nations would do before committing to a single course of action.7 In 
fact, Carter, while recognizing the potential power of an Olympic boycott, also saw it as 
feasible only as part of a larger international cooperative effort.8 While the initial public 
relations effort may have been cautious, advisers in the Carter administration were more 
than eager to pursue the use of the boycott as a political tool. Vice President Walter 
Mondale, in a memo dated January 3, made known his desire to “really go after the 
Olympics—I don’t see why that is sacrosanct.”9 This sat in stark contrast to the attitude 
of United States Olympic Committee (USOC) leaders, who wrote to President Carter 
voicing unequivocal opposition to any sort of boycott.10 
The debate over the boycott was essentially comprised of three interconnected 
questions. The first, which was resolved almost from the outset, was whether a boycott 
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would have any material economic impact on the USSR. The consensus on this issue was 
that a boycott would have little to no effect, especially relative to other proposed 
sanctions. The second was related to the symbolic power of the boycott, and to what 
degree Soviet leaders would be “hurt” by the visible absence of a major nation like the 
United States. On this, both public and governmental sentiment seemed to lean toward an 
affirmative response, though the punitive effect was considered, at least initially, to be a 
function of international harmony on the issue; the more countries that agreed to boycott, 
the more pain would be inflicted upon the Soviets.11 The third issue, somewhat the 
inverse of the second, was based on concern that choosing not to boycott was tantamount 
to an endorsement of the Soviet invasion and perhaps a sign of American weakness 
internationally. Counterbalancing these latter two issues was concern for the athletes. A 
boycott, while perhaps effective at punishing the USSR, would also deprive athletes of 
their opportunity to compete in an event that was for many the culmination of many years 
spent dedicated to sport. At the same time, this opportunity had to be weighed against the 
larger meanings it potentially represented: would competing be worth it if doing so was 
interpreted as support for the Soviet regime? 
As the administration debated these options, public support for the boycott 
grew.12 Riding this momentum, Carter on January 20 laid out his policy platform with 
regard to an Olympic boycott.13 At the core of his proposal were a series of progressively 
more serious measures aimed at pressuring both the USSR and the Olympic governance 
system to comply with U.S. wishes. Carter first set a deadline of February 20, 1980, for 
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Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. If this did not occur, Carter urged the USOC to 
propose either moving or cancelling the Summer Olympics. Should that prove unfeasible, 
the USOC should attempt to organize a large-scale boycott and perhaps organize an 
alternative international sport festival for those nations that joined the U.S. in staying 
away from Moscow.14 Carter also suggested selecting permanent sites for both the 
Summer and Winter games. This would, in his view, eliminate the politicization of the 
Olympics tied to the bidding and hosting process. These proposals were sent to all 
American embassies in an attempt to begin securing the necessary international support 
for the potential boycott.15 
Though Carter has been criticized for his lack of nuanced thinking in calling for 
the boycott, his manipulation of Olympic rhetoric to support the measure is impressive. 
In his letter to USOC President Robert Kane, Carter walks a fine line between applauding 
Olympic values, using them to justify the boycott, and exposing their empty hypocrisy. 
For instance, Carter acknowledges that the Olympics should be apolitical and that a 
boycott would certainly contradict that stance, but defends his position by pointing out 
the control exerted by the USSR over Soviet sport, suggesting that if the Olympics were 
truly apolitical such behavior would not be tolerated. Carter also invokes the amateur 
ideal in trying to assuage concerns about the effects of the boycott upon athletes, 
claiming that they would know better than most “the meaning of sacrifice to achieve 
worthy goals.”16 Finally, he uses the utilitarian view of the Olympics as a peace 
movement to claim that failing to support his plan counteracts efforts to “help secure the 
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peace of the world at this critical time.”17 Although he may have not entirely understood 
the consequences of his actions or how events would ultimately play out, these initial 
comments and proposals suggest a President who understood very clearly both the 
symbolic political power of the Olympics and the malleability of the Olympic value 
system. Further, though framed as a request, the detail with which he lays out his plans to 
the USOC suggest a dictation of orders more than a respectful suggestion. In his State of 
the Union address on January 23, Carter intimated as much, saying “I have notified the 
Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the 
American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.”18 That this 
policy was distributed through all of the U.S.’s diplomatic channels indicates a belief that 
other governments would be able to accomplish within their borders what Carter hoped to 
at home. 
OLYMPIC ALTERNATIVES AND THE IOC RESPONSE: FEBRUARY—MARCH 1980 
Given only a month’s notice, a Soviet withdrawal by the February 20 deadline 
seemed unlikely. Thus, the Carter administration began to explore the possibility of 
moving the games to an alternate site. At the same time, the first stirrings of unrest were 
becoming evident among both American Olympians and the IOC. Shortly after Carter 
had laid out his plans for the U.S. team with regard to the Moscow games, White House 
counsel Lloyd Cutler attended a USOC meeting in the hopes of assuaging concerns about 
the administration’s Olympic policy. While Cutler failed to gain the USOC’s full 
endorsement, he did secure a promise from the USOC to call on the IOC to relocate the 
Olympics, something officials from both organizations knew was practically 
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impossible.19 Though the Carter administration viewed this tenuous agreement from the 
USOC with cautious optimism, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s speech to the IOC in 
advance of its regularly scheduled meeting prior to the start of the Winter Olympics in 
Lake Placid, New York did much more harm than good. Though government leaders 
were more or less correct in assuming that they could exert influence over the UOSC, the 
IOC was not about to be ordered around. Vance’s threat to boycott should the IOC persist 
in holding the Games in Moscow was received with barely concealed contempt.20 
Indeed, at the IOC’s General Session meeting on the eve of the 1980 Winter 
games, the idea of moving the Summer Olympics to a different site was a non-starter.21 
Though Kane argued persuasively, using the IOC’s rules as justification for finding a 
different site, most of the questions posed to him by the session seemed targeted at 
uncovering contradictions in his argument or suggesting inappropriate involvement by 
the U.S. government. The discussion which followed focused on NOC autonomy and 
how best to maintain public credibility. Many members favored doubling down on the 
idea of sport’s apolitical status. By continuing to assert the moral high ground and 
essentially taking no action, the IOC could avoid putting itself in, as Sir Reginald 
Alexander of Kenya put it, “an embarrassing situation.” Balancing this view was 
Canada’s Richard Pound, who voiced concerns that the IOC may be putting NOCs in 
very difficult and potentially dangerous situations by asking them to defy their national 
governments.22 Despite some rather blunt comments to the effect that political 
involvement had always been a part of the Olympics (particularly with regard to the 
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NOCs in developing countries), IOC President Michael Morris—known more popularly 
by his noble title Lord Killanin—concluded that all views presented by the session “were 
basically the same.” 
The statement issued on behalf of Lord Killanin to the press on February 12 
confirmed the IOC’s commitment to Moscow, defining the IOC’s “prime responsibility” 
as ensuring “that the Olympic Games are held every four years in accordance with the 
principles, and within the rules, of the I.O.C.”. Interestingly, the final paragraph of the 
statement acknowledged that “[t]he International Olympic Committee cannot solve the 
political problems of the world.” 23 Although in context this comment is clearly meant to 
establish a bright line between the IOC and the political uproar in which it found itself 
embroiled, it at least partially reveals the extent to which simply ensuring that the event 
took place was a significant motivating factor for the organization. By extension, this also 
shows how little authority the IOC actually wielded when confronted by more powerful 
political players. When asked specifically what the IOC could do to assist the USOC in 
navigating the crisis, Kane responded that only U.S. and Soviet leaders could resolve the 
dispute, effectively ending the discussion before it began. Though Englishman David 
Cecil (identified as “Lord Exeter” or “The Marquess of Exeter” in the meeting minutes) 
voiced his dismay over the aggression shown by the USSR, “sport was not the weapon 
which should counteract it. Sport made people respect each other and created warmth and 
friendship between young people.”24 Further, he noted that ownership of the Olympics 
rested with the IOC, not the host country, in the same breath remarking how 
disappointing it would be if the Games were used to divide the world rather than bring it 
together. The apparent contradiction between asserting ownership of the Olympics and 
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acknowledging that they might be used by other actors to the detriment of the movement 
seemingly went unnoticed. 
At this juncture, both the U.S. and the IOC were approaching critical decision 
points, though the latter’s strategy of attempting to remain above the fray was essentially 
locked in at the Lake Placid meeting. In addition to refusing to move the Olympics, Lord 
Killanin also made it known that he would not pursue any punitive actions against the 
USOC should it, through its potential absence from Moscow, be found in violation of the 
Olympic Charter.25 On February 20, the deadline for the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan, Lloyd Cutler appeared on television to confirm the 
administration’s position that the U.S. would not send a team to Moscow.26 Even given 
the USOC’s ambivalence and the outright refusal of the IOC to entertain any disruption 
of the status quo, the U.S. still viewed a boycott as a legitimate (and effective) policy 
option. This persistence might reasonably be construed as a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how Olympic governance worked; by failing to recognize IOC and 
NOC autonomy, the U.S. perhaps misread the ability of a boycott to achieve its political 
objectives. However, the important question here is not whether the U.S. correctly 
calculated the outcomes of its foreign policy maneuvers, but whether it accurately 
assessed its power and authority in relation to Olympic governance. The U.S. 
commitment to the boycott, and the corresponding lack of anything other than strong 
rhetoric as a response from Olympic officials, confirmed the belief of the Carter 
administration that it could use the Olympics to exert political pressure on the USSR.27 
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Thus, the U.S. continued to act more or less unilaterally in its use of the Olympics 
as a political lever, despite being presented with information that an alternate Olympic-
type festival would be almost impossible to stage in such a short time frame.28 With its 
self-imposed deadline for Soviet withdrawal now past, the administration had to begin to 
consider the logistics of both a potential boycott as well as whether any manner of 
substitute games could be accomplished. These objectives were seen as interdependent. A 
boycott would be more likely to gain international support if there were a suitable 
alternative to the Olympics, and such an alternative would be increasingly feasible as 
more countries committed to supporting U.S. policy.29 To this end, a special committee 
of White House officials led by Cutler which also included Peter Ueberroth, the director 
of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics Organizing Committee (LAOOC), decided to 
approach leaders of western European nations about joining the U.S. effort, as the support 
of these nations (along with China, Mexico, Japan, Kenya, and New Zealand) was seen as 
crucial to its success.30 This committee also investigated the possibility of using NBC’s 
television contract with the IOC as a source of leverage. NBC had suggested that it would 
not televise the Moscow Games if a U.S. team was not present; if this was going to be the 
case, the company wanted to withhold its next scheduled rights payment on April 1.31 
Upon reviewing the notes of the meeting, however, President Carter indicated that this 
was not a priority for the boycott movement.32 In a few weeks, however, he would 
reassess this position. 
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As winter slowly turned to spring in Washington, three realities were 
crystallizing. The first was that, according to U.S. intelligence, governmental support for 
the boycott was relatively widespread. Ninety-five states had either publicly or privately 
expressed support for the boycott, though this support ranged from public statements of 
support to “leaning or evolving toward non-participation”. Additionally, a handful of 
these states were not necessarily aligned with U.S. policy, but simply could not attend 
due to lack of resources.33 The second was that even with governmental support, national 
Olympic committees were in many instances existing in an uneasy stasis, torn between 
asserting their autonomy in accordance with Olympic principles and complying with their 
home government’s wishes. The USOC was among this group of undecided NOCs.34 
Finally, champions of the boycott were beginning to concede that an alternative to the 
Olympics—the carrot being used to drum up support for the boycott, especially among 
the NOCs—would be far more difficult to stage than anyone had anticipated. The Carter 
administration, finally realizing that a single-site event was too tall of a task settled 
instead on a multi-site option as the next-best solution. However, what were quickly 
being termed (pejoratively) “the White House Games” still faced several obstacles, not 
the least of which was the fact that the international sport federations would not support 
such an event, fearful as they were of running afoul of the IOC.35 On top of this, some 
nations began to express displeasure with the lack of progress and leadership in 
developing an Olympic alternative, suggesting that if a single-site event could not be 
held, their support for the boycott would have to be reevaluated.36 The USOC managed to 
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avoid involvement in this particular facet of the boycott fracas, and for good reason. Peter 
Ueberroth’s involvement as a consultant for the White House’s proposed event raised the 
eyebrows of IOC President Killanin, who moved swiftly to ensure that the U.S. Olympic 
apparatus—especially the USOC and the LAOOC—were not contributing to Carter’s 
efforts. If they had been, it would have been difficult for the IOC to turn a blind eye to 
such a blatant violation of IOC rules, which would have in turn put Los Angeles’ status 
as host of the 1984 Olympics in jeopardy.37 
Aside from ensuring the United States’ Olympic organizations did not do 
anything untoward, the IOC was largely content to stick to the position it had adopted at 
Lake Placid in February: confirm its support for a Moscow Olympic festival and shield 
NOCs, when possible, from governmental pressures. The Olympic movement scored a 
major coup in late March when it became clear that public sentiment in the United 
Kingdom favored attending the Games, in defiance of Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s wishes. Not wanting to waste this momentum, the British Olympic 
Association (BOA) readily accepted the Soviet invitation to attend the Games in 
Moscow.38 This dealt a crucial blow to the boycott effort, which saw the UK’s support as 
essential to its success. 
THE FINAL PUSH TOWARD A BOYCOTT: MARCH—MAY 1980 
Around the same time as the BOA decision, the Carter administration was 
preparing for a final confrontation with the USOC. The push for an alternate international 
sport competition had all but evaporated once it had become clear that neither time nor 
resources nor widespread support were readily available. Still, the administration had 
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staked out a strong position on the issue and simply admitting defeat was not an option. 
On March 21, President Carter addressed U.S. athletes in the East Room of the White 
House. He was clear and firm in his remarks, especially with regard to the question of 
whether the U.S. would boycott: 
I can't say at this moment what other nations will not go to the Summer Olympics 
in Moscow. Ours will not go. I say that not with any equivocation; the decision 
has been made. The American people are convinced that we should not go to the 
Summer Olympics. The Congress has voted overwhelmingly, almost 
unanimously, which is a very rare thing, that we will not go. And I can tell you 
that many of our major allies, particularly those democratic countries who believe 
in freedom, will not go.39 
Carter went on to justify the decision as a defense of Olympic principles and values, and 
once again suggest both a permanent site for the Olympics as well as the possibility of an 
alternative competition in 1980, though progress on both initiatives had severely stalled.40 
In responding to questions from athletes, he made it clear that the government possessed 
the authority to revoke athletes’ passports and would do so if necessary.41 
One week after expressing unwavering commitment to the boycott, Carter 
suspended all U.S. exports to the Soviet Union related to the Olympics.42 The primary 
target of this action was the NBC broadcasting contract, something Carter had dismissed 
as irrelevant only a few weeks prior. While the effect on the Moscow organizing 
committee, to which the bulk of the $87 million contract was owed, was minimal, the 
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gesture was powerful.43 Combined with Carter’s unambiguous remarks at the White 
House, the message to the USOC was clear: while the decision to boycott was nominally 
left to the Olympic body, the administration had already made up its mind. 
The deadline for accepting the Soviet invitation to attend the Games was May 24. 
In early April, the USOC leadership began to float proposals in the press that, while 
stopping short of a boycott, would express American dissatisfaction with the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, such as boycotting the opening and closing ceremonies, 
participating as independent (rather than American) athletes, or refusing to stay in the 
Olympic Village.44 These measures, in the eyes of the Carter administration, were 
inadequate. In a somewhat desperate attempt to motivate the USOC to see things their 
way, administration officials began reaching out to USOC corporate sponsors, urging 
them to make further donations contingent upon full USOC support of the boycott.45 Both 
Carter and U.S. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti reiterated publicly that the 
government would use all legal remedies at its disposal to prevent U.S. athletes from 
traveling to Moscow.46 It was becoming clear to USOC administrators that a vote to go to 
Russia would essentially seal their fate as an organization; if Carter did not get his way, it 
would likely mean a revocation of the USOC’s charter.47 To its credit, the USOC 
recognized that, though on the verge of acquiescing to the administration’s wishes, it still 
held one bargaining chip. While Carter had taken a strong stance, it was clear that he 
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preferred the USOC to at least appear to support him willingly, rather than prevent 
Olympic attendance through more forcible means. The USOC was thus able to secure 
promises from the administration for several million dollars in governmental support in 
exchange for a show of solidarity on the boycott issue.48 
On April 5, Carter sent a letter to Robert Kane and other members of the USOC’s 
House of Delegates, once again asking them to support the boycott. Given the recent 
actions taken by the administration, it was clear that this letter was largely perfunctory. 
Though invoking the specter of national security and the message a vote against the 
boycott would send about the U.S.’s level of resolve, the subtext of the President’s letter 
was far simpler: a vote against the boycott would be a vote against the will of the 
government and that of the American people.49 One week later, the USOC membership 
voted by a 1,604-797 margin to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.50 The 
administration, as promised, immediately and publicly supported the decision, indicating 
that it would not only help the USOC financially but also take steps to recognize the 
athletes whose opportunity to compete had just been revoked.51 
With the boycott now official, all that remained to be seen was, first, which 
nations would follow the Americans’ lead and second, how the boycott would impact the 
Games. By this time, the boycott was nothing more than a symbolic measure; the 
administration’s initial belief that it might force the Soviets to leave Afghanistan had 
eroded rather rapidly since February. Ultimately, sixty-four other nations joined the U.S. 
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in avoiding the Moscow Olympics, though as noted above, at least a handful of these did 
so for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. The question of whether the boycott was 
“successful” is more difficult to answer. If the U.S.’s sole objective was to demonstrate 
its strong opposition to the USSR’s incursion into the Middle East, the message was 
unequivocally clear. However, in terms of embarrassing the Soviets by assembling a 
coalition of powerful states committed to the boycott (as Carter had originally hoped), the 
effort was far less effective. Of the sixty-five states not in attendance in Moscow, only a 
handful (most notably Canada, China, Japan, Norway, West Germany) could be 
considered significant enough to either international politics or international sport to 
render their absence meaningful. If, as it seemed to be at the outset, the primary objective 
was to coerce the Soviets out of Afghanistan and also take from them the Olympic 
Games, then the boycott was an utter failure. 
As a sort of epilogue to the turmoil generated by the United States’ actions, 
President Carter met with Lord Killanin in May. This was part of an effort by Killanin to 
meet with the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union in an attempt to, 
however belatedly, resolve the issue to the satisfaction of the IOC and perhaps salvage 
the games. Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was mostly optimistic about the 
upcoming event and seemed to care little whether the U.S. was in attendance. Killanin’s 
meeting with Carter was congenial but tense. While Carter expressed his support for the 
Olympic movement, he was unwilling to take the one step that would, for Killanin, 
demonstrate this support more than any other: allowing the U.S. to compete in Moscow.52 
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These meetings were largely ineffective, but represented (at least in the IOC’s view) a 
good faith effort to address and attempt to resolve the boycott conflict. 
THE OLYMPICS AND UNILATERAL STATE ACTION 
Regardless of how one defines American objectives in assessing its behavior 
relative to the 1980 Summer Olympics, it is clear that the Carter administration viewed 
the Olympics as a venue in which it could meaningfully act without incurring much 
corresponding cost or risk. Almost from the moment it learned of the Soviet invasion, the 
U.S. entertained an Olympic boycott as a viable policy option. As a test of the Olympic 
regime theory which characterizes states as free riders, this seems to be a fairly 
straightforward confirmation. Although not directly involved in the Olympics, the U.S. 
government was able to successfully insert itself as a powerful and controlling actor into 
matters of Olympic governance, ultimately succeeding in enacting a boycott as a form of 
political protest. 
The strongest contrary evidence to the applicability of the theory is linked to the 
U.S.’s inability to enact the entire range of its policy objectives. Specifically, the failure 
to persuade the IOC to move the Olympics and the corresponding inability to rally 
support for an alternative event could be considered an indication that the exercise of 
state power vis-à-vis sport can be limited or restrained. However, this explanation 
assumes that, like the boycott, the U.S. had the wherewithal to act unilaterally, which was 
clearly not the case. Though the Carter administration was certainly willing to commit 
resources toward pursuing its Olympic boycott policy, it is difficult to conclude that the 
U.S. was willing and able to act alone in planning and hosting a non-Olympic sport 
festival. Indeed, the option is most appropriately understood as an incentive for other 
states to join in the boycott effort, contingent upon a collective commitment to the 
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principled action being advocated in Washington. Because a major concern was the effect 
of a boycott on athletes, the option of competing in a comparable event was at least 
partially a palliative measure, designed to assuage fears that supporting the boycott meant 
sacrificing the athletes’ ability to participate. The inability of the U.S. to stage such an 
event, then, should not be considered as an isolated policy failure, but rather the result of 
circumstances that stretched beyond the Carter administration’s control. While it is 
probably true that better planning and strategic thinking would have allowed the 
administration to garner more collective state support for its policies, this particular 
initiative’s dependence on the decisions of other actors pushes it slightly beyond the 
scope of the Olympic regime theory. In other words, because the U.S. had no concrete 
intention to take on the task by itself, it should not bear sole responsibility for failing to 
enact this measure. 
The inability of the U.S. to effectively persuade the IOC to relocate the Games 
still presents a difficult test of the theory. Unlike the alternative games, this was 
something the U.S. thought it could accomplish on its own. President Carter’s initial 
policy statement appealed strongly to Olympic values, demonstrating how the Soviets 
had violated the fundamental ideals from which the Olympics and the IOC drew their 
legitimacy. This proved unconvincing, as the IOC did little more than politely dismiss 
Robert Kane when he formally introduced Carter’s proposals to the General Session in 
Lake Placid. The question thus becomes whether this inability to influence the IOC might 
be considered evidence of a limit on the theorized abilities of states to act 
indiscriminately in Olympic sport. In order to provide a satisfactory answer, a distinction 
must be made between the ability to “act” and the ability to “persuade”. The boycott itself 
might very well be considered an instance of governmental persuasion. The USOC, not 
the government, was the organization ultimately responsible for determining whether the 
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U.S. would be represented in Moscow. Ostensibly, the most the administration could do 
was influence the USOC’s decision. The same might be said for the attempt on the part of 
the U.S. to get the Games out of Moscow. It had no jurisdiction or authority to enact such 
a decision, but it nonetheless appealed to the IOC using its own rhetoric, citing the 
peacefulness and morality of sport and juxtaposing the Soviet invasion (and by extension, 
the USSR’s host status) as antithetical to these beliefs. 
While these are both instances where the U.S. attempted to persuade Olympic 
policymakers, the important distinction to be made is that in the case of the USOC, the 
government was prepared to act (and indeed, in halting Olympic-related exports to the 
USSR and asking USOC sponsors to withhold funds, it did). Though the decision 
nominally was the USOC’s to make, the Carter administration made it clear that failure to 
comply with its views on the boycott would be met with swift retribution. Whether it 
would have taken these aggressive steps in the event of a defiant USOC vote cannot be 
known for certain, but the administration’s dogged commitment to the boycott, even in 
the face of so many setbacks and failed initiatives, suggest that it was not simply bluffing. 
The same power dynamic was not present in the circumstances involving the IOC and the 
possibility of relocating or canceling the Games. While U.S. leaders could talk about the 
desecration of Olympic values until they were blue in the face, it was evident that a 
public relations campaign represented the limit of their jurisdiction. The IOC knew this 
and was content to let the situation play itself out. More generally, however, the idea that 
a state’s ability to act unilaterally in using the Olympics for political purposes is tied in 
some way to its legal (and perhaps legislative) authority over its NOC represents an 
important potential boundary condition for the theory advanced in this study. 
The American-led boycott is popularly regarded as a failure of tactics and of 
leadership. Indeed, over three decades later, both government and Olympic officials 
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invoke the 1980 debacle as clear evidence that Olympic boycotts do not work.53 
Certainly, President Carter and his advisers lacked a deep understanding of international 
sport and the particulars of Olympic governance. Given this knowledge deficiency, the 
administration’s early and strong commitment to the boycott was unwise; Carter’s 
willingness to personally involve himself in the matter only made the problems with the 
policy that much more visible. Whether the U.S. accomplished its objectives and whether 
the price paid by the athletes offset any political gain is, for the purposes of this study, 
somewhat immaterial. At issue is whether the U.S. was able to, unimpeded, use the 
Olympics for political purposes. On this matter, the answer is unquestionably “yes”. The 
Carter administration was able to successfully carry out its boycott despite the 
protestations of both the IOC and USOC. Indeed, when push came to shove, the 
government was able to overpower Olympic leaders (at least in the U.S.), first requesting, 
then demanding, and finally coercing them into supporting its policy. That it is left to 
Olympic scholars and the media to assess the legacy of these actions is an indication of 
the utter lack of any significant consequences for states when they choose to pursue such 
strategies. 
THE IOC AS IMPOTENT POLITICAL ACTOR 
While the U.S. was constantly redefining the objectives of its boycott venture, the 
IOC’s goals remained relatively static. First, it wanted to support and preserve Moscow 
as the Olympic host city. To do otherwise would have simultaneously allowed the 
supposed corruptive influence of politics into the Olympics and laid bare the weakness of 
the IOC relative to other geopolitical actors. However, the IOC was largely able to rely 
on its status as a private organization to protect its ability to hold the Games wherever it 
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chose. Second, the IOC did not want to see a rival international sport event created as a 
viable alternative to the Olympics. On this, the results are somewhat mixed. Shortly after 
the boycott proposal was made public, there existed strong support for such an alternative 
among many nations and NOCs. As the realities of limited time and limited resources 
became more tangible, however, the moral outrage fueling the push for a different sport 
festival waned. While it is certainly possible that, under different circumstances, a rival 
international sport event might have gained traction, the unwillingness of both IFs and 
NOCs to break away from the Olympic cartel speaks to the legitimating power of 
Olympic governance. Finally, the IOC desired full participation, and it was on this point 
that the fundamental struggle between Olympic governance and state use of the Olympics 
was most evident. While the IOC could make strong claims to the independence of its 
affiliated NOCs, it could not compel them to attend. Indeed, especially in its dealings 
with the USOC, the IOC was mostly sympathetic, choosing not to pursue any sort of 
punishment should the USOC choose to align itself with the boycott movement. At least 
in this instance, this is indicative of both structural and ideological barriers to action 
predicted by the Olympic regime theory. Certainly, the IOC could not pursue punitive 
action against the U.S. government. However, by asserting the vital importance of 
Olympic political autonomy in defending the decision to stay in Moscow, and then 
refusing to take action when this element was compromised, the IOC evinced its 
fundamental inefficacy at enforcing its own rules.54 
The 1980 Olympic boycott is an excellent test case for the Olympic regime theory 
because it created a situation in which (like so many Cold War ideological battles) the 
circumstances were essentially distilled into two choices. For the IOC, this did not 
                                                 
54 Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 214-220. 
 117 
necessarily mean aligning with Soviet or American interests, but it did mean staking out a 
position on sport’s utility as a political tool. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan, the 
appropriateness of moving the Games was tied to the strength of the relationship between 
Olympic sport and government action in a domestic political setting. The IOC, not 
surprisingly, chose to assert that one had nothing to do with the other; the actions of the 
Soviet government had no bearing on the ability of the Soviet NOC or the Moscow 
organizing committee to live up to Olympic principles. This view was based on the 
notion that, above all else, the apolitical status of the Olympics was inviolable. However, 
if this was truly the case, the NOCs which yielded to government pressure and chose to 
boycott ought to have been in some way reprimanded for their decisions. Again, 
however, the IOC’s position was to view this political interference as coercive and the 
NOCs as largely powerless to resist, victims caught in unfortunate political 
circumstances. This is compelling evidence of the fundamental inability of Olympic 
governance to do anything more than ensure that the Games are held as scheduled. 
However, it is also a predictable outcome. In either case, establishing a clear 
position would have meant making the IOC vulnerable to charges of politicizing the 
Games, something to which it was very much opposed. What the organization failed to 
realize (or perhaps realized and chose to ignore) is that good governance is at least 
partially a function of meaningful action. Claims about the Olympic movement’s ability 
to promote peace and global harmony were thus undermined by a governance system 
which willingly painted itself into a rhetorical corner of ineffectual inertia. Indeed, as 
Lord Killanin admitted in his most significant public response to the boycott threat, “[t]he 
International Olympic Committee cannot solve the political problems of the world.” 
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Chapter 6:  UNESCO, the IOC, and the International Convention 
against Doping in Sport 
The portions of this chapter based on archival sources were previously published in Scott 
R. Jedlicka and Thomas M. Hunt, “The International Anti-Doping Movement and 
UNESCO: A Historical Case Study,” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 
13 (2013): 1523-1535. Professor Hunt’s contributions to the original article were purely 
analytical and are not reproduced here. 
 
The history of anti-doping policy in Olympic sport is a fascinating study in 
organizational management, international politics, ethics, and international sport 
governance. While scholarly consensus typically dates drug use in the Olympics to 1960, 
performance enhancement’s breadth and depth as a sport (as well as social) issue are far 
more expansive.1 The notion that doping is a concern not just for sport but for public 
policymakers was no more evident than in 2005, when the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the International Convention 
against Doping in Sport. By ratifying this international legal instrument, member states 
agreed to adopt national anti-doping measures through their respective governments and 
to ensure that these measures are aligned, in principle and in practice, with the World 
Anti-Doping Code, the governing document of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA). That the relatively specific issue of drug use in the Olympics ballooned into a 
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major international concern presents an interesting and somewhat difficult test for the 
Olympic regime theory. On one hand, the ease with which states were able to involve 
themselves in anti-doping governance and oversight processes is predictable. While not a 
typical political “use” of sport, states willingly and without fear of reprisal co-opted anti-
doping’s salience within international sport to address broader policy concerns within 
their own borders. On the other hand, the idea that states would choose to act at all is a bit 
counterintuitive. Theoretically, states would be expected to free ride on the efforts of 
Olympic governance, reaping the benefits of legitimately “clean” sport without directly 
helping to address the problem. After all, the IOC had been developing and enforcing (or 
at least attempting to enforce) anti-doping rules for decades prior to serious governmental 
involvement. As this analysis will show, the decision by states to give up their status as 
free riders was foreseeable as the returns on that status began to diminish. The inability of 
the IOC to control drug use in the Olympics and international sport, and the subsequent 
erosion of the Olympics’ perceived legitimacy, prompted states to intervene in order to 
preserve sport’s political utility. 
A FIRST ATTEMPT: 1988—1993 
Established by the UN in 1945, UNESCO was charged with combating 
intellectual and cultural ignorance in the pursuit of world peace. The organization’s 
constitution states, “[t]hat since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men 
that the defences of peace must be constructed”.2 The creators of UNESCO believed that 
intelligence (and by extension, education) was valuable not simply for its own sake, but 
for its ability to prevent future global conflict. They reasoned that the devastating wars 
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that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century stemmed from a fundamental 
lack of respect and understanding between nations; furthermore, because political and 
economic ideals were transient, an armistice designed primarily around these interests 
was inherently unsustainable.3 Thus, if these deficiencies could be addressed and 
corrected, war could be averted. Armed with this belief, the organization’s leaders set out 
to implement systems that would develop education within and facilitate the transmission 
of culture among member nations, while still preserving national identities.4 
Since at least the mid-1950s, sport has been one tool in UNESCO’s educational 
arsenal. Viewed initially as a way to ease the physical and psychological burden of 
postwar recovery efforts, sport eventually came to be recognized as an important 
component of childhood as well as adult education, especially as the relationship between 
UNESCO and the International Council of Sport Science and Physical Education 
(ICSSPE) developed.5 Throughout its history, and in accordance with its high-minded 
aims, UNESCO generally maintained a broad construction of the term “sport”, de-
emphasizing competitive aspects of sport in favor of those that promote health and social 
cohesion. UNESCO consistently eschewed involvement in elite sport, preferring to deal 
with sport as a means to greater egalitarian ends. The organization’s involvement in anti-
doping, then, should be considered within this context. 
In late November 1988, the Second International Conference of Ministers and 
Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport (MINEPS II) convened at 
the House of Unions in Moscow. Hosted by UNESCO, this conference brought together 
delegates from 104 member nations as well as representatives from several NGOs, 
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including the IOC. Among the IOC delegation were the organization’s president, Juan 
Antonio Samaranch, and Prince Alexandre de Merode, a key figure in the burgeoning 
anti-doping movement.6 Only two months removed from Canadian sprinter Ben 
Johnson’s disqualification at the Olympic games in Seoul, it was likely that doping was 
on the minds of many of the delegates. UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor of 
Spain alluded to the growing specter of doping in his opening address, noting that 
“Unesco’s role here is to see, in conjunction with the Olympic movement and the other 
relevant non-governmental organizations, that steps are taken to counter the threats – 
widely condemned but unhappily still present – which are hanging over sport and which 
could hinder its expansion just as they could dim its international prestige”.7 
Like MINEPS I in 1976, the Moscow meeting was precipitated and guided by a 
questionnaire distributed to member nations beforehand. In addition to an array of sport-
related concerns, respondents identified many of the problems commonly associated with 
early doping controls: the inability to account for natural substances, the lack of coherent 
guidelines, and the general ineffectiveness of testing programs to produce results in the 
face of an increasingly pervasive problem.8 At the conference, many speakers identified 
doping as “the most immediate threat to international sport”.9 While delegates described 
their nations’ individual efforts at interdiction, of greater interest were measures of 
broader scope enacted by regional and intergovernmental entities as well as the IOC.10 
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The delegates also identified the key complicating factors with which the anti-doping 
movement would grapple for the next several years; namely, the balance between 
international cooperation and national autonomy, and the protection of basic standards of 
justice and human rights for athletes. 
This discussion produced a recommendation targeted at three groups: UNESCO 
member states, NGOs, and UNESCO itself. Linking this statement to other initial efforts 
(e.g., the First Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport) and emphasizing 
the threat drug use posed to sport, the MINEPS II recommendation called on UNESCO to 
facilitate international cooperation in anti-doping, specifically mentioning national 
governments, the Olympic movement, and non-governmental sport organizations.11 
While not reflected in the language of the final recommendation, the possibility of 
UNESCO creating an international anti-doping instrument was discussed as well.12 In the 
early stages of the anti-doping movement, the organization was viewed as an important 
actor in the process of international harmonization. 
In addition, the conference also saw Mayor and Samaranch issue a joint 
declaration emphasizing the common goals of UNESCO and the Olympic movement and 
the organizations’ commitment to working together toward those ends. The declaration 
contained three areas of concern: closing the gap between industrialized and developing 
countries in terms of sport opportunities, ensuring the universality of the Olympic games, 
and fostering cooperation in anti-doping efforts, emphasizing again the possibility of 
UNESCO adopting an international instrument of some sort.13 This formalization of the 
link between UNESCO and the IOC was not entirely bilateral. As with the MINEPS II 
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recommendations, the organizations’ cooperative anti-doping efforts would be based on 
the already-established International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport. While 
UNESCO gained a powerful ally in its efforts to promote sport across the globe, it 
sacrificed a bit of autonomy in terms of its stance toward doping. 
In his report to the UNESCO General Conference the next year, Mayor heavily 
stressed UNESCO’s relationship with the Olympic movement, while at the same time 
offering a three-pronged plan for anti-doping policy. In addition to cooperation between 
intergovernmental and non-governmental entities, he also suggested “education and 
consciousness-raising campaigns” and “systematic and co-ordinated [sic] long-term 
examination and analysis of the problem” as viable methods of dealing with drug use in 
sport.14 At this time, Mayor still appeared to believe that maintaining an educational 
stance toward doping while still cooperating fully with international anti-doping efforts 
were compatible pursuits. 
The General Conference did not disappoint. Adopting the MINEPS II 
recommendations nearly word-for-word in its resolution, it also ensured that anti-doping 
efforts were extended to developing countries and that UNESCO’s International Charter 
of Physical Education of Sport would be updated to reflect the organization’s attitude 
toward doping.15 Additionally, UNESCO called on Mayor to continue to investigate “the 
possibility of promoting an international instrument against doping in sport”.16 These 
steps further committed UNESCO to the anti-doping cause. The reasoning supporting this 
allegiance is evident in the 1989 resolution: drug use, symptomatic of a more general 
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trend in mainstream society, threatened to undermine the positive outcomes sport could 
potentially produce.17 Because UNESCO had increasingly committed itself to sport as an 
educational tool (especially since MINEPS I in 1976), it had a compelling interest to 
protect sport, or perhaps more specifically, sport’s ability to have a positive impact on 
education. 
One year later, the Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and 
Sport (CIGEPS), a group constituted by UNESCO in 1978, met in Ottawa to consider the 
issue of adopting an international anti-doping instrument. Interestingly, the study driving 
the debate at this meeting was entitled, “Proposals for an International Instrument for 
Education against Doping”.18 The specific inclusion of “education” as the primary 
objective of a proposed instrument indicates how UNESCO viewed this project and its 
role in anti-doping efforts. After demonstrating that existing legal instruments were, on 
the whole, ineffective, the study declared, “[i]t is therefore for Unesco, whose essential 
tasks in this respect are education and information, to monitor and prevent doping in 
sport.”19 Toward this end, three options were presented for consideration by CIGEPS: an 
international convention (an agreement governed by international law), a 
recommendation (a standard-setting and regulatory instrument with moral and political 
but little legal force), and a declaration (a rare and solemn assertion of universal 
principles).20 
Although there was a strong push within CIGEPS for UNESCO to take the lead in 
adopting an international convention, UNESCO ultimately avoided the issue almost 
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entirely. Falling back on the organization’s role as a disseminator of knowledge, the 
Committee, stating that “UNESCO must assume responsibility for education, prevention, 
co-operation and information relating to doping in sport”, meekly submitted a 
recommendation that essentially called for more research.21 Interestingly, at the same 
meeting, CIGEPS issued its Ottawa Declaration, reaffirming its commitment to 
intergovernmental cooperation in sport.22 This proclamation of intergovernmental 
solidarity combined with the reluctance to act meaningfully to combat doping illustrates 
the growing contrast between UNESCO and the anti-doping movement. Nevertheless, the 
General Conference of UNESCO, meeting in 1991, agreed to act on CIGEPS’ 
recommendations, commissioning further study of the feasibility of an international 
instrument.23 
By July 1993, a much more extensive study had been produced for consideration 
by the General Conference. Referencing the Dubin Report as well as other Canadian data, 
the study specifically described the widespread and complex nature of doping, an issue 
that had not been explicitly addressed in previous documents.24 Like the previous study, 
this report examined the existing anti-doping instruments and found them all insufficient 
in one way or another.25 It also noted an apparent lack of emphasis on “education, 
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prevention, information and cooperation activities” among existing regulations.26 This 
claim preceded the most emphatic statement in the document concerning UNESCO’s role 
with regard to anti-doping: “Since the urgent need to combat dope-taking is now 
abundantly clear and punitive measures have proved to be ineffective, UNESCO would 
seem to provide a suitable worldwide framework for co-operation between States on 
research, information exchange, education and prevention.”27 The report, after rehashing 
the available options put forth in the first study, left it to the General Conference to 
decide UNESCO’s level of involvement. 
Despite the portrayal of doping as a significant threat to sport in meetings and 
reports, the increased emphasis on international cooperation in sport, and the apparent 
lack of efficient doping regulation in international sport, the 1993 UNESCO General 
Conference concluded that UNESCO “should not at present envisage standard-setting 
activities to combat doping in sport”.28 Further, it instructed the director-general to 
continue the organization’s contributions to anti-doping through information and 
education.29 This resolution effectively closed the book on UNESCO’s involvement at 
the highest level of anti-doping policy for several years. At the same meeting in 1993, the 
General Conference suspended CIGEPS’ operations in order to conduct an external 
review of the Committee.30 While UNESCO by no means ceased to organize and fund 
sport-related initiatives, it did so without the assistance of a body that had only three 
years ago renewed the organization’s commitment to intergovernmental cooperation in 
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sport. The Committee would begin submitting reports to the General Conference again in 
1999, but would not play a significant role in UNESCO’s stance toward anti-doping. 
In 1993, UNESCO faced a crucial decision. One course of action involved 
becoming more enmeshed in the growing anti-doping movement led by the IOC; indeed, 
such involvement would likely mean taking a strong and visible stand in favor of this 
organization’s tactics. While this course offered the chance at enhancing international and 
intergovernmental cooperation in the fight against doping (not to mention the potential 
pooling of resources), it also meant UNESCO would likely have to fully endorse, and 
perhaps enforce, the increasingly prohibitive policies espoused by the anti-doping 
movement. For an organization that had continuously stressed its commitment to (and 
preference for) educational approaches to curbing drug use in sport, this was a step too 
far. By refraining from adopting an international legal instrument in 1993, UNESCO 
remained consistent with its organizational mission, while still maintaining a firm anti-
doping posture. However, the idea that doping in sport could be successfully fought with 
an approach that balanced interdiction with education would become more and more 
unlikely as the decade progressed. 
FINAL STEPS: 1999-2005 
On February 4, 1999, the First World Conference on Doping in Sport, convened 
in response to a perceived need for cooperation in anti-doping policymaking, adopted the 
Lausanne Declaration.31 This document, agreed upon by delegates from national 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs, included a provision for the 
creation of an international anti-doping agency, a goal that was realized with the 
establishment of WADA on November 10 of that year. Concurrent to these events, 
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UNESCO was renewing its own inquiries into sport and physical education. On June 29, 
its Executive Board approved the decision to convene the Third International Conference 
of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport 
(MINEPS III) in December, bringing together government officials as well as 
representatives from national and international sport organizations in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay.32 
The conference was opened by the president of the host country, Dr. Julio María 
Sanguinetti, whose comments painted a stark picture of doping in sport: 
If the world of sport suffers from doping, it is because society suffers from drug 
addiction…The drug addiction we are trying so hard to combat arose, after all, in 
our well-off societies, not as a consequence of poverty but in the developed 
world, as a by-product of prosperity. It is the expression of a vacuous society, 
whose members feel dissatisfied and alienated by the limitations of a material 
world that offers so much yet...invariably confronts them with the loneliness of 
life itself.33 
With these words as a backdrop, the delegates who engaged in the doping debate 
were generally in favor of the efforts of the IOC and other organizations that helped to 
create WADA.34 UNESCO emphasized the harmonization of effort in combating doping. 
Delegates introduced proposals to limit the trade of performance-enhancing substances, 
increase testing and other doping controls, as well as redoubling efforts at education. 
However, the consensus of the delegates was that “UNESCO’s role in this field should be 
that of promoting education and information”.35 Despite this statement, Director-General 
Koïchiro Matsuura of Japan professed his desire to see UNESCO involved in the 
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development of “an appropriate and effective institutional framework” in the field of anti-
doping.36 Curiously, especially given the prominence of doping on the meeting’s agenda, 
IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch made only brief mention of it in his remarks to 
the conference.37 
MINEPS III was the first major UNESCO-sponsored sport meeting following 
WADA’s creation. While the delegates were explicitly supportive of this development in 
the anti-doping movement, it was clear that they did not see UNESCO as an enactor of 
policy. As it had through much of its past vis-à-vis sport, the organization served as a 
facilitator. In this manner, UNESCO could encourage its members—representatives of 
national governments—to enact WADA’s anti-doping policies and controls without itself 
committing to particular methods or practices. 
One of the most important outcomes of MINEPS III was the suggestion for a 
round table meeting of sport officials to follow up on the discussions of the 1999 
conference. This meeting, convened at UNESCO headquarters in Paris in January 2003, 
had only three agenda items, one of which was the “drafting of an international legal 
instrument to combat doping in sport”.38 In the interim, several steps had been taken 
toward coalescence of the global anti-doping effort. First, WADA had implemented 
unprecedented levels of drug testing at the 2000 Sydney Olympics.39 The creation of the 
International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS) 
in February 2000 and that group’s Cape Town Declaration in May 2001 strengthened the 
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links between national governments and WADA in terms of funding and representation.40 
At an earlier meeting of IICGADS in November 2000 in Oslo, WADA president Richard 
Pound assured national government representatives that, “whatever the cost to win the 
fight against doping in sport, we will bear it together within a context that we will design 
together”.41 Reportedly, the meeting agenda also included a discussion of what authority 
might be accorded to groups like WADA that had no governmental jurisdiction.42 These 
steps served to bolster WADA’s legitimacy and the organization’s quest to unify anti-
doping efforts at the global level. 
The sport ministers at the round table in Paris in early 2003 were working within 
this context as they contemplated the possibility of UNESCO adopting an international 
anti-doping instrument. They borrowed much of the language in the working documents 
from this meeting from the studies of ten years prior. Indeed, they appear to have given 
very little consideration to new material.43 However, they drew far different conclusions 
from this material than earlier UNESCO committees. In 1993, the general consensus had 
been to provide the UNESCO General Conference with options; ten years later, the 
majority opinion was that UNESCO should play a more active role in adopting an 
international legal instrument.44 
In July 2003, the UNESCO Executive Board met to consider (among other things) 
the possibility of once again putting this decision before the General Conference. The 
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Board considered two options, taking the lead in adopting an international convention, or 
reaffirming UNESCO’s commitment to physical education and sport within the context 
of promoting education more generally. The second option, the Board claimed, would 
preclude the adoption of any international legislation.45 By this time, it had become clear 
that any international instrument would need to be a convention; anything less would do 
little to address the jurisdictional problem confronting the anti-doping movement at the 
time. 
The first option was fraught with caveats. First, the difficulty and complexity of 
adopting an international convention was great, and it was questionable whether 
UNESCO possessed the resources to accomplish the task.46 Indeed, the Executive Board 
projected that two full-time positions would need to be created and projected a budgetary 
allocation of $200,000, which UNESCO could not realistically accommodate without 
additional contributions from member states.47 This course of action was further 
obstructed by UNESCO’s existing commitments to educational initiatives related to 
physical education and sport. 
Conversely, the second option maintained the status quo. UNESCO would remain 
an “interested partner” in the growing anti-doping movement, and continue to combat 
doping through its educational efforts.48 In essence, this tack would allow UNESCO to 
endorse the creation of an international instrument without having to deal with the tedium 
of actually creating one. It would also allow the organization to remain consistent with its 
previous actions vis-à-vis doping in sport. While UNESCO had expanded its role in 
                                                 
45 Follow-up to the Round Table of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and 
Sport (166 EX/42, Paris, March 21, 2003), 3–4. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
 132 
international sport, it had always ensured that this was done with a view toward 
education. The organization recognized the value and importance of elite sport, but had 
refrained from direct involvement in this area. 
Despite the apparent obstacles, the Executive Board ultimately decided that 
UNESCO should take the lead in adopting an international anti-doping convention.49 In 
his address to the Executive Board, Director-General Matsuura said: 
I must confess that I was not originally convinced that it was for UNESCO, rather 
than the United Nations itself, to undertake this task. However, given the strong 
feelings expressed by many Member States at the Round Table and subsequently, 
I am increasingly persuaded that it is UNESCO’s proper responsibility and that, 
although the timeline is short, the goal is achievable.50 
Matsuura went on to mention the anticipated support of WADA, the IOC, and the 
Council of Europe, indicating that perhaps the task would not be as daunting as it first 
appeared. All that remained was a vote of support from the General Conference. 
At its 2003 meeting, the General Conference unsurprisingly confirmed this 
recommendation, and proposed that a draft convention be submitted at its next meeting in 
2005.51 In its resolution, the Conference “reaffirm[ed] its belief that UNESCO should 
play a major role in the preparation of an international convention against doping in 
sport”.52 While worded to maintain the appearance of consistency, this marked a 
significant departure from previous policy. In fact, the 1993 Conference, by deciding not 
to adopt an international instrument, effectively expressed the opposite belief. Despite the 
concerns voiced at several points in the process leading to this decision, at each step 
(MINEPS III, the round table meeting, the Executive Board, and the General 
                                                 
49 Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 166th Session, UNESCO (166 EX/Decisions, Paris, 
April 4–16, 2003), 6. 
50 Summary Records, Executive Board, UNESCO (166 EX/SR.1-11, Paris, April 4–16, 2003), 22. 
51 Records of the General Conference: Resolutions, UNESCO (32 C/Resolutions, Paris, September 29–
October 17, 2003), 22–23. 
52 Ibid. 
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Conference), the threat of doping outweighed concerns about UNESCO’s role in the anti-
doping movement and the organization’s compatibility with WADA’s anti-doping 
policies. After convening MINEPS IV in 2004 in Athens to essentially draft the 
convention, the 2005 UNESCO General Conference adopted the International 
Convention against Doping in Sport.53  While some extra qualifications were added, in 
basic terms, the Convention ensures that all signatories will abide by the World Anti-
Doping code developed by WADA. On December 11, 2006, Luxembourg became the 
thirtieth state to ratify the Convention, bringing the treaty into full effect for all 
signatories on February 1, 2007.54 
OLYMPIC ANTI-DOPING EFFORTS 
As a test of theory, this case is somewhat less straightforward than the two 
presented in preceding chapters. One of the reasons for this ambiguity is that Olympic 
governance preferences in this case are not uniform. Whereas the South Africa issue in 
1968 and the 1980 boycott were both more clearly bounded in terms of problem 
definition, relevant actors, and chronological scope, the issue of policing anti-doping was 
(and is) far more diffuse and open-ended. Correspondingly, WADA’s creation and 
relatively rapid growth legitimacy and authority were not always perceived by the IOC as 
positive or desirable developments, even though both organizations were ostensibly 
possessed of the same fundamental objectives with regard to preventing drug use in sport. 
In theoretical terms, then, it is difficult to assess applicability and predictive utility 
without first deciding how to treat WADA. Its organizational composition blurs the line 
                                                 
53 Records of the General Conference: Resolutions, UNESCO (33 C/Resolutions, Paris, October 3–21, 
2005), 29–48. 
54 UNESCO, Ratification by Luxembourg of the International Convention against Doping in Sport, 
December 15, 2006. < http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=36159&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>. 
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between sport and state governance, which means it can be considered neither a 
completely Olympic organization nor a free-riding governmental entity. WADA’s 
organizational makeup is reflective of the widespread and pervasive nature of the 
performance enhancement issue; the dimensions of the chemical performance 
enhancement problem stretch far beyond the Olympics and elite international sport. 
Moreover, WADA could reasonably be considered both a constituent and an outcome in 
terms of Olympic governance. The organization was created as the result of interaction 
between sport and public leaders, but its quick transition to and persistence in 
maintaining autonomy means it is not simply an agent through which other actors work. 
Recalling the discussion of regime theory in Chapters 1 and 2, this suggests that WADA 
might more accurately be described as part of (or governing) an anti-doping regime in its 
own right, related to but distinctly separate from the Olympic regime.55 This is all a 
somewhat roundabout (but necessary) way of saying that WADA’s preferences and 
behaviors in the development of the International Convention against Doping in Sport are 
not immediately predictable or clearly accounted for by the Olympic regime theory under 
investigation here. While it undoubtedly played a role in the development of the 
international legal instrument, and is thus alluded to throughout the brief historical 
narrative above, WADA’s actions will not be explicitly considered by any theoretical 
test. 
Shifting the focus of the analysis to the IOC, the matter is still decidedly less clear 
in this case than in the other chapters in this work. One would expect the IOC to eschew 
government interference in anti-doping efforts, just as it does in other instances when 
states attempt to defy its authority. Even so, Samaranch’s presence and comments at the 
                                                 
55 This possibility has been defended elsewhere. See Barrie Houlihan, “Harmonising Anti-Doping Policy: 
The Role of the World Anti-Doping Agency,” in Doping and Public Policy, eds. John Hoberman and 
Verner Møller (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004), 19-30. 
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1988 MINEPS conference in Moscow suggest a softening of this stance.56 The IOC’s 
initial interaction with UNESCO is probably better understood as a search for renewed 
legitimacy, however, especially given the organization’s difficulties in addressing the 
doping problem up to that point in time. On the heels of the highly visible Ben Johnson 
episode, and with the Dubin inquiry underway in Canada, the IOC needed to demonstrate 
that it was meeting the urgency of these recent developments. It was clear that 
UNESCO’s reticence to become involved in anything more than doping education meant 
that it would not likely threaten the IOC’s authority in international sport.57 Given the 
historically tense relationship between the two organizations, the IOC’s willingness to 
reach out to UNESCO signaled its confidence that it could exert some authority over the 
nature of UNESCO’s ultimate involvement in anti-doping efforts. Coupled with the push 
for a separate anti-doping body within the IOC shortly after MINEPS II, it is relatively 
clear that the IOC had little regard for the idea of ceding authority over doping controls in 
Olympic sport.58 
After a relatively quiet decade on the anti-doping front, in which the IOC 
celebrated the reunification of the German Olympic teams, the admittance (or in some 
cases, re-admittance) of Eastern bloc national Olympic committees, and the “Centennial 
Olympics” in Atlanta, the Festina affair at the 1998 Tour de France once again brought 
doping in international sport to the forefront of public debate.59 The French government’s 
                                                 
56 See above  as well as Hunt, Drug Games, 84. 
57 There existed some sentiment in the 1970s that international sport might be better governed by an 
intergovernmental body like UNESCO, rather than a private organization like the IOC. See Urho 
Kekkonen, “The Olympic Games to UNESCO!” Instant Research on Peace and Violence 2, no. 1 (1972): 
42. Kekkonen was the president of Finland at the time. 
58 Hunt, Drug Games, 85. 
59 Dag Vidar Hanstad, Andy Smith, and Ivan Waddington, “The Establishment of the World Anti-Doping 
Agency: A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes,” International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport 43, no. 3 (2008): 228-229. 
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role (rather than that of sport organizations) in uncovering the possession and use of 
drugs at the Tour, together with the developing Salt Lake City bid scandal, served to 
undermine the notion that the IOC possessed the means and integrity to adequately deal 
with what was becoming an increasingly serious challenge.60 The First World Conference 
on Anti-Doping in Sport, held in Lausanne, Switzerland in February 1999, was in many 
ways a response to both the immediacy of the problem evinced by the 1998 Tour de 
France scandal as well as the sentiment that international sport organizations could not be 
relied upon to combat doping on their own. Though convened by the IOC with the 
intention of reasserting its authority over anti-doping, it was at this meeting (which led to 
the establishment of WADA) that the organization lost control of the issue for good. The 
attempt to enfold public authorities in the warm embrace of the Olympic faith backfired 
utterly. Instead of acquiescing to the IOC’s preeminence, speakers at the conference 
derided the organization’s efforts and strongly argued against its further leadership in 
harmonizing anti-doping policy.61 By the time MINEPS III convened in November 1999 
to revisit the question of adopting an international legal instrument, WADA (though only 
recently established) was clearly the recognized anti-doping authority in international 
sport. 
The emergence of an international doping regime has perhaps done more to reveal 
the limits of Olympic governance than any other event in Olympic history. Armed only 
with its vacuous moral arguments about the sanctity of sport and the adequacy of 
Olympic ideology as a governing mechanism, the IOC was poorly prepared to effectively 
deal with growing public concern about the doping problem.62 When confronted with the 
                                                 
60 Ibid. Also Hunt, Drug Games, 106-107. 
61 Hanstad, et al., “The Establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency,” 237-239. 
62 John Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping Control,” in Doping in Elite Sport, 
eds. W. Wilson and E. Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001): 241-274. 
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empirical evidence of its repeated shortcomings in curbing drug use in sport at the 
Lausanne conference, the IOC was powerless to construct a counterargument. Because it 
lacked and actively avoided the sort of oversight and transparency that might have 
reassured governmental actors of the IOC’s ability to effectively govern, the organization 
had nothing to which it could appeal as a justification for continuing to lead the anti-
doping regime. While this account explains the IOC’s failure to prevent intervention in an 
issue area that had for many years been its sole province, the reasons why governmental 
bodies involved themselves in the first place still needs to be clarified. 
UNESCO AND THE LOSS OF FREE RIDER STATUS 
According to Olympic regime theory, actors outside of the Olympic governance 
system (especially states) are expected to free ride. That is, they will be content to allow 
sport organizations to bear the costs of providing international sport, safe in the 
knowledge that they can not only reap the benefits of Olympic sport but also use it for 
political purposes should the need or opportunity arise. However, unlike state action in 
the other two case analyses, the fact that governments (and in particular an 
intergovernmental organization like UNESCO) sought involvement in sport 
policymaking presents a distinct challenge for the theory. Because the theory also 
explains how punishing free riders or extracting contributions from them is beyond the 
capabilities of the Olympic regime, it is admittedly puzzling why these actors would 
voluntarily give up their status in order to take on the burden of, in this case, developing 
and maintaining anti-doping policy. 
In tracing the progression of UNESCO from unwilling participant to treaty 
enactor, it is important to reiterate the nature of states’ relationship to international sport 
in terms of costs and payoffs. As free riders, states do not bear any costs. 
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Correspondingly, they will (at least theoretically) not be overly discerning in terms of 
product quality. What this means is that as long as Olympic governance provides an 
acceptable form of international sport which states can use without incurring costs, states 
will not take any action to alter their position in the system. Put more simply, as long as 
states can free ride, they are highly unlikely to attempt to fix something that is not 
broken. This has arguably been the case for most of the Olympics’ history. Despite 
anachronistic views toward the participation of women, major event security failures, and 
deep-rooted organizational corruption, the Olympic regime and states have coexisted in 
relative stasis. The logical follow-on from this, however, is that if something is broken, 
states’ free-riding status is fundamentally altered. The entire premise of nonintervention, 
especially concerning sport-specific matters, is based on the idea that states are accruing 
some nonzero benefit simply through the nature and existence of Olympic governance. If 
that benefit is reduced or eliminated, the incentive to free ride is eliminated as well. 
Further, if the benefit is transformed into an imposed cost on the free riding group, the 
motivation for correcting the situation is elevated to an even greater extent. 
UNESCO’s pivot from educational advocate to policymaker can thus be 
explained in terms of these dynamics. Though it had for many years acquiesced to the 
IOC’s alleged authority in elite competitive international sport, preferring to see sport as 
but one of several educational and development tools, the failure of the IOC to 
successfully police doping in sport and the corresponding belief that this would have a 
profound effect on society at large prompted a shift in governmental preferences.63 From 
a theoretical standpoint, the perception that drug use in elite sport would have negative 
                                                 
63 This change has been well-documented. See, for example, Hunt, Drug Games, 111-114, Hanstad, et al., 
“The Establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency,” 243-245, and Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: 
Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 2
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implications for their own jurisdictions meant that states could no longer see anti-doping 
efforts as the sole responsibility of sport organizations.64 Not surprisingly, these 
preferences were enacted not only through the actions of individual states but through 
existing collaborative institutions like UNESCO and the Council of Europe. As the policy 
harmonization effort which began with the formation of WADA in 1999 continued to 
gather momentum, and as the claims about doping’s negative effects expanded in their 
voracity, it became clear that UNESCO could no longer justifiably remain a disinterested 
observer.65 
Though state involvement in what was for many years a sport-specific issue may 
seem counterintuitive to the theoretical arguments advanced in this study, the IOC’s 
inability to effectively deal with the problem led to a fundamental shift in state 
preferences. No longer able to reliably free ride on the IOC’s anti-doping governance, 
governmental actors were able to reassign this governing responsibility at least partially 
outside of the Olympic governance system, creating what has become a pervasive 
network of organizations committed to what is popularly described as the “fight” against 
doping. While the young anti-doping regime’s methods and tactics remain highly 
debatable, its existence as a relatively independent entity, as well as the intervention of 
national governments in supporting that independence, are outcomes that be explained in 
terms of regime forces. 
                                                 
64 Some authors have noted that this calculation may have been motivated by more than a genuine concern 
for public health. See for example Dionne L. Koller, “How the United States Government Sacrifices 
Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of National Prestige,” Brigham Young University Law 
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Conclusion 
This study (both the arguments advanced in Section I and the empirical support 
found in Section II) represents a significant contribution to the study of Olympic sport 
and to sport management more generally. From a theoretical standpoint, this study 
engages prominent ideas in both international relations and sport policy, bridging a gap 
consistently identified as problematic in the extant literature.1 The key insights of this 
study are its classification of Olympic governance as an international regime, the 
isolation of the regime’s ideological governing principles as fundamentally problematic, 
and the identification of the paradoxical effects these principles have on the ability of the 
regime to provide effective governance in a state-based international political system. 
Each of the cases presented in Section II demonstrate these effects in different ways. 
The IOC’s response to South Africa’s place in the Olympic movement in 1968 
shows, perhaps more so than the other two cases, the inadequacy of Olympism as a guide 
for policymaking. Though the IOC interpreted Olympic doctrine in such a way that 
inviting South Africa to the Summer Olympics in Mexico City seemed the best course of 
action (reasoning that inclusiveness and a narrow construction of the IOC’s 
responsibilities vis-à-vis its own rules prohibiting racial discrimination most closely 
adhered to the principles of Olympism), other members of the Olympic movement did 
not share its views. While this illustrates the malleability of Olympism as an ideology, 
perhaps more telling in this case was the inability of the IOC to assert its authority as the 
supreme leader of the Olympic movement. Faced with the possibility of a massive 
                                                 
1 Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd, “Sport and International Relations: Continued Neglect?” in Sport and 
International Relations: An Emerging Relationship, eds. Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 6-15. 
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boycott and political protests at the games, the IOC acquiesced to mounting pressure and 
rescinded its invitation to the South African NOC, eventually electing to ban it altogether. 
The South Africa case provides a glimpse into the tenuous nature of Olympic 
governance. As I argued at the beginning of this study, the Olympic governance system is 
built upon a transaction between members of the Olympic movement and the IOC in 
which inclusion in the movement is traded for recognition of the IOC’s authority over 
what amounts to the Olympic brand. While it is probably true that the value of Olympic 
movement membership is greater now than it was in 1968, what this case demonstrates is 
that even such a valuable ideological association is not entirely invaluable. Further, the 
case demonstrates the limits of the IOC’s power. Though it is officially recognized as 
having the final word on the interpretation of Olympic principles, it lacks the ability to 
enforce its proclamations in the face of concerted resistance. Again, while these 
conclusions may be historically contingent, the case provides a general sense of the ways 
in which a reliance on Olympism (as opposed to more official structural or legal 
arrangements) undermines the IOC’s authority in Olympic governance. 
The well-known U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic games switches 
the focus to state behavior. Perhaps having learned from its mistakes in 1968 (and having 
weathered a large boycott of the 1976 games in Montreal), the IOC remained largely 
above the fray as the Carter administration pushed for a widespread boycott in protest of 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the IOC’s commitment to Moscow as the host 
site did not waver, this case demonstrates the ease with which a national government can 
manipulate an Olympic event for its own political interests. On this point, two important 
conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, it is once again evident that Olympic 
ideology is easily manipulated. Indeed, President Carter’s justification for demanding a 
boycott was couched almost entirely in Olympic rhetorical terms, as he argued that 
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allowing an overtly hostile state to host the games undermined the Olympic spirit and all 
that the Olympic movement stood for. While this reasoning did not persuade the IOC, it 
was enough to persuade dozens of other governments to join the boycott movement. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly for future scholarship, the particular ways 
in which the U.S. government exerted itself in the boycott effort demonstrate the 
mechanism through which states pursue political action in Olympic sport. While the 
Carter administration made demands upon both the USOC and the IOC, it was only able 
to gain leverage over the former, ultimately coercing the USOC to boycott against its 
own wishes. That the U.S. (a state which mostly maintains a bright line between sport 
and politics within its own borders) was able to so easily influence its NOC while 
simultaneously failing to even gain the IOC’s full attention suggests that the NOC may be 
an important mediating factor when analyzing how states “use” Olympic sport for 
political purposes. If a state pursues political objectives through Olympic sport (calling to 
mind the aggressive free riding discussed in Chapter 1), the range and probable success 
of those objectives may be limited by the amount of leverage the government is able to 
exert over its NOC. 
The final case in this dissertation deals in a different way with the limits of state 
free riding on the Olympic regime. The rapid transformation of UNESCO from interested 
bystander to international legislator with regard to anti-doping and the concomitant 
decline of the IOC’s authority in this area demonstrate both the limits of states’ tolerance 
for ineffective governance and the limits of ideology as a governing mechanism. The IOC 
struggled for decades to adequately address performance enhancing drug use in sport, 
which led to increased governmental involvement in the issue. What is most surprising is 
that the IOC actually encouraged UNESCO’s involvement in an effort to turn this trend 
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to its advantage, perhaps reasoning that UNESCO’s reluctance to involve itself in elite 
international sport would make it more accepting of the IOC’s authority. 
As with the other two cases, the bounds of the Olympic regime’s jurisdiction are 
once again laid bare when confronted with a serious challenge. Called on by 
governmental interests to demonstrate its commitment to more transparent and 
democratic governance in anti-doping, the IOC’s only strategy was to reassert its 
ideological principles. The shift in governmental attitudes in this case is also indicative of 
how governments treat the overlap of sport-specific issues with those related to public 
policy. In the case of UNESCO’s involvement in drafting international anti-doping 
legislation, the problem of doping in sport became sufficiently serious that the IOC’s 
perceived authority over Olympic sport was eroded. In other words, the pervasiveness of 
drug use in sport (along with the attendant perception of moral corruption, cheating, and 
so forth) signaled to governments that the Olympic regime could no longer effectively 
govern the issue, which in turn meant that it could not provide the type of sport that they 
found so politically attractive and useful. That the doping issue was reframed in terms of 
broader health and educational concerns only helped reaffirm the appropriateness of 
governmental engagement, especially from UNESCO’s perspective. This push toward 
governmental involvement in what was for many years an issue confined to Olympic 
sport as well as the result of this involvement suggest two possible conclusions. First, 
when the Olympic regime fails to effectively govern an issue that is linked to problems 
outside of the Olympic movement, governments may be more likely to assert their 
authority and claim jurisdiction over the issue. Second, that this case led to the creation of 
what might reasonably described as an international anti-doping regime (led by WADA) 
indicates that governments may be willing to take a more active role in international sport 
governance. 
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The conceptualization of Olympic governance as an international regime provides 
the beginnings of a research agenda for future scholarship, which might examine how the 
basic causal relationship posited in this study is affected or bounded by any number of 
variables and contextual conditions. Further, the regime concept applied to Olympic 
governance might be transferred to other sport settings. Certainly, the notion that sport 
should remain free from political interference is evident and popular outside of the 
international arena. From a more general (and practical) standpoint, sport governance 
plays a prominent role in the sport industry, especially as increasingly more sport 
organizations adopt corporate structures.2 Indeed, the distinction between good 
governance and good management is largely trivial. This study identifies a major obstacle 
to effective governance. Sport leaders and managers can use the ideas presented in this 
study to more carefully consider the effects of incorporating ideological principles into 
their policymaking, as well as the ways in which a reliance on ostensibly noble principles 
can contribute to the propagation of suboptimal structural arrangements. While the 
symbolism of politically-transcendent sport may be an effective marketing tool, this study 
suggests that policies enacted in support of this ideal are ultimately self-sabotaging. 
In the introductory essay, I suggested that when considering sport’s place in 
society, governance matters. That is to say, the individuals and groups who exert control 
over sport are responsible for the outcomes it effectuates. Though the achievable social 
objectives of sport are diverse, it is not simply a value-neutral set of behaviors, 
manipulable for unlimited ends. Rather, the responsibility associated with sport 
governance is rooted in understanding the nature of sport and the limits it places upon 
                                                 
2 Lesley Ferkins, David Shilbury, and Gael McDonald, “The Role of the Board in Building Strategic 
Capability: Towards an Integrated Model of Sport Governance Research,” Sport Management Review 8, 
no. 3 (2005): 195-225. See also John Forster, “Global Sports Organisations and Their Governance,” 
Corporate Governance 6, no. 1 (2006): 72-83. 
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sport’s social utility. Ultimately, this study does not attempt to study sport solely for 
sport’s sake, or to simply transfer theories from other fields and assess their applicability 
in a sport setting.3 Rather, this study recognizes that sport, while similar to many other 
social phenomena, simultaneously possesses characteristics that make it distinctly and 
consequentially different. Synthesizing these views, I have advanced a conception of 
Olympic sport that can inform both future scholarship and practice. 
                                                 
3 Laurence Chalip, “Toward a Distinctive Sport Management Discipline,” Journal of Sport Management 20 
(2006), 1-4. 
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